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Tutorial2

# Tutorial2 - CSC5350 Game Theory in Computer Science...

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CSC5350 Game Theory in Computer Science Tutorial 2 CHEN Wenhao [email protected] SHB 905

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(Exercise 18.2) Formulate a first price auction as a strategic game and analyze its Nash equilibria. In particular, show that in all equilibria player 1 obtains the object?
(Exercise 18.2)

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(Exercise 18.2)
(Exercise 24.1) (Exercise 24.1) Let G be a strictly competitive game that has a Nash equilibrium. a. Show that if some of player 1 s payoffs in G are increased in such a way that the resulting G is strictly competitive then G has no equilibrium in which player 1 is worse off than she was in an equilibrium of G . (Note that G may have no equilibrium at all.) b. Show that the game that results if player 1 is prohibited from using one of her actions in G does not have an equilibrium in which player 1 s payoff is higher than it is in an equilibrium of G . c. Give examples to show that neither of the above properties necessarily holds for a game that is not strictly competitive.

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(Exercise 24.1) DEFINITION: A strategic game <{1,2},(A
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Tutorial2 - CSC5350 Game Theory in Computer Science...

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