Scholasticism1 - Philosophy 100B Philosophy Week 3:...

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Unformatted text preview: Philosophy 100B Philosophy Week 3: Scholasticism Avicenna Avicenna a key figure for Moslems, Jews and Christians; making philosophy a distinct enterprise Muslim philosophy philosophy Mu‘tazilite kalam continued in the 11 century, Muslim philosophy philosophy Ash‘arite theology: Ash‘arite theology: Abu-l-Hasan al-Ash‘ari (873-935); Ash‘ari (873-935); anti-Mu‘tazilite; more conservative about religion more Muslim philosophy philosophy Mu‘tazilites: human moral agency somewhat independent of God Ash‘arites: human acts human not done by humans, acquired from God not Muslim philosophy philosophy al-Juwayni (1028-85): Ash‘arite theology within kal am ; k al Ash‘arite God creates everything, God including human acts including Muslim philosophy philosophy Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111): Abu (1058-1111): Juwayni’s pupil; Persian lawyer, theologian and Persian philosopher, philosopher, (Algazel in the West) Ghazali Ghazali I ntenti ons of the Phi l osopher s, a summary replying to Avicenna’s summary; The I ncoher ence of the Phi l osopher s, a refutation of fal asi fa on key issues f al refutation Ghazali Ghazali I ntenti ons of the Phi l osopher s, a summary replying to Avicenna’s summary; The I ncoher ence of the Phi l osopher s, a refutation of fal asi fa on key issues f al refutation the eternity of the world; Ghazali Ghazali I ntenti ons of the Phi l osopher s, a summary replying to Avicenna’s summary; The I ncoher ence of the Phi l osopher s, a refutation of fal asi fa on key issues f al refutation the eternity of the world; God’s knowledge of particulars; Ghazali Ghazali I ntenti ons of the Phi l osopher s, a summary replying to Avicenna’s summary; The I ncoher ence of the Phi l osopher s, a refutation of fal asi fa on key issues f al refutation the eternity of the world; God’s knowledge of particulars; God and his attributes; Ghazali Ghazali I ntenti ons of the Phi l osopher s, a summary replying to Avicenna’s summary; The I ncoher ence of the Phi l osopher s, a refutation of fal asi fa on key issues f al refutation the eternity of the world; God’s knowledge of particulars; God and his attributes; the resurrection of the dead Ghazali Ghazali The Del i ver er fr om Er r or , an autobiography; a ‘sceptical crisis,’ like Descartes; but no rational solution Ghazali Ghazali dissatisfied with kal am , k al dissatisfied attracted by Sufism; criticizes Farabi, Avicenna and fal asi fa, f al criticizes but blends Ash‘arite theology with Avicenna’s Aristotelianism Ghazali Ghazali accepts the determinist accepts consequences consequences of the primacy of God’s causality Ghazali Ghazali a kind of occasionalism: what seem to be human choices (or effects of natural causes) are really occasions when God acts are Ghazali Ghazali God himself is absolutely free to act: divine attributes like wisdom and power are distinct from God himself, so that there is no list of properties to constrain God’s will to Ghazali Ghazali but in fact, since God is all-powerful and all-merciful, the world that God has made is the best of all possible worlds Muslim and Jewish philosophy philosophy after Ghazali, the center of Muslim after philosophy philosophy shifted westward to Spain, al-Andalus, where Jews as well as Muslims were where active active in the 11 and 12 centuries Muslim and Jewish philosophy philosophy a few famous names: Ibn Gabirol (1021-58, Avicebron) Judah Halevi (1075-1141) Ibn Bajja (1075-1139, Avempace) Ibn Tufayl (1110-85, Abubacer) Solomon Ibn Gabirol Solomon The I mpr ovement of M or al Qual i ti es; The Fountai n of L i fe; both written in Arabic; also Hebrew poetry Solomon Ibn Gabirol Solomon Fountai n of L i fe: emanationist metaphysics based on Neoplatonic sources but not conventional Neoplatonism Solomon Ibn Gabirol Solomon Fountai n of L i fe: although God is unknowable, although we know God indirectly we through the effects through of God’s will on the world of Solomon Ibn Gabirol Solomon Fountai n of L i fe: God creates matter directly m atter directly God and then for ms it through his will f or and it so that every item in the universe is a composite of matter and form: is form universal hylemorphism universal hyle Judah Halevi Judah A D efense and an Ar gument Defense on Behal f of the Scor ned Rel i gi on on the Kuzar i the K uzar Judah Halevi Judah the Kuzar i : the K uzar Jews under pressure in Muslim Spain: Halevi thinks of the Khazars, Halevi central Asians who adopted Judaism; central a fictional defense of Jewish dogma fictional Judah Halevi Judah the Kuzar i : the K uzar a dialogue among the Khazar king and four others: Judah Halevi Judah the Kuzar i : the K uzar a dialogue among the Khazar king and four others: a philosopher, Judah Halevi Judah the Kuzar i : the K uzar a dialogue among the Khazar king and four others: a philosopher, a Christian, Judah Halevi Judah the Kuzar i : the K uzar a dialogue among the Khazar king and four others: a philosopher, a Christian, a Muslim, Judah Halevi Judah the Kuzar i : the K uzar a dialogue among the Khazar king and four others: a philosopher, a Christian, a Muslim, a Jew Judah Halevi Judah the Kuzar i : the K uzar an important philosophical genre: debates, real and