Frankfurt’s description of the unwilling addict, Adam, is that he has conflicting first-order desires, which is the desire to do something or want something, whereas this something could be a drug. Adam is a person in which one of his conflicting first-order desires will take place. Both desires are his, and whether he finally takes the drug or finally succeeds in refraining from taking it, either way he acting to satisfy his own desire. In both cases he does something he himself wants to do, and he does it because of his desire to do it, not because of some external influence. The unwilling addict identifies himself, however, through the formation of a second-order volition, which is that he wants his desire to refrain from taking the drugs. He wants this certain desire to be his will, but he is unable to make it so. Frankfurt draws an important distinction between freedom of the will, which is having a will that is free, and freedom of action, which is freedom to do what you want to do. Someone
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