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Unformatted text preview: Econ 171 &Introduction to Game Theory Midterm #2 25 February 2010 This test contains three problems. Each part of each question is worth 10 points for a maximum of 100 points. Answer all questions (showing your work where necessary). You have 75 minutes to complete the test. Good Luck! 1. Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information: Consider the fol lowing extensive form game. (Player 1&s payo/s are listed ¡rst at the terminal nodes.) (a) How many subgames does this game have? (Remember, the entire game does not count as a subgame.) (b) Write out the complete strategy sets for player 1 and player 2. (Hint: How many information sets does each player have under their control?) (c) Represent the game in normalform (i.e., matrix form). (Hint: The dimension of the matrix will be 8 & 3 .) 1 (d) Find ALL the purestrategy Nash equilibria of this game. (Remember, you need to specify the entire strategy pro&le for each player, including what the players actions would be at information sets o/ the equilibrium path).actions would be at information sets o/ the equilibrium path)....
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This note was uploaded on 04/06/2010 for the course ECON Econ 171 taught by Professor Jack during the Spring '10 term at UCSB.
 Spring '10
 Jack
 Game Theory

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