This preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.
Unformatted text preview: b c well 0 better than -25). If Sna does ake not c confess, the Nuckles is better of to confess since -1 is better tha -2. en ff s s an This means tha Nuckles' p at pure strateg to confess strictly d gy dominates t pure the strate not to confess! egy c So s Snake's str rategies...If Nuckles co f onfesses, then Snake  S now let's consider S is be etter off to confess as w (i.e. -10 is much b c well 0 better than -25). If Nuc ckles does not c confess, the Snake is better off t confess since -1 is better than -2. en s to This means tha Snake's p at pure strateg to confes strictly dominates th pure gy ss he strate not to confess! egy c 306 So w end up with... we 307  D Draw both th extensive form and normal for represen he rm ntations of t the follow wing game: : ROC PAPER SCISSOR CK, R, RS ngelina and Jennifer, a trying to decide wh get's to d are o ho date Brad Two people, An . ee he per, rs on Friday night. They agre to use th rock, pap scissor game to decide h r e (with the winner getting the date). For c convenienc represen a win with a payoff o 1 and a loss with a payoff of -1 ce, nt of 1. If the is a tie the payoff is (0, 0). Ar there any pure strat ere t s re y tegy Nash e equilibria? Here are the rul of the game: e les Rock smashes Scissors k Pape covers Rock er R Sciss sors cuts Paper Roc wins ove Scissors ck er Pap wins ov Rock per ver Scissors wins over Paper Deno Rock = "R", Paper = "P", Scis ote ssors = "S" Both players rev veal their choice simultaneously. Note that the normal form game l e three by thr matrix a the exte ree and ensive form game has nine termi m s inal nodes is a t (i.e. p payoffs). 308 ECON 301 LECTUR #18 1 RE Reca the matc all ching pennie game fro last time... es om TCHING PE ENNIES MAT Two friends take a penny i their han and place it either "h in nd e heads up" o "tails up" or ". y eed offs ws: They have agre to payo as follow If, wh they op their ha hen pen ands, the pe e...
View Full Document
This note was uploaded on 05/25/2010 for the course ECON 301 taught by Professor Sning during the Spring '10 term at University of Warsaw.
- Spring '10