Midterm2 - Econ 171 Introduction to Game Theory Midterm #2...

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Midterm #2 This test contains three problems. Each part of each question is worth 10 points for a maximum of 100 points. Answer all questions (showing your work where necessary). You have 75 minutes to complete the test. Good Luck! 1. Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information: Consider the fol- lowing extensive form game. (a) How many subgames does this game have? (Remember, the entire game does not count as a subgame.) (b) What is the Subgame Perfect Outcome of this game? (c) What is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ? (Remember, the outcome spec- be called upon to act.) 2. In±nitely Repeated Games: dillema with stage game: Player 2 Confess Don±t Confess Player 1 Confess 1,1 5,0 Don±t Confess 0,5 4,4 1
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(a) Suppose Player 1 believes Player 2 will play a Trigger strategy. [That is, Player 2
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This note was uploaded on 04/06/2010 for the course ECONOMICS Econ 171 taught by Professor Jack during the Spring '10 term at UCSB.

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Midterm2 - Econ 171 Introduction to Game Theory Midterm #2...

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