IR Notes Lecture 17

IR Notes Lecture 17 - IR Notes Lecture 17March 20, 2007...

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IR Notes Lecture 17—March 20, 2007 Economic Instruments of Foreign Policy I. Economic Sanctions a) The logic of economic sanctions b) The sanctions debate II. Engagement a) The logic of engagement b) The advantages and disadvantages of engagement III. The North Korea Example a) Historical background b) Options toward North Korea I. Economic Sanctions a) The logic of economic sanctions i) Seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing its opportunities to take part in the int’l economy in order to coerce target government to change its political behavior ii) Work in 1 of 2 ways (1) Convince the price of pursuing policies are too high, not worth it (2) Provoke or incite popular revolt in the target country due to decline in welfare iii) Apartheid in South Africa (1) Thought that int’l pressure through sanctions was partly responsible for bringing down apartheid iv) One key to success of economic sanctions is multilateral cooperation (1) Don’t’ work until all states out there are willing to participate so that states really suffer (2) There was hope that end of Cold War would help this cooperation v) Distinct from trade wars (no political motive, only economic), and economic warfare (go to war in some balnk????? vi) Have specifically coercive goals on a political issue vii)Try to bring about a change without resorting to military force viii) Success (1) Accede to most demands because of the use or threat of use of economic sanctions b) The Sanctions Debate i) Robert Pape’s argument against sanctions (1) Existing research overestimated success of strategy (a) Had argued they succeed 1/3 of the time (b) He found only 5% of cases were successful as usually something else was going on that led to the change in a country’s policy (2) Then goes on to say why it isn’t an effective strategy (a) Key argument is that states are simply not that fragile nor likely to become more fragile going forward (b) States can swallow a heavy price for something they find desireable
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(c) Also argues that they are a form of punishment but when nationalist populations are punished by int’l community, they don’t turn against own arguments, they get angry at rest of world and rally around their own governments (3) Sanctions regimes tend to be porous, hard to impose rigorous sanctions regime due to transportation technology (a) Multilateral cooperation after Cold War simply hasn’t happened (4) Moral questions about sanctions (a) More likely to hurt poor than regime being targeted (b) Estimated 1,000,000 Iraqis killed thanks to sanctions ii) Pape’s conditions under which sanctions can succeed (1) In disputes involving minor issues (2) When target state’s economic interaction is almost entirely with coercing state (a) Don’t have to rely on other states to cooperate with sanctions
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This note was uploaded on 03/12/2010 for the course GOVT 006 taught by Professor Wallander during the Spring '08 term at Georgetown.

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IR Notes Lecture 17 - IR Notes Lecture 17March 20, 2007...

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