Scholasticism1280-1400_2 - Philosophy 100B Philosophy Week...

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Unformatted text preview: Philosophy 100B Philosophy Week 4: After Scholasticism scholasticism 1280-1400 scholasticism Ockham Ockham in language in and logic remarkably creative and influential Scotus Scotus in metaphysics Ockham Ockham William of Ockham (1288-1347): a Franciscan in Oxford and London when there was no job open for a theology master; all his theology, philosophy and logic produced between 1317 and 1325 Ockham Ockham 1324, summoned to Avignon, where the Pope lived, disagreeing with the Franciscans about poverty Ockham Ockham the Minister General of the Franciscans asked Ockham to study the Pope’s views, which Ockham called not just wrong and foolish, but heretical Ockham Ockham he and the Minister General fled to Italy and Germany, to the court of Emperor Ludwig, the Pope’s main enemy Ockham Ockham spent the rest of his career writing political treatises, pro-imperial and anti-papal: he died in 1347 Ockham Ockham for a century and a half, since before 1200, philosophy had been about Aristotelian metaphysics and psychology, not about logic Ockham Ockham but Ockham made but logic and language logic the foundation of all his philosophy, as Abelard had tried to do Ockham Ockham also like Abelard, he was an anti-realist about universals, a nominalist: his aim was ontological reduction, his ontological reduction requiring a new view of logic and language requiring Ockham Ockham Aristotle’s ten categories are the most basic types of items that can be predicated of anything; they are the most basic categories Ockham Ockham the ten categories can be divided into two groups: substance and nine types of accident accident Ockham Ockham the ten categories can be divided into two groups: substance and nine types of accident: accident substance persists as accidents change Ockham Ockham the nine types of accident are quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, place, state, acting, being-acted-upon state, Ockham Ockham of any item, like Rosalie, I can predicate substance, and I can also predicate accidents: Rosalie is green, five inches long, and just at this moment she is eating a bug Ockham Ockham Rosalie is a substance Rosalie substance that has various properties that properties which are predicated of it as accidents as accidents Ockham Ockham both substance and accidents were commonly thought of as real: were real if a frog acts to eat a bug, the frog’s action is surely real Ockham Ockham but except for quality, but quality and, in a very few cases, relation, and, relation Ockham denies Ockham that accidents are real that Ockham Ockham substances like Rosalie are real particulars; her special shade of green her green is also a real particular, a quality; but no other accidents truly predicated of Rosalie are real Scotus Scotus in his metaphysics, in order to deal with the properties of the only unique substance, God, Scotus had needed not just real distinctions not real but also formal distinctions but formal Scotus Scotus critics of Scotus critics might say might that he was that needlessly multiplying entities needlessly Ockham Ockham ‘Ockham’s razor’ is a rule against needlessly multiplying entities; it is the slogan of Ockham’s project of of ontological reduction ontological reduction Scotus Scotus according to Scotus, Phosphorus (Morning Star), Hesperus (Evening Star), which are really both Venus, would be distinct items would distinct by reason distinct Ockham Ockham according to Ockham, Phosphorus and Hesperus are not distinct items at all; it is only our concepts of them that are distinct Ockham Ockham as a nominalist, Ockham wants a leaner ontology: he wants to get by with fewer types of entity; but he has to explain the same universe that Scotus had to explain Ockham Ockham Scotus took a metaphysical approach, Scotus metaphysical but Ockham’s approach was linguistic and logical, and logical applying old ideas in new ways Ockham Ockham one old idea was mental language, one mental language going back to Aristotle Ockham Ockham the traditional view: types of things in the world types things are represented by mental words, are mental words represented in turn by spoken words represented spoken words Ockham Ockham language­words are ‘imposed’ directly on mental words directly mental words and indirectly on things and things by an arbitrary act or convention Ockham Ockham language-words are signs for mental words which in turn are signs for things Ockham Ockham according to Ockham, however, both language-words both and mental words and are signs for things Ockham Ockham according to Ockham, however, language-words language-words are arbitrarily imposed, are but mental words but signify things naturally naturally Ockham Ockham to talk about Rosalie in Latin, I will say ‘rana,’ but in English I will say ‘frog’; in both cases in the mental word (FROG) is the same, the and it signifies frogs naturally and naturally Ockham Ockham to develop this new theory, Ockham combined the very old idea of the mental language mental with the less old idea of with supposition supposition Peter of Spain Peter the sixth chapter of the the Summary of Logic Summary of Logic by Peter of Spain, written around 1230, is an important account of is supposition supposition Peter of Spain Peter substances have properties: substances properties Rosalie, the frog, is green; Rosalie, green terms also have properties Peter of Spain Peter terms are items that can be used in propositions, that propositions like ‘Socrates is a man,’ where ‘Socrates’ is where the subject term subject and ‘man’ is and the predicate predicate Peter of Spain Peter two properties of terms are signification and supposition Peter of Spain Peter with its property of signification, with signification a term is said to ‘signify’; term with its property of supposition, with supposition a term is said to ‘supposit’ Peter of Spain Peter because terms in propositions do not always supposit for what they signify, the distinction between supposition and signification signification helps clarify how terms work in propositions Peter of Spain Peter in isolation, outside a proposition, a bare term has signification but not supposition Peter of Spain Peter the property of signification equips a bare term to refer to a form (FROG) to and to items (frogs) having that form and Peter of Spain Peter when I say ‘frog,’ without saying