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Unformatted text preview: According to Stace, Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent. Acts not freely done are those whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent. (Stace, 416). Before I say what is wrong with this argument, I want you to think about what exactly free will is, if there even is such a thing. In the first part of this paper, I will give a modified analysis of the previous statement in a way which it allows this analysis to be much more suitable. Next, I will explain the Soft Determinists view of moral responsibility in relation to this modified analysis. Finally, I will consider some objections against this view and evaluate how the view fares against my objections. The first thing I must stress and make clear is that Staces original analysis suggests that an action directly caused by internal psychological states of an agents mind, such as a persons emotions, thoughts, wishes or desires, is freely done. However, if an action is caused by physical forces or physical conditions outside the agent, then it is not freely done. There are problems with the analysis Stace brings up and clarifies. One such counterexample that denies this analysis can be explained such as if a man were to give his Rolex watch to another man who threatened him by pointing a gun to his head. One would think that this was not an act of free will, but according to Staces original analysis, it in fact is. The immediate cause of the action was not an actual external force, but was made due the psychological fear of death. This is a valid counterexample because the action was caused by courses of psychological states, but clearly most people believe it was not was an act freely done. There was no actual external force of the gunshot; it was just pointed towards the mans head which gave him the emotion of fear, thus providing an accurate counterexample to Staces original analysis of free will.original analysis of free will....
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This note was uploaded on 01/13/2010 for the course PHIL 202 taught by Professor Jacobs during the Spring '09 term at Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.
- Spring '09