lecture27-slides - 10/29/09 Hawk Dove V = value of resource...

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10/29/09 1 Hawk Dove Hawk Dove (V-C)/2 V 0 V/2 V = value of resource C = cost of injury First possibility: there will be a genetic polymorphism of Hawks and Doves. At a stable equilibrium, average payoff for Hawks must equal average payoff for Doves. Let P equal the proportion of Hawks in a mixed population. Then at equilibrium P[(V-C)/2] + (1-P)(V) = P(0)+(1-P)(V/2) avg. Hawk payoff avg. Dove payoff Solving for P, we get P = P* = V/C
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10/29/09 2 Another possibility: Not a genetic polymorphism, but a mixed ESS, i.e., act like a Hawk a fraction P* of the time and act like a Dove a fraction 1-P* of the time. Mixed ESS’s play multiple tactics with some (non-zero) probability. So, we can explain why the speckled wood butterflies (and many other animals) don’t always engage in physical fights over a contested resource… …but why should the owner nearly always win in these butterflies? Let’s consider a new strategy, Bourgeois
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10/29/09 3 Bourgeois: If a territory owner, act like a Hawk. If a territory intruder, act like a Dove.
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lecture27-slides - 10/29/09 Hawk Dove V = value of resource...

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