roywchen_103108_17308Eco...ummary_of_topics_Midterm_2

roywchen_103108_17308Eco...ummary_of_topics_Midterm_2 - o...

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Econ 398: Summary of topics relevant to Midterm 2 Simultaneous and sequential games Changing the rules/order of play Portraying games in different forms o Sequential games strategic/normal form o Simultaneous games extensive form Subgames Subgame-perfect equilibria Utility over gambles Expected utility property Risk neutrality, risk aversion, risk loving Mixed-Strategy Nash equilibria Mixed strategies Nash equilibria in mixed strategies Opponent’s indifference property Expected payoffs 2x2 games o Expected utilities of pure strategies o Best responses and intersections of best responses (Nash equilibria) o Minimax method (zero-sum games only) Games larger than 2x2 o Deleting dominated strategies (and rationalizability)
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Unformatted text preview: o Full and partial mixing o In a Nash equilibrium, any pure strategies that a player uses with positive probability must have the same expected payoff, and any pure strategy that a player uses with zero probability must have a lower expected payoff than any pure strategy that player uses with positive probability Complicated examples War of attrition: drawing utilities in order to figure out the best responses Expert advice: writing a sequential game in strategic form in order to find Nash equilibria (pure and mixed) Cheap talk: Multiple subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in a game with both sequential and simultaneous moves...
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This note was uploaded on 04/14/2010 for the course ECON 398 taught by Professor Emre during the Spring '07 term at University of Michigan.

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