This preview shows pages 1–7. Sign up to view the full content.
This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.
View Full DocumentThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.
View Full DocumentThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.
View Full Document
Unformatted text preview: CSC5350 Game Theory in Computer Science Tutorial 2 CHEN Wenhao whchen@cse.cuhk.edu.hk SHB 905 (Exercise 18.2) Formulate a first price auction as a strategic game and analyze its Nash equilibria. In particular, show that in all equilibria player 1 obtains the object? (Exercise 18.2) (Exercise 18.2) (Exercise 24.1) ¡ (Exercise 24.1) Let G be a strictly competitive game that has a Nash equilibrium. ¡ a. Show that if some of player 1 ’ s payoffs in G are increased in such a way that the resulting G ’ is strictly competitive then G ’ has no equilibrium in which player 1 is worse off than she was in an equilibrium of G. (Note that G ’ may have no equilibrium at all.) ¡ b. Show that the game that results if player 1 is prohibited from using one of her actions in G does not have an equilibrium in which player 1 ’ s payoff is higher than it is in an equilibrium of G. ¡ c. Give examples to show that neither of the above properties necessarily holds for a game that is not strictly competitive. (Exercise 24.1)(Exercise 24....
View
Full
Document
This note was uploaded on 04/23/2010 for the course CSC CSC5350 taught by Professor Leunghofung during the Winter '09 term at CUHK.
 Winter '09
 LeungHoFung
 Computer Science

Click to edit the document details