5650Team3_ColumbiaDraft1_David review for group

5650Team3_ColumbiaDraft1_David review for group - Columbia...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–4. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Columbia 1 BCIS 5650 Group 3 Report 5: Technology Disaster Analysis: Columbia Group 3 Members: David C. Kupfer DavidKupfer@my.unt.edu Jongsung Lee JongSungLee@gmail.com Candice Leitner Candice.Leitner@dyn-intl.com Tracy Rittter TracyRitter0313@gmail.com Fall 2009 BCIS 5650 Section 1 Professor Vedder November 5, 2009
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Columbia 2 BCIS 5650 Group 3 Report 5: Technology Disaster Analysis: Columbia Space Shuttle Columbia took its place for mission STS-107 as NASA’s 113 th shuttle launch at 10:39 a.m. EST on January 16, 2003. At 10:40:22 a.m., a briefcase-sized piece of foam insulation broke away from the left bipod ramp of the Columbia’s external fuel tank and struck the shuttle’s left wing at the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panel 8. At approximately 9:00 a.m. EST on February 1, 2003, 16 minutes before the scheduled touchdown at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Columbia disintegrated at reentry due to damage from the foam strike (NASA). How did this tragedy occur? What factors preceded the disaster? What lessons were learned and changes made as a consequence of this catastrophe? These are the items that this paper will address, beginning with the issues surrounding the technologies involved and the misunderstandings and overconfidence of NASA in those technologies. We will also explore the paradigms in effect at the time and their role in the disaster. Three major paradigms were determined to have been significant in the event. One was the belief that if nothing bad had happened, nothing bad would happen. Another was the value of “Faster, better cheaper” (CAIB, p. 103). This paradigm led to some extent to the third, that if something was not specifically unsafe, then it was safe. These paradigms contributed to a management atmosphere ripe for disaster. Communication tended to flow one way only—downward—management was persistently unwilling to hear or respond to bad news. There were strong internal and external pressures to perform which also contributed to management’s failures throughout both Columbia’s last mission and NASA’s entire history with the Space Shuttle program.
Background image of page 2
Columbia 3 What technologies were involved? Were any misunderstood, misapplied, abused, overly trusted, etc.? The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report Volume I describes the Space Shuttle as “one of the most complex machines ever devised” (p. 14). The Space Shuttle consists of four main parts: the Orbiter, Space Shuttle Main Engines, External Tank, and Solid Rocket Boosters. These components are assembled from “more than 2.5 million parts, 230 miles of wire, 1,060 valves, and 1,440 circuit breakers” (p. 14). The Space Shuttle technologies directly involved in the accident were those regarding the foam insulation used on the external fuel tank and the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon on the leading edge of the wing of the Orbiter. The External Tank holds as much as 143,351 gallons of liquid oxygen stored at minus 297
Background image of page 3

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 4
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Page1 / 23

5650Team3_ColumbiaDraft1_David review for group - Columbia...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 4. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online