ECS1050.02.post

ECS1050.02.post - Von Neumann & the Bomb Strategy is not...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–12. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Strategy is not concerned with the efficient application of force but with the exploitation of potential force (T. Schelling, 1960, p. 5).
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
UNIT I: Overview & History Introduction: What is Game Theory? Von Neumann and the Bomb The Science of International Strategy Logic of Indeterminate Situations 6/25
Background image of page 2
A Brief History of Game Theory Dr.Strangelove The Science of International Strategy The Prisoner’s Dilemma Securing Insecure Agreements Postwar Economic Regimes
Background image of page 3

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
A Brief History of Game Theory Minimax Theorem 1928 Theory of Games & Economic Behavior 1944 Prisoner’s Dilemma 1950 Nash Equilibrium 1950 The Evolution of Cooperation
Background image of page 4
Dr. Strangelove John von Neumann (1903-57). Hilbert program Quantum mechanics ENIAC The Doomsday Machine
Background image of page 5

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
The Doctrine of Military Decision Step 1: The Mission Step 2: Situation and Courses of Action Step 3: Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action Step 4: Comparison of Available Courses of Action Step 5: The Decision Source: O.G. Hayward, Jr., Military Decisions and Game Theory (1954).
Background image of page 6
Military Decision & Game Theory A military commander may approach decision with either of two philosophies. He may select his course of action on the basis of his estimate of what his enemy is able to do to oppose him. Or, he may make his selection on the basis of his estimate of what his enemy is going to do . The former is a doctrine of decision based on enemy capabilities; the latter on enemy intentions. (O. G. Hayward, Jr. 1954: 365)
Background image of page 7

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Military Decision & Game Theory Source: O. G. Hayward, Jr. 1954 Southern Route BISMARCK SEA Northern Route Rain Clear Weather New Guinea New Britain Northern Route Southern Route Northern Southern Route Route 2 days 2 days 2 1 day 3 days 1 Japan US Battle of the Bismarck Sea, 1943 US min 2 1 Jmax 2 3
Background image of page 8
Military Decision & Game Theory Game theory lent itself to the analysis of military strategy, casting well accepted principles of decision making at a rigorous, abstract level of analysis. In situation of pure conflict, the “doctrine of decision based on enemy capabilities” and game theory point to the value of prudence : maximize the minimum payoff available.
Background image of page 9

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
The Science of International Strategy Schelling’s Reorientation of Game Theory Securing Insecure Agreements Post War Economic Regimes Bargaining and Negotiation
Background image of page 10
Realism The actor (nation-state) is rational : goal-directed, concerned with maximizing power or security. The environment is anarchic : : there is no supervening authority that can enforce agreements. The solution
Background image of page 11

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 12
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 03/21/2010 for the course ECON 1050 taught by Professor Neugeboren during the Summer '09 term at Harvard.

Page1 / 49

ECS1050.02.post - Von Neumann & the Bomb Strategy is not...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 12. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online