Unformatted text preview: they can aggregate demand information across different events. To capture this asymmetry, I will assume that the promoter . rst chooses the late price for tickets, and then brokers choose their prices. Obviously, price  exibility in the late market should ideally be treated as an endogenous choice, since the promoter could develop similar competencies as those of brokers. The model, however, establishes a natural benchmark case. Later, I will return to this assumption, and I will discuss the strategies that promoters have explored to deal with brokers. Finally, I assume Bertrand competition between brokers in the late resale market. As it turns out, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is for the promoter to sell enough tickets to satisfy the diehard fans and the number of busy professionals who are expected to attend at the price that diehard fans are willing to pay; that is, to...
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- Spring '06
- Subgame perfect equilibrium, diehard fans