LectureNote10-CovertChannels

LectureNote10-CovertChannels - C OVERT C HANNELS C LARK-W...

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Unformatted text preview: C OVERT C HANNELS C LARK-W ILSON M ODEL C HINESE W ALL M ODEL R OLE B ASED A CCESS C ONTROL C OVERT C HANNELS CS 556 - Computer Security - c circlecopyrt 2009 Colorado State University 76 / 92 Information Flow Channels C LARK-W ILSON M ODEL C HINESE W ALL M ODEL R OLE B ASED A CCESS C ONTROL C OVERT C HANNELS CS 556 - Computer Security - c circlecopyrt 2009 Colorado State University 77 / 92 A secure system should not only protect against direct revelation of data, but also against violations that produce illegal information flow through indirect means. Inference Channels - A user at a low security class uses the low data to infer information about high security class. Covert channels - Require two active agents, one at a low level and the other at a high level and an encoding scheme to pass on information about the high level to the low level Covert Channels C LARK-W ILSON M ODEL C HINESE W ALL M ODEL R OLE B ASED A CCESS C ONTROL C OVERT C HANNELS CS 556 - Computer Security - c circlecopyrt 2009 Colorado State University 78 / 92 Covert channels are typically based on monitoring the usage of system resources Harmless cases The channel parallels an overt channel (and is therefore legal) The sender and receiver are the same process (mumbling channel) Harmful cases The sender and receiver are not permitted to communicate under the given security policy Covert Channels C LARK-W ILSON M ODEL C HINESE W ALL M ODEL R OLE B ASED A CCESS C ONTROL C OVERT C HANNELS CS 556 - Computer Security - c circlecopyrt 2009 Colorado State University 79 / 92 High Trojan Horse Infected Subject Low Trojan Horse Infected Subject Low Principal High Principal Information is leaked unknown to the high principal covert channel Covert Channels C LARK-W ILSON M ODEL C HINESE W ALL M ODEL R OLE B ASED A CCESS C ONTROL...
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LectureNote10-CovertChannels - C OVERT C HANNELS C LARK-W...

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