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Scholasticism1280-1400_1 - Philosophy 100B Philosophy Week...

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Unformatted text preview: Philosophy 100B Philosophy Week 4: After Scholasticism John Duns Scotus (1266-1308) William of Ockham (12881347) 1347) before Scotus before Hugh of Ripelin Ulrich of Strasbourg Dietrich of Frieberg Meister Eckhart Henry of Ghent Godfrey of Fontaines Peter John Olivi Peter of Auvergne Simon of Faversham before Ockham before Thomas of Sutton Hervaeus Natalis William of Alnwick Hugh of Newcastle Francis of Meyronnes Durandus of St. Pourcain Peter Auriol John of Jandun Marsilius of Padua Walter Burley Walter Chatton after Ockham after • • • • • • • • • • • • Nicholas Bonet Francis of Meyronnes Francis of Marchia Gregory of Rimini Nicholas of Autrecourt Albert of Saxony Paul of Venice Nicolas Aston Richard Brinkley John Wyclif Marsilius of Inghen Biagio Pelacani di Parma Biagio • • • • • • • • • • • • • John Buridan Adam Wodeham William Crathorn Robert Holcot Thomas Bradwardine Richard Swynshead Roger Swynshead William Heytesbury Ralph Strode John Dumbleton Richard Kilvington John Baconthorpe Walter Chatton Ockham Ockham in language in and logic remarkably creative and influential Scotus Scotus in metaphysics Scotus Scotus applies metaphysics to trinitarian theology: Doctor subtilis Scotus Scotus key terms: intrinsic mode real distinction formal distinction instantiation repeatability individuation Scotus Scotus terms applicable to frogs and to God Scotus Scotus consider a very special frog, an individual member of the frog species, dear to John Duns Scotus Scotus Scotus this frog is ‘Rosalie,’ a substance with various properties: age, weight, color and so on Scotus Scotus Rosalie is green: Rosalie green her property, green, is a color (C); her green but Rosalie’s green color (C ) but color g is not just any green (C ); g it is a particular shade of green (C ) it gs Scotus Scotus not Rosalie Rosalie not Rosalie not Rosalie Scotus Scotus not Rosalie Rosalie not Rosalie not Rosalie Scotus Scotus some particular shade of some color (C ) Scotus Scotus the color of any real individual is always a C how an undetermined C Scotus Scotus Scotus Scotus Rosalie really has color (C); she is really not colorless Scotus Scotus Rosalie also really has the color green (C ), has ), g r not the color red (C ) Scotus Scotus Rosalie also really has her special shade of green (C ) of green Scotus Scotus rather than some other color (C ); Scotus Scotus a C is an intrinsic mode intrinsic mode Scotus Scotus Scotus Scotus Scotus Scotus but if Rosalie has the specific property C but Scotus Scotus Scotus Scotus because Rosalie and C because are separable, separable, Scotus Scotus Scotus Scotus C and C are not really distinct; really Scotus Scotus a real distinction real distinction requires real separability: if X is really distinct from Y, X can exist without Y and Y without X and Scotus Scotus a formal distinction formal distinction does not require real separability: if X is formally distinct from Y, X and Y are really identical but are definable independently Scotus Scotus but a formal distinction is not just a distinction of reason, is distinction of reason which merely enables me to think of X as apart from Y to think Scotus Scotus a distinction of reason is merely mental, but a formal distinction is extramental without being a real distinction Scotus Scotus for a real distinction between items, it is both necessary and sufficient that the items are really separable that Scotus Scotus for real identity between items, it is both necessary and sufficient that the items are really inseparable Scotus Scotus items are formally distinct if they are really identical but can be defined independently but defined such that the definitions apply to real items, not merely mental items to real items, mental Scotus Scotus every substance (except God) has an essence that defines it and also turns up in other substances: the essence is ‘repeatable’ or ‘communicable’ Scotus Scotus every substance also has a this-here-ness, a haecceitas (haec­ce­itas) haecceitas an individuator, which is not repeatable which Scotus Scotus for every substance, the essence and the haecceitas the haecceitas are formally distinct but really identical: the substance needs both to be just the item that it is Scotus Scotus Rosalie the frog is a substance with properties; is substance properties God also has properties, which are more problematic Scotus Scotus according to Scotus, God’s properties are all identical with each other, and God is identical with them Scotus Scotus in God, in properties are perfections: perfections wisdom, power and so on; the intrinsic mode the intrinsic mode of each of God’s perfections of is infinity infinity Scotus Scotus Scotus Scotus in God, wisdom, power and so on have the same intrinsic mode, infinity, have intrinsic mode infinity but their definitions are different; but definitions for each perfection, the intrinsic mode of infinity for infinity is really identical with it but formally distinct is really identical formally distinct Scotus Scotus as a consequence, the perfections as themselves, themselves, which are all inseparable from God, and hence from one another, are also formally distinct but really identical; they all belong to God’s essence they Scotus Scotus some properties of a substance are some accidents, accidents separable from it and hence really separable distinct; distinct; other properties are essential or necessary, other essential necessary not separable and hence not distinct not Scotus Scotus some properties are also transcendental: some transcendental since they cannot