literary, about religion; Halevi’s aims were Halevi’s more dogmatic than philosophical: more ‘apologetic’ Ibn Bajja Ibn Abû Bakr Muhammad ibn Yahyà ibn as-Sâ’igh at-Tûjîbî Ibn Bajja ibn Ibn The Rul e of the Sol i tar y Ibn Bajja Ibn The Rul e of the Sol i tar y the goal: conjunction with the Active Intellect the means: complete abstraction from ordinary thoughts, complete isolation from human society, to prepare for conjunction as a gift from God Ibn Tufayl Ibn Abu Bakr Ibn Tufayl H ayy I bn Yaqzan, L i vi ng, Son of the Awar e Ibn Tufayl Ibn Abu Bakr Ibn Tufayl H ayy I bn Yaqzan, L i vi ng, Son of the Awar e a mystical version mystical of Avicenna’s system, of influenced by Ghazali Ibn Tufayl Ibn H ayy I bn Yaqzan: Hayy, a doe, the hermit Absal: Hayy’s education on a desert island; travels with Absal to a neighboring island; returns to the desert island Ibn Tufayl Ibn H ayy I bn Yaqzan: the truth learned through philosophy the corresponds exactly to revealed religion, religion, but the philosophical version is to be taught only to an élite is Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn Ibn Tufayl’s successor as personal physician to Abu Ya‘qub as Yusuf, Yusuf, the Almohad Amir of Spain, was Ibn Rushd Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn Abu-l-Walid Muhammad Abu-l-Walid Ibn Ahmad Ibn Ibn Rushd Averroes (1126-98) (1126-98) Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn philosopher, royal physician, chief judge of Cordoba under the Almohad dynasty, militant reformers of Islam militant Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn major philosophical works, commentaries on Aristotle, some at the request of his employers, whose ideology valued human reason whose Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn brilliant career ending in political disgrace, damaging the prospects damaging of philosophy in Islam of Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn three works on philosophy and religion: methodology; exposition; polemic; all written 1179-80 Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn three works on philosophy and religion: The Deci si ve Tr eati se The Expl anati on of the Sor ts of Pr oofs i n the Doctr i nes of Rel i gi on I ncoher ence of the I ncoher ence Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn The Deci si ve Tr eati se: speaking as a judge about methodology from the point of view of religious law from Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn The Deci si ve Tr eati se: d emonstr ati on is the best type of thinking; demonstr is demonstrative reason is required by the demonstrative Koran; Koran; Koranic passages that seem to contradict Koranic reason interpreted allegorically reason Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn The Deci si ve Tr eati se: philosophy is an obligation for Islam philosophy but not for all Muslims, but only those capable of demonstr ati ve d emonstr only reasoning as distinct from dii al ecti cal d reasoning reasoning Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn The Deci si ve Tr eati se: demonstrative reasoning is Aristotelianism; dialectical reasoning is Ghazali and kal am k al Ghazali Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn The Expl anati on : an account of theology for ordinary an people, people, following the Koran closely in opposition to Ash‘arite theology in Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn The I ncoher ence of the I ncoher ence: a polemic polemic against Ghazali’s I ncoher ence, classified by its author as dialectical classified Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn The I ncoher ence of the I ncoher ence: no opposition between philosophical demonstration and sacred philosophical law, law, even on the main issues contested by even Ghazali: Ghazali: the eternity of the world, God’s knowledge of particulars, the resurrection of the dead the Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn The I ncoher ence of the I ncoher ence: Averroes accepts the resurrection of the dead and the immortality of individual souls, doctrines not accepted by him elsewhere doctrines Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn the Commentator the on the Philosopher on wrote commentaries of three types Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn on almost the whole Aristotelian corpus short commentaries: short concise summaries concise middle commentaries: middle paraphrases paraphrases Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn on five works long commentaries: close extensive analysis On the Soul M etaphysi cs Physi cs On the H eavens Poster i or Anal yti cs Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn a doctrinaire Aristotelian, trying to protect Aristotle from trying Avicenna, Avicenna, but an acute and patient thinker but Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn rejects Avicenna’s distinction about rejects necessity: necessity: God as God a necessity in itself necessity all other things as all necessities from another (God) Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn returns to Aristotle’s conception of returns necessity necessity as temporal rather than causal: the heavens are necessary because they are eternal because Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn Aristotle On the Soul : Aristotle On three