Strategy16Handout - Midterm 2 Next Tuesday Exam focuses on new material Chapter 5 to beginning of Chapter 9 Lectures 8-16 HW 4-6 Signaling with

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
10/30/2008 1 Midterm 2: Next Tuesday ± Exam focuses on new material ± Chapter 5 to beginning of Chapter 9 ± Lectures 8-16, HW 4-6 ± Come early and bring a UMID ± No cellphones or i-pods allowed ± Calculators must be simple, non-graphing, non-complex, non-computer-like calculators with one memory register. If you do not bring an appropriate calculator, you may not use it one on the exam. You may not share calculators. Signaling with Strategic Uncertainty Otto Stag Hare Ludwig Stag 2 , 2 0 , 1 Hare 1 , 0 1 , 1 ± Recall the Stag-Hunt Game ± How can Ludwig and Otto coordinate? ± Ludwig can tell Otto, “I will hunt stag” ± “Cheap talk” ± Does Ludwig benefit if Otto believes him? ± Does Ludwig benefit by following through? Signaling with Strategic Uncertainty ± We should model the signaling: Ludwig “I’m hunting Stag” “I’m hunting Hare” Otto Stag Hare Ludwig Stag 2 , 2 0 , 1 Hare 1 , 0 1 , 1 Otto Stag Hare Ludwig Stag 2 , 2 0 , 1 Hare 1 , 0 1 , 1 A “Cheap Talk” (Subgame Perfect) Equilibrium
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 04/14/2010 for the course ECON 398 taught by Professor Emre during the Spring '07 term at University of Michigan.

Page1 / 3

Strategy16Handout - Midterm 2 Next Tuesday Exam focuses on new material Chapter 5 to beginning of Chapter 9 Lectures 8-16 HW 4-6 Signaling with

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online