5650 Grp 3 Rep 1 Quest 3 2009 09 01 first draft[1]

5650 Grp 3 Rep 1 Quest 3 2009 09 01 first draft[1] - ALTO...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–4. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
ALTO III and PARC 1 BSIC 5650 Group 3 Report 1 Question 3_Alto III and PARC: What Went Wrong at PARC and What Can We Learn [September 1, 2009 10:30 AM] Group 3 Members: David C. Kupfer [email protected] Jong Sung Lee [email protected] Candice Leitner [email protected] Tracy Rittter [email protected] Fall 2009 BCIS 5650 Section 1 Professor Vedder September 17, 2009
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
ALTO III and PARC 2 BSIC 5650 Group 3 Report 1 Question 3_Alto III and PARC: What Went Wrong at PARC and What Can We Learn PARC connotes a simultaneous measure of achievement and disappointment. The discoveries made by a group of scientists at a research facility in California over 30 years ago have created an impact on both the leaders of technology and business that is still felt today. PARC was a dynamic learning center for those who believed in no boundaries for the advancement of computer science. It redefined the meaning of the computer as it reshaped or invented new methods to transmit, store, and process data. It was a laboratory that developed cutting-edge technology that defines our workplace and often our home. Communication with coworkers, customers, supervisors, as well as family and friends, is managed by such PARC instruments as the computer mouse, the Ethernet, and the graphic user interface with overlapping screen windows and pop-up menus. Even with the stunning advances, Xerox is portrayed as a corporate bumbler for failing to become a behemoth in the computer industry, a giant that could have dwarfed the combined efforts of Apple and Microsoft, two companies which continue to profit from the engineering achievements of the PARC laboratory. It is difficult to assess why precisely Xerox failed to commercialize on the success of its own researchers. In works such as Dealers of lightening: Xerox PARC and the dawn of the computer age (Hiltzik 2000) and Fumbling the future : How Xerox invented, then ignored the first personal computer (Alexander & Smith, 1988), critics recognize that there were many mistakes. They condemn the missed opportunities but disagree on the causes. This paper will see how Xerox’s strategy of fostering basic research was weakened by a lack of executive vision. Corporate Xerox, during the 1970s, could not commit to the marketing of innovation which the PARC engineers were committed to developing. Why did Xerox Purchase SDS and why did PARC Develop?
Background image of page 2
ALTO III and PARC 3 One can look at various approaches to the central question “ why didn’t Xerox succeed in business as it did in basic research” and glean multiple causes for the failure to develop research as well as new conclusions about the management of Xerox. To understand the background of the mismatch between engineering and finance, one can look to the origins of PARC. Xerox, in the late 1960s, was essentially a “one-product company” – the photocopier (Alexander & Smith, 1988, p. 23). The leadership of the company required that new products should be developed in order to maintain
Background image of page 3

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 4
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 03/09/2010 for the course BCIS 4940 taught by Professor Angelo during the Spring '09 term at Texas Tech.

Page1 / 18

5650 Grp 3 Rep 1 Quest 3 2009 09 01 first draft[1] - ALTO...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 4. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online