Phenomenology final notes

Phenomenology final notes - Question One (1) Gorner 159...

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Question One (1) Gorner 159 Existing authentically, Dasein takes itself over in its thrownness, in its has-been. In thus coming back to itself authentically it repeats the being it has been. To authentic having-been Heidegger gives the name repetition, though the word he uses – Wiederholung – also has the meaning of bringing or fetching back. In its resoluteness Dasein is bringing itself back to what it has been. The authentic past (Gewesenheit) is this repetition. But for the most part we d not repeat the being we have been. Our having-been is forgotten. Existing authentically, Dasein discloses the situation. This disclosing of the situation is an enpresenting (Genenwartigen). But as authentic enpresenting it does not lose itself in what it enpresents. In such authentic enpresenting Dasein does not forget its its having-been or merely expect its possibilities of being. In its ordinary dealings with things, by contrast, Dasein loses itself in what it enpresents. The present of authentic existence Heidegger calls der Augenblick. In ordinary use of the fact that Blick means “look”. Used to designate authentic enpresenting, Augenblick takes on an active sense. It is active because it refers to an ecstasis. For the inauthentic present Heidegger simply uses “enpresenting”, though he also uses it in a sense which is neutral with respect to the distinction between the authentic present and the inauthentic present. Question Two 54 Gorner The being of the subject is implicitly understoof as presence-at-hand. So what is needed to dispel the illusion that such a proof is needed is an adequate ontology of Dasein. Properly understood in its being Dasein already is what those who seek to provide proofs of the external world think has to be proved for it. It is in-the-world comporting itself to entities within the world. Where, then, does Heidegger stand in relation to the realism/idealism debate? According to realism the external world exists and we can know both that it does exist and what it is like. Some statements of Heidegger's existential ontology, such as that with Dasein as being-in-the-world entities within-the-world are always already disclosed (uncovered), appear to agree with realism. But what fundamentally distinguishes Heidegger's statements of existential ontology, such as the one above, is that they are ontological, whereas the thesis of realism is essentially ontic. Its about what there is rather than about the being of what there is. He takes a much more favorable view of idealism – suitably interpreted. Being and reality are
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This note was uploaded on 02/01/2010 for the course PHIL 471 taught by Professor Buck during the Spring '10 term at McGill.

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Phenomenology final notes - Question One (1) Gorner 159...

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