PHIL_262g_Collaborative_Question_Stud_-1

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Unformatted text preview: Please continue to add stuff as you see fit------------------------------------------ PHIL 262g Collaborative Question Study Sheet The purpose of this document is to collaboratively work on the study questions handed out to us in class. I am personally working on a "master" guide which addresses who said what throughout the semester. However, if people want to start donating their thoughts on specific questions, that is also heavily encouraged. Again, collaborative effort. Pitch in, and remember to be wary. This is a study guide, not a definitive sheet of answers, although hopefully we can get pretty close. Contribute whatever you think helps: full paragraphs, key points, etc. Please type above the dotted line for each question. Rock on.---------------------------------------------- The Questions: STUDY QUESTIONS FOR FINAL NOTE: Few, if any, questions on the final will be verbatim repeats of these questions. However, if you can answer these questions in detail, and can provide cogent considerations for and against the positions in question, you'll be prepared to do well on the exam. (1) What does Searle mean by “intentionality”, and why, in his view, can’t computers have it? Intentionality is a technical term. It means aboutness. It’s commonly explained as the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for things, properties, and states of affairs. also, the fact of being deliberate or purposive. The quality of mental states (e.g., thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes) that consists in their being directed toward some object or state of affairs. Humans have brains and machines don’t 1) It’s not because I am the instantation of a computer program that I can understand English and have other forms of intentionality. It is because I am a certain sort of organism w/ a certain sort of biological structure. 2) Only something that has the same casual powers as the brain can have intentionality. 3) W/e else intentionality is, it’s a biological phenomenon. 1. Searle uses intentionality in order to provide a characteristic differentiating the mental from the physical ; mental states cannot exist unless their object completes them. “Intentionality is by definition that feature of certain mental states by which they are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world ”. He believes that we extend our own intentionality to artifacts (e.g. computers), thus, such artifacts do not have their own intentionality. He says, “Our tools are extensions of our purposes”. Accordingly, no syntactic operations that occurred in the computer would provide it with semantic content. Searle argues that a computer maintains inputs and outputs with no understanding of what it’s doing, and of course, with no particular intention of doing what it is doing. It does not understand anything except the rules for the symbol manipulation it is carrying out. Following instruction according to a program system means there are no intentional states existing...
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This note was uploaded on 12/18/2009 for the course PHIL 262g taught by Professor Yaffe during the Fall '06 term at USC.

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PHIL_262g_Collaborative_Question_Stud_-1 - Please continue...

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