Chapter4_SocialPlanner_012809

# Chapter4_SocialPlanner_012809 - Social Planner Juan...

This preview shows pages 1–7. Sign up to view the full content.

Social Planner Duke University and Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta January 28, 2009 Social Planner January 28, 2009 1 / 21

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
Motivation How do we show that an equilibrium exist? How do we characterize an equilibrium? How do we evaluate its e¢ ciency? An allocation is Pareto Optimal if there is no way to rearrange production or reallocate goods so that someone is made better o/ without making someone else worse o/. Pareto Optimality 6 = perfect state of the world or any concept like that. Social Planner January 28, 2009 2 ± 21
E¢ ciency and the Social Planner Let us imagine we have a powerful dictator, the Social Planner, that can decide how much the households consume and work and how The Social Planner is benevolent. It searches for the best possible allocation. The Social Planner does not follow prices. But it understands opportunity cost. The only constraints the social planner faces are the physical resource constraints of the economy. By construction, the solution of the Social Planner±s problem will be Pareto optimal. Juan Rubio-Ram²rez (DUKE) Social Planner January 28, 2009 3 / 21

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
Social Planner Problem Problem: max f c t , k t + 1 , l t g T t = 0 T t = 0 β t u ( c t ) subject to c t + k t + 1 = k α t ( A t l t ) 1 α + ( 1 δ ) k t c t ± 0 , 0 ² l t ² 1 , k 0 > 0 given Using the fact that l t = 1 and, to save on notation assume that A t = 1 : max f c t , k t + 1 g T t = 0 T t = 0 β t u ( c t ) subject to c t + k t + 1 = k α t + ( 1 δ ) k t c t ± 0 and k 0 > 0 given Social Planner January 28, 2009 4 / 21
Lagrangian and FOCs Lagrangian L = T t = 0 β t u ( c t ) + T t = 0 λ t [ k α t c t k t + 1 + ( 1 δ ) k t ] FOCs: L c t = β t u 0 ( c t ) λ t = 0 L c t + 1 = β t + 1 u 0 ( c t + 1 ) λ t + 1 = 0 L k t + 1 = λ t + λ t + 1 α k α 1 t + 1 + ( 1 δ ) ± = 0 Social Planner January 28, 2009 5 / 21

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
Characterization of Solution I Rewriting these conditions yields
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

## This note was uploaded on 05/13/2010 for the course ECON 110D taught by Professor Schmitt-grohe during the Spring '08 term at Duke.

### Page1 / 21

Chapter4_SocialPlanner_012809 - Social Planner Juan...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 7. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document
Ask a homework question - tutors are online