exam2_review

Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, Seventh Edition

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Overview Consumer Theory Producer Theory Exchange
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Edgeworth Box Contract Curve All Possible Exchange Points
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Overview Consumer Theory Producer Theory Exchange Walrasian Equilibrium (Multiplicity)
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Walrasian Equilibrium Requirements: 1) Full information 2) “Smooth Indifference Curves” (Convex, continuous, monotonic) 3) Interior Solution 4) No Externalities Outcome: Welfare Thoerems 1) If (x,p) is a Warasian equilibrium, then x is Pareto Efficient 2) Suppose x is a PE allocation in which each agent holds a positive amount of each good. If preferences are convex, continuous, and monotonic, there exists an initial endowment for which x is a Walrasian Equilibrium.
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Overview Consumer Theory Producer Theory Exchange Walrasian Equilibrium (Multiplicity) Game Theory Are the Requirements Satisfied? Interior Solution? Information Externalities Modern Day Economics Partial Equilibrium Games (Industrial Organization)
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Game Theory A Careful model of how agents interact with one another. Nash Equilibrium: A strategy profile in which no one has an incentive to change strategies Dominant Strategy Equilibrium: A strategy profile in
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exam2_review - Overview Consumer Theory Producer Theory...

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