{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}

PS2-solutions

PS2-solutions - Suggested Solutions to Problem Set 2 Ying...

This preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

Suggested Solutions to Problem Set 2 Ying Chen ECN 416 Game Theory 1 . Consider the following 2 -player game. 2 10 0 0 10 3 3 1 2 10 10 2 6 4 3 3 4 6 6 6 Find the following sets of best responses. (a)  1 ( ) for = ¡ 1 3 1 3 1 3 ¢ . (Notation: The fi rst element in is the probability that player 2 chooses , the second element is the probability that he chooses and the third elemment is the probability that he chooses . Same for part (b).) (b)  1 ( ) for = ¡ 0 1 3 2 3 ¢ (c)  2 ( ) for = ¡ 1 3 1 6 1 2 ¢ (Here is player 2 ’s belief over player 1’s strategy.) 2. Player 1 has to take a soccer penalty shot to decide the game. She can shoot eft, iddle, or ight. Player 2 is the goalie. He can dive to the eft, iddle, or ight. Actions are chosen simultaneously. The payo ff s are as follows. 2 4 6 7 3 9 1 1 6 4 3 7 6 4 9 1 7 3 4 6 (a) For each player, is any strategy dominated by another strategy? No dominated strategies for either player. (b) Is ever a best response for player 1? If so, for what beliefs about player 2 ’s strategy is a best response for player 1 ? Is a ever a best response for player 2 ? If so, for what beliefs about player 1 ’s strategy is a best response for player 2 ? ( Hint: You can write player 1’s belief as

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

What students are saying

• As a current student on this bumpy collegiate pathway, I stumbled upon Course Hero, where I can find study resources for nearly all my courses, get online help from tutors 24/7, and even share my old projects, papers, and lecture notes with other students.

Kiran Temple University Fox School of Business ‘17, Course Hero Intern

• I cannot even describe how much Course Hero helped me this summer. It’s truly become something I can always rely on and help me. In the end, I was not only able to survive summer classes, but I was able to thrive thanks to Course Hero.

Dana University of Pennsylvania ‘17, Course Hero Intern

• The ability to access any university’s resources through Course Hero proved invaluable in my case. I was behind on Tulane coursework and actually used UCLA’s materials to help me move forward and get everything together on time.

Jill Tulane University ‘16, Course Hero Intern