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1.27.09 Phenom Notes

1.27.09 Phenom Notes - 1.29.09 I Being and Time II The...

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1.29.09 I. Being and Time II. The Question III. The Questioner I. Being and Time A. Engagement with the history of philosophy B. titles are illuminating the most fundamental question is the question of Being he distinguishes this question from beings Being, something that we part take as is, from beings themselves entities and being it self will be questioned Heidegger is critical of intentionality because it is not critical enough because intentionality is, Heidegger thinks the question is “is” which is the question underneath Husserl Heidegger calls this his fundamental ontology Time is related to claims of what things are Fundamental ontological question : what is, is Time does relate itself back to the being question All the answers are parallel to certain views about time a) questions about time are not deep enough Heidegger thinks time is more fundamental to the appearance of things Subjective notions of time a) ............ time is a feature of the human soul, it stretches itself into the past and future b) Heidegger does not think this gets to the fundamental nature of ontology, c) something fundamental about time as a question of .... (8:38) C. Heidegger starts with the question of being fundamental question, which has been forgotten the forgetfulness of the question of being Heidegger the idea of the question the forgetfulness of the question is what is forgotten says ; what is forgotten is a question, a question towards being “the seeking of something is implicit in the question, always a sense of seeking in the question, seeking is guiding by what is sought” in wanting to know something, there is recognizing you don't know and also knowing something no question comes from complete ignorance
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