commentaries; L ong Commentar y on the M etaphysi cs; L etter on Conjuncti on wi th the Acti ve I ntel l ect ; I ncoher ence Arist ot le, On the Soul On a f ew lines few especially t roublesom e e specially “In respect of that part of the soul by which the In part soul soul both knows and understands…. Since [just knows understands…. as] in the whole of nature there is something which is matter to each kind of thing (and this is matter what is potentially all of them), while on the other potentially hand there is something else which is their cause cause and is productive by producing them all – these productive being related as a craft to its material – so there craft material must also be these differences in the soul.” English from Greek (Hamlyn) English • Ar1 – the soul has parts; – one part knows and understands • Ar1 – the soul has parts; – one part knows and understands • Ar2 – in each natural thing there is (M) matter, matter which is each thing, but potentially, which – and also something (A) causal and causal productive, productive – where A : M :: a craft : its material where material • Ar1 – the soul has parts; – one part knows and understands • Ar2 – in each natural thing there is (M) matter, matter which is each thing, but potentially, which – and also something (A) causal and causal productive, productive – where A : M :: a craft : its material where material • Ar3 – because the soul is a natural thing, because the A/M distinction applies to it “And there is an intellect which is this kind by And intellect becoming all things, and there is another which is becoming so by producing all things, as a kind of producing disposition, like light, does…. And this intellect disposition like is distinct, unaffected, and unmixed, being in distinct unaffected and unmixed being essence activity…. In separation it is just what it activity…. separation is, and this alone is immortal and eternal.” immortal eternal.” English from Greek (Hamlyn) English • Ar4 – one intellect (M?) becomes all things ?) all – another intellect (A?) produces all things ?) all – acting like light, as a disposition • Ar5 – this intellect (A?) is, • • • • • • distinct unaffected unmixed essentially active essentially active separate alone immortal and eternal this list of terms, this especially ‘unmixed,’ suggests that the intellect cannot be involved with any physical aspect of human with cognition “On the part of the soul through which the soul On soul knows and understands…. And because, just as in knows understands…. nature, there is something in each and every genus which is matter (and it is that which is them all in matter potency) and something else which is a cause and potency and cause agent (and it is that because of the fact that it does agent whatever is required, like the disposition of craft disposition craft toward the material), it is necessary that these material), differences exist in the soul.” English from Latin from Arabic from Greek English “In it, then, there must be an intellect which is the In intellect intellect in regard to everything being produced, produced and an intellect which is the intellect in regard to producing that whole understanding, like a habit, producing habit which is like light…. And that intellect is also set apart, not mixed or able to be affected, and in its apart not affected and substance it is activity…. And since it is set apart, activity…. it is only what it is, and that alone is immortal immortal forever.” forever.” English from Latin from Arabic from Greek English the soul i s soul “ t he first act ualit y o f a nat ural body of body w hich has l i fe pot ent ially” which p ot if a body was anim at ed if by t he soul b ut is no longer anim at ed by it , but t hat anim at ing soul seem s t o have no fut ure seem but t here is b ut “ a part of t he soul by which t he soul bot h knows and underst ands,” an int ellect t he int ellect ’s purpose iis not t o anim at e t he body s a nim but t o enable t he soul t o know a nd underst and k now u nderst t he int ellect is act ually of t wo k inds: one funct ions o ne by “ becom ing a ll t hings,” t he ot her “ b y producing a ll t hings, by p roducing a s a kind of disposit ion” as t his dual int ellect is “ d ist inct , dist u naffect ed and unm ixed, a nd b eing in essence act ivit y” being t his dual int ellect is “ iin separat ion … n j ust what it is, a nd t his alone i s i m m ort al a nd et ernal ” et i n just a few words, t his crypt ic passage suggest s a dist inct ion suggest d ebat ed for cent uries o ne side of t he int ellect is a causal or productive agent; productive another side is another a passive or material object of agency; agency an agent or active intellect intellect and a material intellect and this i ntel l ect a s a whole, a s apart from t he body body a nd apart from t he em bodied soul , soul i s “ alone … im m ort al and et ernal” t he Neoplat onist s, t he Greek com m ent at ors on Arist ot le, Arist t he Muslim philosophers iinvent ed an elaborat e t erm inology nvent t o sust ain t he m any ensuing d ist inct ions by t he early 13 century by active agent material receptive habitual separate abstract acquired continued corruptible generable generated in potency mechanical operative passible patient passive possible speculative who could possibly keep it all