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Unformatted text preview: "pornography" was considerably different from "obscenity." The ordinance did not refer to the prurient interest, to offensiveness, or to the standards of the community. Plaintiffs were of distributors and readers of books, magazines, and films. Collectively plaintiffs (or their members, whose interests they represent) made, sold, or read just about every kind of material that could be affected by the ordinance. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional finding it regulated speech rather than conduct and prevented the ordinance from taking effect. The court of appeals agreed and affirmed holding the ordinance discriminated on the ground of the content of the speech. OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed; the ordinance did not define pornography in terms of prurient interest, offensiveness, or standards of the community and, thus, was not treated as unprotected obscenity, and the unconstitutional language of the ordinance was not severable....
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- Spring '10
- U.S. state, United States district court, states District court, United States District