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WeekofMar02 - W3211 Spring 2009 Professor Vogel Recitation...

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W3211 Spring 2009 Professor Vogel Recitation Week of 03/02/09 1. Consider the following payo/ matrix: T S T 1 2 ; 1 4 ; 0 S 0 ; 7 2 3 ; 3 game). Suppose the game is a sequential game in which Player 1 moves ±rst and to the game. (b) Consider the simultaneous move game represented by the payo/ matrix above. Suppose this stage game is repeated twice and that Players value future utility as much as current utility. Is there an SPNE in which the players adopt the following trigger strategies? Trigger strategy : Player i "cooperates" and plays Silent as long both Players have always cooperated in the past; and Player i plays Tell if either Player has ever played Tell in the past. (c) Now suppose this simultaneous move stage game is repeated in±nitely many times and that each player has the same discount rate 0 1 . What is the range
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This note was uploaded on 12/21/2009 for the course ECON 1211 taught by Professor Govel during the Spring '08 term at Columbia.

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WeekofMar02 - W3211 Spring 2009 Professor Vogel Recitation...

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