be contained by any of the ten categories, they are said to ‘transcend’ them: being is the most obvious case Scotus Scotus some transcendental properties are essential or necessary: again, being seems to be an obvious case again, being Scotus Scotus but all of God’s properties are essential, belonging to God’s essence, belonging not distinct from God; not yet no property of God yet is absolutely identical with him absolutely or with God’s other properties or Scotus Scotus how can God’s properties how be essential to him be and identical with him without being absolutely indistinct without absolutely from God and each other? Scotus Scotus the solution is the formal distinction: the formal distinction God’s properties are formally distinct but not really distinct really from God and from one another from Scotus Scotus these are truths about God that we can know without revelation, without the help of Scripture without Scotus Scotus we can know them through the science of metaphysics, which is distinct from theology; theology as we know it, strictly speaking, comes from revelation, not reason Scotus Scotus the most problematic theological issue, the Trinity, is a mystery to which we cannot reason Scotus Scotus but metaphysics seems to be a kind of natural theology, kind natural as distinct from revealed theology: as revealed after observing facts about the world, after facts we reason to God’s existence as needed to explain the facts as facts Scotus Scotus metaphysics is reasoning about the transcendentals, items that transcend Aristotle’s items categories: categories: first, being being and others coextensive with being, and being including unity, truth and goodness Scotus Scotus second, disjunctive transcendentals: necessary/contingent, necessary/contingent, actual/potential, infinite/finite infinite/finite cause/caused, prior/posterior and so on and Scotus Scotus third, pure perfections either common to God and creatures: knowledge, will, power; or proper to God alone: omniscience, omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence omnipresence Scotus Scotus correct understanding of the correct transcendentals transcendentals grounds a proof of God’s existence, which is the main goal of metaphysics which Scotus Scotus Scotus is more optimistic about theology than Aquinas or other earlier scholastics or Scotus Scotus there is more positive theology in Scotus, there positive theology as a practical science, theology practical not a theoretical science, not theoretical because its purpose is to lead to right because action action Scotus Scotus metaphysics is theoretical: we can know God through metaphysics through without revelation: without God’s existence for example God’s Scotus Scotus the large structure of the the extremely intricate proof the of God’s existence by Scotus Scotus Scotus 1 there is a first agent; 2 there is an ultimate goal of activity; 3 there is a maximally excellent being 4 those three claims are coextensive: all will be true of any being all of whom any one is true of 5 a being of whom any is true will be infinite infinite 6 there can only be one such being 7 God must be simple Scotus Scotus the crux of the proof is this premiss: if it is possible that something if is an essentially uncaused being, is then it is necessary that something is an essentially uncaused being is Scotus Scotus ‘essentially uncaused’ means ‘impossible to be caused’ impossible Scotus Scotus if it is possible that something is something impossible to be caused, then it is necessary that something is something impossible to be caused is Scotus Scotus one conclusion of the proof: God is maximally excellent, entailing that God is maximally perfect: a property is ‘perfect’ which is always better to have than not to have Scotus Scotus ‘perfect being theology,’ perfect like Anselm’s: like God has all the perfect properties, and has them in infinite degree and degree Scotus Scotus being, unity, simplicity, goodness, power, wisdom, justice, mercy Scotus Scotus we normally understand such words as they apply to God’s creatures: how do they apply to God? Scotus Scotus do they apply in the same sense, having the same lexical definition, univocally? or in a different sense, equivocally? or in a sense somehow comparable, analogically? Scotus Scotus at least some claims about God proved by metaphysics are univocal for God and creatures; are univocal without some univocal claims, there can be no analogical claims there analogical Scotus Scotus some concepts some used to make such claims used will correspond to properties which are common to God and creatures Scotus Scotus those properties will be a subset of the transcendental properties: “either indifferent to finite or infinite being, or proper to infinite being” or Scotus Scotus wisdom as a property of creatures, is complex: is complex the simple perfection of wisdom the simple plus imperfection Scotus Scotus the simple perfection of wisdom the simple minus imperfection, minus a “formal notion,” is indifferent to finite or infinite being Scotus Scotus the simple perfection of wisdom the simple plus maximal perfection plus is complex but proper to God, is complex infinite being being Scotus Scotus maximal perfection maximal is an intrinsic mode of God’s wisdom, intrinsic mode really identical with it identical but formally distinct formally distinct Scotus Scotus the two complex concepts of wisdom, the complex one applying to God, the other to creatures, are analogical, are analogical enabling us to analogize from creatures to God Scotus Scotus a key difference between creatures and God is God’s infinity God’s infinity Aquinas Aquinas Aquinas had taught that infinity and finitude are relational: relational