Tutorial6

# Tutorial6 - CSC5350 Game Theory in Computer Science...

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CSC5350 Game Theory in Computer Science Tutorial 6 CHEN Wenhao [email protected] SHB 905

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Outline ± Repeated Games ± Iterated Prisoner s Dilemma
Repeated Games ± Let G be a strategic game. An infinitely repeated f an extensive game with perfect gameof Gis an extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous moves, with he same set of players as that in ± The same set of players as that in G ± Set of terminal histories is the set of sequences (a 1 , a 2 , ) of action profiles in G ± The player function assigns the set of all players to every history ± Preference relations ± Discounting imit of means ± Limit of means ± Overtaking

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Repeated Games ± Discounting preference relation or some number (0 1) a sequence of payoffs ± For some number d in (0, 1), a sequence of payoffs (v t i ) is at least as good as another sequence of payoffs (w ) if and only if ± E.g. d=0.5 round 1234 > = 5 v 53100 w 01530 5 2 -4 -3 d t-1 1 0.5 0.25 0.125 (v ) 5 1 -1 -0.375 = 4.625 Æ is preferred
Repeated Games ± Limit of means preference relation ± A sequence of payoffs (v t i ) is preferred to another sequence of payoffs (w ) if and only if g ± E.g.

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## This note was uploaded on 04/23/2010 for the course CSC CSC5350 taught by Professor Leunghofung during the Winter '09 term at CUHK.

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Tutorial6 - CSC5350 Game Theory in Computer Science...

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