philosophy of minds and machines notes

Philosophy of minds - Substance Dualism there are two fundamental kinds of substance mental and material M ental does not have extension into space

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Substance Dualism – there are two fundamental kinds of substance: mental and material. Mental does not have extension into space, material cannot think. The Cogito – I think therefore I am; I am a thinking thing. First person access to one’s own mind Privacy/First Person Privilege – Logical Behaviorism – the meaning of psychological statements are their verification conditions, which consist of performed overt behavior The Problem of Other Minds – given that I can only observe the behavior of others, how can I know others have minds? Behavior on its own is not enough to guarantee the presence of mentality Type-Identity Theory – mental events are type-identical to the physical events in the brain with which they are correlated Multiple Realizability – the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or events. Functionalism – mental states are constituted solely by their functional role; they are casual relations to other mental states, sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 12/03/2009 for the course PHIL 36802 taught by Professor Chrisfrey during the Fall '09 term at Pittsburgh.

Page1 / 3

Philosophy of minds - Substance Dualism there are two fundamental kinds of substance mental and material M ental does not have extension into space

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online