Strategy10Handout - 10/2/2008 Midterm 1: Next Tuesday...

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10/2/2008 1 Midterm 1: Next Tuesday ± Covers up through Chpt. 5 & HW 3 ± Come early and bring a UMID ± No cellphones or i-pods allowed ± Calculators must be simple non graphing Calculators must be simple, non-graphing, non-complex, non-computer-like calculators with one memory register. If you do not bring an appropriate calculator, you may not use it one on the exam. Example – George and Hiromi Hiromi TU George RV 2 , 0 2 , 0 RW 2 , 0 2 , 0 SV 3 , 1 0 , 0 SW 3 , 1 1 , 2 Example – George and Hiromi ± ((R,W), U) is the Rollback Equilibrium here ± It has an interesting property ± The Rollback Equilibrium induces a NE in the subgame left by deleting George’s first node subgame left by deleting George s first node 3 HIROMI T U W V (3,1) 2 GEORGE (0,0) (1,2) Example – George and Hiromi Hiromi George V 3 , 1 0 , 0 ± Rollback Equilibria induce NE in every subgame of the original game, and so are called Subgame-Perfect Equilibria (SPE) W 3 , 1 1 , 2 Wars of Attrition ± A waiting game between two agents ±
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This note was uploaded on 04/14/2010 for the course ECON 398 taught by Professor Emre during the Spring '07 term at University of Michigan.

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Strategy10Handout - 10/2/2008 Midterm 1: Next Tuesday...

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