Lecture33 - Engineering 101 Lecture 33 Project 8 Prof....

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Engineering 101 Engineering 101 Lecture 33 Lecture 33 Project 8 Project 8 Prof. Michael Falk University of Michigan, College of Engineering
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Announcements Announcements Project 8 – Due Weds Dec 6 at 9pm Written part to be turned in on paper in your lab on Dec 7 or 8. No clickers today. All students get 3 points.
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Evolutionary Evolutionary Games Games There are a number of mathematical models that people study to understand how populations evolve. These incorporate some combination of the concepts of competition, survival, reproduction and mutation.
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Cooperation in Cooperation in Evolution Evolution Sometimes survival depends less on innate ability than one a species’ participation in cooperative behavior. Cooperation is itself a bit of a paradox, as it is not clear that it has immediate value. After all if we didn’t need to cooperate with each other we could eat each other!
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The Prisoner’s The Prisoner’s Dilemma Dilemma Imagine you have two suspects of a crime who are being separately interrogated. Each can betray the other for a lighter sentence. If neither betrays then they will both go to jail for 6 months. If one betrays the other then he will get off free while the other goes to jail for 4 years. If they betray each other, then both go to jail for 2 years.
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The Prisoner’s The Prisoner’s Dilemma Dilemma No matter what Harry does, my outcome is better if I rat him out. Harry Keeps Quiet Harry Talks I keep Quiet I get 6 mo. I get 4 years I Talk I go Free I get 2 years
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The Prisoner’s The Prisoner’s Dilemma Dilemma I’m sending both of
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This note was uploaded on 04/02/2008 for the course ENGR 101 taught by Professor Ringenberg during the Fall '07 term at University of Michigan.

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Lecture33 - Engineering 101 Lecture 33 Project 8 Prof....

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