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# ch12_p3 - c The managers of these firms realize that...

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12_3. Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers, Western Where (WW) and  B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS).  Each firm has a cost function given by: ( q )  =  30 q +  1.5 q 2 The market demand for these seat covers is represented by the inverse demand equation: P =  300  -  3 Q, where  Q  =  q 1  +  q 2  , total output. a. If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rival’s output as given (i.e., the  firms  behave as Cournot oligopolists), what will  be the  equilibrium quantities  selected by each firm?  What is total output, and what is the market price?  What  are the profits for each firm? b. It occurs to the managers of WW and BBBS that they could do a lot better by  colluding.  If the two firms collude, what would be the profit-maximizing choice of  output?  The industry price?  The output and the profit for each firm in this case?
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Unformatted text preview: c. The managers of these firms realize that explicit agreements to collude are illegal. Each firm must decide on its own whether to produce the Cournot quantity or the cartel quantity. To aid in making the decision, the manager of WW constructs a payoff matrix like the real one below. Fill in each box with the (profit of WW, profit of BBBS). Given this payoff matrix, what output strategy is each firm likely to pursue? d. Suppose WW can set its output level before BBBS does. How much will WW choose to produce in this case? How much will BBBS produce? What is the market price, and what is the profit for each firm? Is WW better off by choosing its output first? Explain why or why not....
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