IR Notes Lecture 14

IR Notes Lecture 14 - IR Notes Lecture 14February 27, 2007...

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IR Notes Lecture 14—February 27, 2007 IR Theory After 9/11 I. Critiques of IR Theory II. The Iraq War a) Historical Background b) Options for Iraq in 2002 c) Arguments on the War d) IR Theory and the War III. The “Global War on Terror” and IR Theory I. Critiques of IR Theory a) Largely derived and meant to describe great power behavior i) Great powers are important but can this help us explain behavior beyond the great powers b) Applicability to the developing world i) Some argue that there are unique dynamics in developing world making these theories less applicable (1) Mithalan the idea that states are functionally undifferentiated, some would argue that less developed states may be differentiated, can find niche in IPOL (2) Differing history and dynamics undermining the logic of these theories, derived from behavior of great powers c) Don’t give much of a role to non-state actors d) These theories are historical relics i) Alright for understanding old conflicts, but not very useful to increasingly globalized world where non-state actors are important II. War in Iraq a) History i) In August 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait arguing it is a historical province, and that it was digging into Iraqi territory ii) January 1991 military campaign to oust Iraq, and war is over in April iii) Ceasefire was UN resolution 687 (1) Called for Iraq to verify that it had destroyed all its WMDs and capability iv) Sanctions put on Iraq until it could be verified that they had done this (1) Controversial: who were sanctions really hurting? And is this really effective? v) Coalition continued to enforce no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq to protect Kurds in north, Shia in south vi) Growing dissatisfaction with sanctions regime (increasingly porous with smuggling through unprotected borders, hurting the ordinary Iraq civilians) and the no-fly zones enforced by British and U.S/ (1) No-fly zones was a continuous operation, slow and steady drain on resources vii)Following 9/11
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(1) Wondering whether Saddam was connected to al-qaeda b) 2002 there are 4 different options on what to do with the Iraqi situation that nobody was particularly happy with i) Status quo plus: keep general framework in place but try to improve upon it— more effective, targeted sanction regime (1) Didn’t require military force, but also detractors—if sanctions hadn’t worked for this point, why should we expect them to work in the future ii) Engagement: lift sanctions, try to engage Baghdad (1) Hope is that if you show Iraqi people that there’s a chance of cooperation with the int’l community, that population will rise up against Saddam in dissatisfaction and problem would be solved by Iraqis themselves (2) But what type of message will this send to other rogue states (3) Also possibility of failure is large: Saddam can pretend to play along while
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This note was uploaded on 03/12/2010 for the course GOVT 006 taught by Professor Wallander during the Spring '08 term at Georgetown.

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IR Notes Lecture 14 - IR Notes Lecture 14February 27, 2007...

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