Syllabus

Syllabus - 6. Games with Incomplete Information (2-3...

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Tentative Syllabus 1. Introduction to Game Theory (1 Lecture): Games and solutions. Game theory and mechanism design. Examples from networks. 2. Strategic Form Games (4-5 Lectures): Matrix and continuous games. Iter- ated strict dominance. Rationalizability. Nash Equilibrium; existence and unique- ness. Mixed and correlated equilibrium. Supermodular games. Potential/congestion games. 3. Learning, Evolution, and Computation (3 Lectures): Myopic learning; fic- titious play. Bayesian learning. Evolutionarily stable strategies. Computation of Nash equilibrium in matrix games. 4. Extensive Games with Perfect Information (2 Lectures): Backward induc- tion and subgame perfect equilibrium. Applications in bargaining games. Nash bargaining solution. 5. Repeated Games (3 Lectures): Infinitely/finitely repeated games. Trigger strategies. Folk theorems. Imperfect monitoring and perfect public equilibrium.
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Unformatted text preview: 6. Games with Incomplete Information (2-3 Lectures): Mixed and behavioral strategies. Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Applications in auctions. Dierent auction formats. Revenue and eciency properties of dierent auctions. 7. Mechanism Design (3-4 Lectures): Optimal auctions; revenue-equivalence theorem. Social choice viewpoint. Impossibility results. Revelation principle. In-centive compatibility. VCG mechanisms. Mechanisms in networking, decentralized mechanisms. 8. Network Eects and Games over Networks (2-3 Lectures): Positive and negative externalities. Utility-based resource allocation. Selsh routing. Wardrop and Nash equilibrium. Partially optimal routing. Network pricing. Competition and implications on network performance. Strategic network formation. Price of anarchy. 1...
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This note was uploaded on 05/08/2010 for the course CS 6.254 taught by Professor Asuozdaglar during the Spring '10 term at MIT.

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