straight? straight? not even Averroes; Aristotle’s theory of cognition is exceedingly intricate is cognition starts with the senses, cognition to which sensible forms to (color, shape, etc.) (color, are transmitted to become (i) forms in the imagination something like images (ii) and then intelligible forms (ii) in the intellect the forms of natural objects, the like the form of humanity like in the particular substance called ‘Socrates,’ ‘Socrates,’ exist as individual forms, in particular matter/form composites the same forms the that make each substance what it that is is (making Socrates human) have an important cognitive role have cognitive if I come to know that Socrates is human, human, this happens because my intellect this grasps, as a uni ver sal , u ni the form of humanity which is in Socrates, which as an i ndi vi dual form Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn three different interpretations of the key sections of Aristotle On the Soul On of Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn Epi stl e a nd Shor t Commentar y: Shor MI is not a part of the soul nor anything outside the soul anything MI is a disposition of imaginative forms in the soul: forms their disposition their to become intelligible Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn M i ddl e Commentar y: for some commentators, the MI is also for MI a disposition, disposition, but a disposition of a separate but substance substance separation keeps it ‘unmixed’ separation Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn for Averroes in this period the MI is in individual humans, the MI not in a separate substance, but it attaches to a separate substance, but attaches the AI, the AI when humans achieve conjunction with the AI conjunction AI Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: the MI cannot be mixed with human the bodies; bodies; the MI cannot be matter the matter in the way that the matter of a body is in matter Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: the matter of a body the of receives forms as individuated, receives as but the MI but MI receives forms as universals receives Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: also, the MI is a single substance, also, is the same for all humans, and apart from them, and absolutely unmixed with body absolutely Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: but why is the MI called ‘material’? but MI in this usage, in what ‘material’ means what is not ‘made of matter’ is matter but ‘receptive’ Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: but why is the MI called ‘material’? but MI in this usage, in what ‘material’ means what is not ‘made of matter’ is matter but ‘receptive,’ but receptive of intelligible forms receptive as universal as Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: in reality, the Intellect is one, a single matter/form composite single matter form composite of a special kind, in which the AI is form, in form corresponding to the MI as matter: MI matter the MI is receptive or passive the or but the AI is active but Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: since there is just one Intellect, but many individual humans, but the many lack the understanding, the that can be attained only by the one Intellect Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: only the one Intellect is immortal; individual humans are not immortal, although humanity as a whole although will always exist Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: humans are capable individually not of understanding (intellection) but only of sensation, but imagination and cogitation; and cogitation prepares images, products of the imagination, products for reception by the Intellect Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: forms in the imagination are individual: forms in they individuate human thoughts, which are veridical only if they apply correctly to individual material objects to Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: particular imaginative forms particular forms are produced in the particular souls that receive particular sensations through a particular sense apparatus made of matter made Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: the corresponding items of thought are received in the MI are MI as universal intelligible forms as forms only after the AI makes them only intelligible Ibn Rushd, Averroes Ibn L ong Commentar y: just as colors are not visible just until light illuminates them, until so human thoughts so are not receivable by the MI MI until the AI makes them intelligible until Averroes Averroes 1126-98 Maimonides 1138-1204 Maimonides Maimonides Moshe ben Maimon Almohad Spain Cordoba family of distinguished family lawyers lawyers North Africa Egypt Maimonides Maimonides writings: legal, rabbinical, philosophical Commentar y on the M i shna M i shneh Tor ah Gui de for the Per pl exed Maim onides M aim t he legal and rabbinical works t hat syst em at ize and r at ionalize law and rabbinical debat e l aw also int erpret t hose t radit ions philosophically in Arist ot elian t erm s Maim onides M aim Commentar y on the M i shna, in Arabic; ‘Mishna’ means ‘repetition’ or ‘secondary’; Mishna’ the first extensive written version of the legal traditions called the ‘Oral Torah’; debates on cases under judgment and