C__Documents and Settings_ipek hızlıkan_Local Settings_Application Data_Mo

C__Documents and Settings_ipek hızlıkan_Local Settings_Application Data_Mo

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An interview with Thomas C. Schelling: Interpretation of game theory and the checkerboard model N. Emrah Aydinonat Ankara University Abstract This note is mainly based on a short interview with Thomas C. Schelling (TCS), who shared the Nobel Prize with Robert J. Aumann in 2005. The interview took place on 06.03.2001 at University of Maryland, College Park, USA. It consists of two parts. The first part is about his interpretation of game theory, particularly about the use of game-theoretic models in explaining the origin and maintenance of conventions, and norms. The second part is on the origin of Schelling’s influential checkerboard model of residential segregation, particularly about his approach to modeling social phenomena exemplified by this model. The note ends with some concluding remarks. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Trustfonds of Erasmus University Rotterdam and Erasmus Institute for Philosophy of Economics, which made this interview possible. Citation: Aydinonat, N. Emrah, (2005) "An interview with Thomas C. Schelling: Interpretation of game theory and the checkerboard model." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 2 pp. 1-7 Submitted: October 11, 2005. Accepted: October 20, 2005. URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2005/volume2/EB-05B20001A.pdf
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1 1. Introduction This note is mainly based on a short interview with Thomas C. Schelling (TCS), who shared the Nobel Prize with Robert J. Aumann in 2005. The interview took place on 06.03.2001 at University of Maryland, College Park, USA. It consists of two parts. The first part is about his interpretation of game theory, particularly about the use of game-theoretic models in explaining the origin and maintenance of conventions, and norms. The second part is on the origin of Schelling’s influential checkerboard model of residential segregation, particularly about his approach to modeling social phenomena exemplified by this model. Each part starts with a short introduction. The note ends with some concluding remarks. 2. The Interpretation of Game Theory The classical interpretation of game theory is that games should represent the physical and institutional rules of the game in the real world. Yet game-theoretic models do not generally reflect the physical and institutional rules in the real world, rather the rules of the game are usually the invention of the theorist (Janssen1998: 23). That is, game-theoretic models do not provide a description of the environment within which a particular result (e.g., a particular convention) has emerged, they rather abstract from such factors. An alternative interpretation is that ‘to make sense a game should present the way in which individuals (players of the game) conceive the situation’ (Rubinstein 1991). Of course, game-theoretic models portray the way in which model agents perceive the hypothetical scenario described by the theorist. Yet they do not represent the way in which real individuals perceive the problem situation in
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C__Documents and Settings_ipek hızlıkan_Local Settings_Application Data_Mo

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