an item is finite if limited by a relation to some other item; if it is not limited by such a relation, it is infinite it infinite Aquinas Aquinas matter is limited by form (no longer unlimited in potency) and form by matter (individuated, no longer repeatable) Aquinas Aquinas what is infinite what infinite lacks such a relation; infinity is not real real but merely relational but relational Scotus Scotus Scotus disagrees: items are finite or infinite items infinite not from relations to other items but from an “intrinsic degree of finite or infinite an infinite perfection Scotus Scotus Scotus agrees with Aristotle that spatial extension can only be spatial extension potentially rather than actually infinite – actually infinite in the sense that infinite in another increment is always possible Scotus Scotus Scotus then imagines Scotus a potentially infinite magnitude magnitude actualized all at once, becoming “as great in actuality as it was as potentially” Scotus Scotus next, he moves next, from extension to intension, extension intension from quantity to quality from the series n, n + m, n - m … to the series ‘good,’ ‘better,’ ‘worse’ ... Scotus Scotus next, he moves next, from an actually infinite magnitude, magnitude, a quantitative perfection, quantitative to a qualitative perfection, to qualitative actually infinite in degree actually Scotus Scotus what is infinite in perfection what in cannot be imperfect in any way; but an actually infinite magnitude but magnitude would be imperfect: each of its parts less than the whole each Scotus Scotus hence, what is maximally perfect and also actually infinite in degree and in cannot have parts and so must be simple and unitary Scotus Scotus in the same way, the best concept accessible to us of the maximally perfect God will cover all the pure perfections, infinite in degree infinite in Scotus Scotus or in simpler terms, God is infinite being, God being since being is the first transcendental since being and entails all other perfections Scotus Scotus but if the divine infinite being is simple and unitary, are God’s perfections absolutely identical with one another and with God? Scotus Scotus no, in some sense God’s perfections are distinct, but the distinction is formal but formal Scotus Scotus because they are inseparable from God, because inseparable God’s perfections are God’s essential to God essential and inseparable from one another, hence really identical hence really but formally distinct but formally Scotus Scotus as a property of God, infinity is distinct in this formal way infinity formal from each of the perfections of which it is the intrinsic mode of intrinsic mode Scotus Scotus thus, the simple perfection of wisdom thus, simple plus infinite or maximal perfection or plus is complex and proper to God, is complex as the infinite being as Scotus Scotus in this way, much can be learned by metaphysical reasoning, starting with God’s infinity: starting infinity a positive theology Scotus Scotus various truths about God, like his trinitarian structure, which are revealed by scripture which revealed can be better understood by metaphysics can understood by Scotus Scotus Scotus thought of the Trinity in an Augustinian way: three aspects of one essence, risking modalism, rather than as a community of rather persons, persons, risking polytheism Scotus Scotus the three persons are related by procession: are procession procession ≠ coming-to-be, as a chicken comes-to-be from an egg Scotus Scotus relations of procession are necessary and timeless on Augustine’s cognitive model on Augustine Augustine On the Trinity, 9.4 “As there are two things, the mind and As the love of it, when it loves itself, so are there two things, the mind and the knowledge of it, when it knows itself. Therefore the mind itself, and the love of it, and the knowledge of it, are three things, and these three are one; and one and when they are perfect they are equal.” when Scotus Scotus in this context, in a (iv) ‘mental word’ is produced naturally by (iii) memory, a faculty of mind, faculty remembering its (ii) intelligible object, which corresponds in turn to which (i) an extra-mental object (i) Scotus Scotus as in (iii) God’s memory (ii) an intelligible object is God’s essence, and the two produce (iv) the divine Word, Christ, who is not external to God Scotus Scotus just as the Word is knowledge, proceeding from God’s memory; so the Spirit is love, proceeding from God’s will Scotus Scotus because the love comes because from both the Father and the Son, from the Spirit proceeds from both, the proceeds according to Augustine: and the famous filioque and filioque Council of Nicea, 325 Council “We believe in one God, Father Almighty, We maker of all things visible and invisible, and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, …. and in the Holy Spirit. Holy Council of Constantinople, 381 Council “We believe in one God, Father Almighty, We maker of all things visible and invisible, and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, …. and in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father. proceeds Western Latin Church, 589 Western “We believe in one God, Father Almighty, We maker of all things visible and invisible, and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, …. and in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father and from the Son [filioque].” Son Schism, 11th century Schism, Roman Catholic Church Eastern Orthodox Church destruction of Constantinople, destruction 1204 1204 Second Council of Lyon, 1274 officially adds the filioque officially filioque Scotus Scotus Scotus agrees, but his approach is different: the filioque, a relational term, the filioque relational is not required