145hw3 - [0 , 1] . (a) Derive a symmetric Bayesian Nash...

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Econ 145: Problem Set III Ichiro Obara February 18, 2009 Feburuary 26, 2009 1. Consider a f rst price auction with n bidders, whose values are inde- pendently and uniformly distributed over [0 , 10] . (a) Derive a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (b) Compute the seller’s expected revenue in this auction. 2. Consider an all-pay auction with n bidders, whose values are indepen- dently and uniformly distributed over
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Unformatted text preview: [0 , 1] . (a) Derive a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (b) Find the optimal reserve price to maximize the seller’s revenue as a function of n (you may use the revenue equivalence theorem for the case with uniform distributions). Also derive the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium with this optimal reserve price. 1...
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This note was uploaded on 03/02/2010 for the course ECON econ 145 taught by Professor Obara during the Winter '10 term at UCLA.

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