{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}

PS1-solutions

# PS1-solutions - Sketch of Solutions to Problem Set 1 Ying...

This preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

Sketch of Solutions to Problem Set 1 Ying Chen, ECN 416 Game Theory 1. Consider the following game: 2 1 3 1 1 0 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 2 3 0 (a) Assume that both players are rational. What happens? If player 1 is rational, he won’t play since is strictly dominated by . If player 2 is rational, he won’t play since is strictly dominated by . (b) Assume that both players are rational and that each believes that the other is rational. What happens? Player 1 won’t play since it is now strictly dominated by . Player 2 won’t play since it is now strictly dominated by . (c) Find the strategies that survive the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strate- gies. (   ) 2. Iterated Deletion of (weakly) Dominated Strategies Consider the following two-player game 2 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 2 2 1 3 1 3 3 1 2 2 (a) Are there any strictly dominated strategies? Are there any weakly dominated strategies? If so, explain what dominates what and how. No strictly dominated strategies. Weakly dominated strategies: weakly dominates ; weakly dominates . (b) After deleting any strictly or weakly dominated strategies, are there any strictly or weakly dominated strategies in the ‘reduced’ game? If so, explain what dominates what and how. What is left?

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
After deleting and , weakly dominates and weakly dominates . What’s left is (   ) .
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

### Page1 / 3

PS1-solutions - Sketch of Solutions to Problem Set 1 Ying...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document
Ask a homework question - tutors are online