the judgments rendered; and compiled around 200 CE by Judah haNasi compiled Maimonides Maimonides Commentar y on the M i shna a m ajor legal st udy wit h philosophical cont ent : t hirt een principles of fait h Maim onides M aim God’s existence God’s properties (unity, eternity) God’s powers (foreknowledge) the truth of prophecy rewards and punishments the resurrection of the dead Maimonides Maimonides M i shneh Tor ah a comprehensive codification of Talmudic law and subsequent commentary and Maimonides Maimonides legal and rabbinical works themes in common with the Gui de Gui themes Arabic Aristotelian cosmology an absolutely unbodily God an unbodily life to come in the life to come, the soul is intellect, not bodily life not prophecy explained philosophically: AI prophecy AI Aristotelian virtue theory Aristotelian Maimonides Maimonides legal and rabbinical works themes in common with the Gui de Gui themes rationalism rationalizing ceremonial and dietary law without obvious moral or social benefit without historicizing religion Maimonides Maimonides in the rabbinical works, the truths of philosophy are the secrets of religion: secrets the Biblical creation story is the Aristotelian physics; Aristotelian Ezekiel’s vision of the chariot is Ezekiel’s Aristotle’s metaphysics Aristotle’s Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: perplexing words in the Bible; God seems to have a body; some stories seem obscure; Genesis Ezekiel Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: negative theology: God has no attributes at all despite the external, superficial sense of scripture, according to philosophical arguments according Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: philosophical arguments in theology: God’s attributes must be either essential or not; if God’s attributes are not essential, they are accidental; but they are not accidental but Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: ` philosophical arguments in theology: predicating an essential attribute predicating is defining is God cannot be defined God has no essential attributes God Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: philosophical arguments in theology: God has no essential attributes God has no accidental attributes God has no attributes at all QED Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: all we can say of God is all that God acts, that that God creates, for example, but not that God is creative but Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: there is no property, P, there that we can assert of God, that though there are privations, not-Q, that we can deny; God is not-powerless: correct God is powerful: incorrect God philosophy serves faith faith but how? Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: the transcendent Aristotelian God the of Muslim philosophy of is not the providential God of the Bible of Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: is the account of God in the Gui de Gui is to be taken at face-value, or is there a hidden rationalism: an esoteric rationalism? Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: the Gui de itself is explicit the Gui about the esoteric content of religion and about its own esoteric content Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: the right way to teach is not to be public and explicit; only a few are fit to learn the truth, especially about difficult doctrines especially Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: a difficult doctrine: the eternity of the world, as debated in the Gui de Gui as Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: if the world is not eternal, but created from nothing (ex ni hi l o), there must be a Creator, a God Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: but it cannot be demonstrated that the world is not eternal, that it has a beginning that Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: Maimonides rejects the premiss used Maimonides in kal am, k al that the world has a beginning; then he grants that the world is then eternal, eternal, as part of a very long proof of God’s existence Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: but the world cannot be proved to be eternal: cannot to Aristotle’s arguments for the eternity of the world are not demonstrations are demonstrations Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: also, other good arguments show the world not to be eternal show not Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: and if the world were eternal, there would be no basis for Jewish there faith, faith, no miracles and no Law no Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: Why were Moses and Ezekiel prophets, but not others? why are there 613 commandments, not more or less? not Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: if the world is not eternal, but created by God, the answers are easy: ‘because God made it so’ Maimonides Maimonides The Gui de: but if Maimonides is sincere, his own explanations of the purposes of the of commandments, commandments, of the nature of prophecy, would be pointless ...
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This note was uploaded on 02/24/2010 for the course PHILOSOPHY 100B taught by Professor Copenhaver during the Spring '10 term at UCLA.

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