Many-to-OneMatching145

Many-to-OneMatching1 - Many-to-One Matching Ichiro Obara UCLA Obara(UCLA Matching 1 25 Many-to-One Matching Many-to-One Matching Obara(UCLA

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–9. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: Many-to-One Matching Ichiro Obara UCLA January 27, 2010 Obara (UCLA) Matching January 27, 2010 1 / 25 Many-to-One Matching Many-to-One Matching Obara (UCLA) Matching January 27, 2010 2 / 25 Many-to-One Matching Many-to-One Matching We consider two-sided markets where one side can “hire” more than one from the other side. Example. I Two firms f 1 , f 2 and five workers w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 , w 5 . I Each firm can hire up to two workers. Each worker can work for one firm or stay unemployed. I Each worker has a strict preference between two firms & unemployment. I Each firm has a strict ranking over workers and keeping a vacant position (ex. w 5 f 1 w 2 f 1 f 1 ... ). Obara (UCLA) Matching January 27, 2010 3 / 25 Many-to-One Matching Many-to-One Matching Formal Model F = { f 1 ,..., f M } . W = { w 1 ,..., w N } . firm i ’s capacity is q i . f i is firm i ’s preference over workers and keeping a position vacant. w j is worker j ’s preference over firms and unemployment. Obara (UCLA) Matching January 27, 2010 4 / 25 Many-to-One Matching Many-to-One Matching Remark Note that we are assuming that 1 a worker’s preference does not depend on who are his or her peers ( No peer effect ). 2 the value of a worker to a firm does not depend on who are other workers hired by the same firm ( No complementality ) Obara (UCLA) Matching January 27, 2010 5 / 25 Many-to-One Matching Many-to-One Matching A matching ( μ F ,μ W ) describes who works where (or does not work). I μ F ( f i ) is the set of workers hired by firm f i and vacant positions (ex. q i = 4 ,μ F ( f i ) = ( w 3 , w 5 , f i , f i )). I μ W ( w j ) is the firm (or unemployment) that hires worker w j . I μ satisfies w j ∈ μ F ( f i ) ⇔ f i = μ W ( w j ) and | μ F ( f i ) | = q i . Obara (UCLA) Matching January 27, 2010 6 / 25 Stability Stability Obara (UCLA) Matching January 27, 2010 7 / 25 Stability Individual Rationality We define the notion of individual rationality as usual....
View Full Document

This note was uploaded on 03/06/2010 for the course ECON 102 taught by Professor Serra during the Spring '08 term at UCLA.

Page1 / 25

Many-to-OneMatching1 - Many-to-One Matching Ichiro Obara UCLA Obara(UCLA Matching 1 25 Many-to-One Matching Many-to-One Matching Obara(UCLA

This preview shows document pages 1 - 9. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online