is to distinguish the Son from the Spirit Scotus Scotus Scotus agrees, but his approach is different: there is a distinction between Son and Spirit because non-relational properties because non of those persons are different Scotus Scotus but why is it that persons proceed but persons from divine faculties of cognition? from cognition Scotus Scotus Scotus argues that the results of procession must be internal to God but still different but from what produces them from Scotus Scotus they must also be they necessary, necessary in some sense essential, in essential but not merely inherent in God’s essence but inherent as properties or perfections of it Scotus Scotus in order to be internal, essential and necessary essential and necessary in this non­inhering way, in non­inhering they must be they instances of God’s essence, instances divine persons divine Scotus Scotus to make the divine persons different, the relational distinctions the relational expressed by the filioque expressed filioque are not strictly required Scotus Scotus relational differences: not wrong but not obligatory; essential differences: suggest Arianism; accidental differences: make God mutable Scotus Scotus Scotus bases a different distinction on haecceitas, on haecceitas this-here-ness: Scotus Scotus Scotus bases a different distinction on haecceitas, on haecceitas this-here-ness: the individuator, non-relational, non-accidental, non-essential Scotus Scotus Scotus bases a different distinction on haecceitas, on haecceitas a non-qualitative property of a substance responsible for its individuation: thishereness, rather than whatness (quidditas), responsible for what kind it is Scotus Scotus in an individual created substance, all its merely formally distinct properties all formally distinct are really identical; are really identical and all are qualitative, and qualitative explaining what­kind the substance is, explaining what­kind except haecceitas, except haecceitas the one non-qualitative, formally distinct property Scotus Scotus haecceitas explains that a substance is an individual and that this individual substance cannot be instantiated: cannot instantiated an instance of it cannot be produced an Scotus Scotus a clone of the substance Rosalie can be produced, as an instance of frog essence, but not as an instance of Rosalie Leibniz Leibniz principle: principle: the identity of indiscernibles the Leibniz Leibniz trivially: if individual X is distinct from individual Y, some property must belong to X and not to some Y, Y, or vice versa or Leibniz Leibniz trivially: for X to be non-identical, X must be discernible from Y by some property Leibniz Leibniz a stronger version: any two individuals, any in order to be individuals, must differ qualitatively or relationally must Leibniz Leibniz but imagine an odd universe: only two exactly similar spheres, each a mile in diameter, made of pure krypton, with the same temperature, with color, and so on: color, nothing else exists Leibniz Leibniz every property, every qualitative and relational, qualitative of one sphere also belongs to the other sphere: two such items, with all their properties in common, with refute the identity of indiscernibles refute Scotus Scotus but the two spheres are different: something about them, not a qualitative or relational property, makes them different: the haecceitas of one the haecceitas is not the haecceitas of another is haecceitas Scotus Scotus likewise, each of the three persons in God, each an instance of the divine essence, is different from the two others by its haecceitas, by haecceitas not a relational or qualitative property Scotus Scotus Scotus kept worrying about relational and non-relational properties of the divine persons throughout his career Scotus Scotus for Scotus and all Christians: the three persons in one God are not three Gods but three instances but instances of the divine essence Scotus Scotus analogy from creatures: three individual human persons are instances of human nature: in these individuals (in­dividua) that nature is no longer dividable that (dividua), though it was dividable Scotus Scotus analogy from creatures: because the divine essence, instantiated in three persons, instantiated can never have been dividable, can it can never have been split up, in the human way, among three persons who are really distinct Scotus Scotus Scotus makes another distinction: repeatable v dividable; dividable when an essence is repeated in (communicated between) the individuals that instantiate it, it must be repeatable Scotus Scotus every human individual has the essence of humanity, or human nature, everything needed to be human Scotus Scotus each individual human person has its own haecceitas, has haecceitas which is formally distinct which formally distinct from that person’s human nature from but is not repeatable but repeatable Scotus Scotus the divine essence, like human nature, is repeatable, communicable; is repeatable but unlike human nature, which is divided among discrete individuals when it is repeated, the divine essence is not dividable the dividable Scotus Scotus the divine essence is the repeatable, repeatable, numerically one, and undividable Scotus Scotus an elaboration of the formal distinction enables Scotus to assert the needed differences within divine unity Scotus Scotus each one of the three persons is essentially identical is essentially identical with the other two, with which preserves unity, but formally (hypostatically) distinct but formally distinct from the other two, which preserves difference Ockham Ockham in language in and logic remarkably creative and influential Scotus Scotus in metaphysics ...
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