Problem Set 1
Ying Chen,
ECN 416 Game Theory
Four questions due Thursday, January 28, 2010, at the beginning of class.
1.
Consider the following game:
2
1
3
1
1
0
2
1
3
1
2
2
1
0
0
1
1
2
3
0
(a)
Assume that both players are rational. What happens?
(b)
Assume that both players are rational and that each believes that the other is
rational. What happens?
(c)
Find the strategies that survive the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strate
gies.
2.
Iterated deletion of (weakly) dominated strategies
Consider the following
twoplayer game
2
1
1
0
1
3
1
1
1
0
2
2
1
3
1
3
3
1
2
2
(a)
Are there any strictly dominated strategies? Are there any weakly dominated
strategies? If so, explain what dominates what and how.
(b)
After deleting any strictly or weakly dominated strategies, are there any strictly
or weakly dominated strategies in the ‘reduced’ game? If so, explain what dominates
what and how. What is left?
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 Spring '10
 Y.Chen
 Game Theory, Democracy, weakly dominated strategies, Ying Chen

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