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Unformatted text preview: for the final, then your final grades would be computed as follows. 0.3(70/100) + 0.3(33/40) + 0.4(70/100) Course Description : Lecture. This course covers a variety of topics regarding exchange of discrete goods. In particular, we focus on the performance of different mechanisms and mechanism design problems in real life. Along the way, we also study some useful math such as linear programming. Prerequisite : Calculus, analysis, and probability. Outline : Market Design without Money 1. Room Assignment/House Allocation Problem 2. Kidney Exchange http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=104404&org=NSF 3. Matching 4. College Admission Problem Market Design with Money (theory of Auction) 5. Second Price Auction Appendix, SSS 6. First Price Auction Appendix, SSS 7. Revenue Equivalence Appendix, SSS 8. Optimal Auction Appendix, SSS 9. Internet Auction 10. Assignment with Money...
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This note was uploaded on 04/25/2010 for the course ECON 145 taught by Professor Obara during the Winter '10 term at UCLA.
- Winter '10