L12(1)_HeideggerBeingTime - PHI 310 Lecture 12 Heideggers...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
PHI 310 Lecture 12: Heidegger’s Being and Time. Being and Dasein. I. HEIDEGGER’S LANGUAGE AND ITS TRANSLATION Throughout Being & Time (designated hereafter ‘ BT ’) Heidegger discounts substantive (noun) forms , using instead verbal, adverbial or adjectival forms of terms because he seeks to highlight the transitory, temporal aspects of how things are or occur and especially the transitory, temporal aspects of the ways in which things reveal themselves or are manifest to us . Heidegger deliberately draws from Attic Greek and also old German to stress adverbial and adjectival forms of words, rather than substantive (noun) or verbal forms. Heidegger does this so far as possible to stress how things are or appear for some period or in some situation, to try to wean us away from almost automatically assuming we can formulate everything of any importance in terms of subject, predicates and persisting states and locations of things. II. PRELIMINARY ORIENTATION Important Initial Points: 1. Heidegger is clear and careful about how he poses his questions and the sequence in which he poses them. 2. Heidegger’s central topic: How are we, such that we can be ‘here’, on any occasion, to witness whatever occurs or manifests itself? Why Heidegger’s issues and explorations of our being-here so oblique: consider 2.1–2.5: 2.1 Philosophy begins with experiences which seem simultaneously most important to life yet currently least well understood and articulated. 2.2 However philosophy sets out to deal with such experiences (2.1), it must be with the intention of giving an account of the experience that is responsive to that experience itself, not just one that is intellectually satisfying because it accords with the way one usually classifies, describes, accounts for or explains such things. 2.3 These two points may seem obvious. However, following them out seems forever short- circuited by, not just our presuppositions or prejudices but by the way we understand how it is to ‘be’ philosophical about anything. Hence we must start with how we understand ourselves to ‘be’ philosophical in order properly to engage with (2.1) and (2.2). 2.4 All three points (2.1–2.3) must be considered as addressing issues which are ultimately ontological’ at least in this sense: we must reconsider how things are and how they reveal their being to us , not whether they are real, nor what they are, nor what kinds of reality they exhibit (taxonomy), nor which of the various non-philosophical practices researches them best. 2.5 Heidegger’s phenomenological inquiry in BT centrally concerns: How must WE be such that
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
what or whomever confronts us (or what- or whomever we encounter) can reveal its being to us? III.
Background image of page 2
Image of page 3
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

Page1 / 6

L12(1)_HeideggerBeingTime - PHI 310 Lecture 12 Heideggers...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online