anything else, you know what sort of item I’m talking about Peter of Spain Peter terms get their significations by imposition – by imposition Adam naming things in the Garden; by the usual theory, the impositions are conventional the conventional Peter of Spain Peter when I say when ‘Rosalie is a frog,’ the term ‘frog’ has both signification and supposition, but the term has supposition only in propositional context Peter of Spain Peter there are several types of supposition Peter of Spain Peter simple supposition: a term stands for a universal, term like ‘FROG’ like in ‘Rosalie is A FROG’ Peter of Spain Peter material supposition: a term stands for itself, term like ‘frog’ like in “‘frog’ has four letters” Peter of Spain Peter personal supposition: a term stands for a particular, term like ‘Rosalie’ like in ‘Rosalie is A FROG,’ or for particulars Peter of Spain Peter three types of three personal supposition personal Peter of Spain Peter determinate: ‘some frog is leaping’; some frog confused and distributed: distributed ‘every frog is leaping’; every frog merely confused: confused ‘every frog is an animal’ every frog is Peter of Spain Peter the types of personal supposition were probably meant to explain complications of complications tense and quantification tense Peter of Spain Peter the basic distinction is between personal supposition, where terms stand for particulars, where particulars and simple supposition, and simple where terms stand for universals where universals Peter of Spain Peter in Peter’s realist metaphysics, in realist these universals are these real substances, real though of a special kind Peter of Spain Peter when I say when ‘Rosalie is A FROG,’ the species signified by ‘FROG ’ (in simple supposition) is a real substance, though of a special kind Ockham Ockham but for Ockham, the only real things are particulars, requiring him to distinguish simple from personal supposition in a different way Ockham Ockham for Peter of Spain, for in personal supposition in terms supposit for particulars; for Ockham, they supposit for whatever they signify: extramental, mental, linguistic or extramental, imaginary Ockham Ockham for Peter of Spain, for in simple supposition in terms supposit for universals; for Ockham, they supposit for mental concepts but they do not signify at all Ockham Ockham language-words language-words and mental words, and both used as terms in propositions, can supposit can for things, language-words and mental words words Ockham Ockham when they supposit for things, when mental words like FROG are ‘first intentions’; when they supposit for mental words, when mental words like SPECIES are ‘second intentions’ Ockham Ockham when they supposit for things, when language-words are ‘terms of first imposition’; when they supposit for language-words, language-words are ‘terms of second imposition’; when they supposit for mental words, language-words are ‘terms of second intention’ Ockham Ockham the purpose of Ockham’s theory and its new terminology Ockham Ockham to account for the fact that we use language as if universals were real, though only particulars are real Ockham Ockham the language-word ‘species’ and the mental word FROG both signify concepts that can supposit for many particular items, thus doing the job of universals Ockham Ockham Ockham’s new account of personal and simple supposition explains how this works without real universals without real Ockham Ockham the key innovations are first intentions, second intentions and so on…. Ockham Ockham another innovation was a new taxonomy of terms as absolute/connotative and abstract/concrete Peter of Spain Peter in Peter of Spain’s system terms often need analysis, rephrasing, to remove their unclarity Peter of Spain Peter unclarity might arise because some terms signify some one thing primarily but primarily another thing secondarily another secondarily Ockham Ockham terms of that kind are called connotative by Ockham, to distinguish them from to absolute terms absolute without secondary signification Ockham Ockham ‘green-thing’ is a connotative term (a single word, viride, in Latin) (a viride analyzed as analyzed ‘an X with greenness,’ an green (viriditas in Latin, ­itas indicating abstract quality) in a proposition of the form ‘N is an X with Y-ness’ Ockham Ockham the signification of ‘green-thing’ goes both to itself, X, primarily, and secondarily to Y-ness, ‘greenness,’ the property that a green thing must have the thing Ockham Ockham but ‘green-thing,’ -thing,’ a connotative term, connotative is also a ‘concrete’ term Ockham Ockham concrete terms are concrete either connotative, connotative like ‘green-thing,’ or absolute like ‘frog,’ or absolute which has no secondary signification Peter of Spain Peter abstract terms abstract like ‘greenness’ like have the form ‘Y-ness,’ which in Peter of Spain’s system puts them in one of the nine accidental categories Ockham Ockham Ockham would put ‘greenness’ in the category of quality, regarding it as real, unlike the other accidental categories Ockham Ockham ‘Rosalie is green’ Rosalie green is analyzed as is ‘Rosalie is an X with greenness,’ Rosalie green in the form in ‘N is an X with Y-ness’ Ockham Ockham ‘greenness’ ness’ is an abstract absolute term is suppositing for suppositing real accidents of quality, real accidents just as ‘Rosalie’ supposits for a real substance for real substance Ockham Ockham only particulars are real: only particulars real Rosalie, a particular frog, is green Rosalie, green because she has greenness, because green a particular quality signified by an abstract term: both she and her quality are real both real Ockham Ockham her quantity her her place her her position and so on are not real are not real Ockham Ockham when abstract terms are asserted of particulars, they will be merely verbal, just synonyms for the corresponding terms that signify real items Ockham Ockham ‘frogness,’ for example, frogness,’ will not be a term for a real universal; real universal it is abstract, it with the Y-ness form, with but it is not a quality, so it is not real Ockham Ockham mistakes about universals, mistaking words for real things, are detected by analysis of language, looking beneath its surface for deeper structures ...
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This note was uploaded on 02/24/2010 for the course PHILOSOPHY 100B taught by Professor Copenhaver during the Spring '10 term at UCLA.

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