lecture19full

lecture19full - Recap Second degree price discrimination 1...

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Unformatted text preview: Recap Second degree price discrimination 1 Could offer two different bundles at two different prices to price discriminate 2 Had to make sure individuals wanted to buy (Individual rationality) and that the high demanders bought the right bundle (Incentive compatibility) 3 When marginal cost was constant: amount sold to high demanders was the same under second degree price discrimination as it would be under first degree discrimination, but the fee was lower amount sold to low demanders was lower in order to get the high demanders to buy the right bundle Types of games 1 Static games of complete information (Nash equilibrium) 2 Dynamic games of complete information (Subgame perfect equilibrium) 3 Static games of incomplete information (Bayesian Nash equilibrium) 4 Dynamic games of incomplete information (Perfect Bayesian equilibrium) Static games with complete information Static games are written down in normal form Normal form representation specifies 1 The players in the game 2 The strategies available to each player,...
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lecture19full - Recap Second degree price discrimination 1...

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