Tutorial5

Tutorial5 - CSC5350 Game Theory in Computer Science...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–13. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
CSC5350 Game Theory in Computer Science CHEN Wenhao [email protected] SHB 905 Tutorial 5
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Outline ± Assignment 1 ± Subgame ± Subgame perfect equilibrium ± Finding subgame perfect equilibrium ± Exercises
Background image of page 2
Assignment 1 marking scheme ± Q1 ± (a) 5% ± (b) 5% ± (c) 15% ± Q2 ± (a) 5% ± (b) 5% ± (c) 10% ± (d) 5% ± Q3 ± (a) 10% ± (b) 15% ± Q4 ± 25%
Background image of page 3

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Subgame ± Let G be an extensive game with perfect information, for any nonterminal history h of G, the subgameG(h) following the history h is an extensive game ± Players: the players in G ± Terminal histories: the set of all sequences h of actions such that (h, h ) is a terminal history of G ± Player function: assign player P(h, h ) to each proper subhistory h of a terminal history ± Preferences: each player prefers h to h ’’ if and only if she prefers (h, h ) to (h, h ’’ )
Background image of page 4
Subgame ± The subgame following the empty history is the entire game ± Every other subgame is called a proper subgame ± The number of nonterminal histories is equal to the number of subgame
Background image of page 5

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Example 1, 3 3, 1 X Y Z XZ 1 2 2, 2 3, 1 XY 2 1, 3 2, 2 YZ 2
Background image of page 6
Example ± Number of nonterminal histories: 4 ± Empty history ± X ± Y ± Z 1, 3 3, 1 X Y Z XZ 1 2 2, 2 3, 1 XY 2 1, 3 2, 2 YZ 2
Background image of page 7

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
± Number of nonterminal histories: 4 ± Empty history ± X ± Y ± Z 1, 3 3, 1 X Y Z XZ 1 2 2, 2 3, 1 XY 2 1, 3 2, 2 YZ 2
Background image of page 8
± Number of nonterminal histories: 4 ± Empty history ± X ± Y ± Z 1, 3 3, 1 X Y Z XZ 1 2 2, 2 3, 1 XY 2 1, 3 2, 2 YZ 2
Background image of page 9

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
± Number of nonterminal histories: 4 ± Empty history ± X ± Y ± Z 1, 3 3, 1 X Y Z XZ 1 2 2, 2 3, 1 XY 2 1, 3 2, 2 YZ 2
Background image of page 10
± Number of nonterminal histories: 4 ± Empty history ± X ± Y ± Z 1, 3 3, 1 X Y Z XZ 1 2 2, 2 3, 1 XY 2 1, 3 2, 2 YZ 2
Background image of page 11

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Subgame perfect equilibrium ± A strategy profile s* with the property that in no subgame can any player i do better by choosing a strategy different from s* i , given that every other player j adheres to s* j u (O h (s -i *, s *)) (O ))
Background image of page 12
Image of page 13
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 04/23/2010 for the course CSC CSC5350 taught by Professor Leunghofung during the Winter '09 term at CUHK.

Page1 / 51

Tutorial5 - CSC5350 Game Theory in Computer Science...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 13. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online