Brockriede&Ehninger

Brockriede&E - TOULMIN ON ARGUMENT AN INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger URING the period 1917-1932 D

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Unformatted text preview: .. TOULMIN ON ARGUMENT: AN INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger URING the period 1917-1932 D several books, a series of articles, and many Letters to the Editor of QJS gave serious attention to exploring the nature of argument as it is characteris- tically employed in rhetorical proofs.1 Since that time, however, students of public address have shown comparatively little interest in the subject, leaving to philosophers, psychologists, and sociol- ogists the principal contributions which have more recently been made toward an improved understanding of argu— ment.2 Among the contributions offered by “outsiders” to our field, one in partic- ular deserves more attention than it has so far received from rhetoricians. We Mr. Brockriede is Assistant Professor of Speech and Supervisor of Forensics at the University of Illinois. Mr. Ehninger is Associate Professor of Speech at the University of Florida. 1 E.g., such books as James M. O’Neill, Crav- en Laycock, and Robert L. Scales, Argumenta- tion and Debate (New York, 1917); William T. Foster, Argumentation and Debating (Boston, 1917); and A. Craig Baird, Public Discussion and Debate (Boston, 1928); such articles as Mary Yost, “Argument from the Point of View of Sociology,” QIS, III (1917), 109-24; Charles H. Woolbert, “The Place of Logic in a System of Persuasion,” QIS, IV, (1918), 19-39; Gladys Murphy Graham, “Logic and Argumentation,” Q18, X (1924), 350-363; William E. Utterback, “Aristotle’s Contribution to the Psychology of Argument,” QJS, XI (1925), 218-225; Herbert A. Wichelns, “Analysis and Synthesis in Argu- mentation,” QIS, XI (1925), 266-272; and Ed- ward Z. Rowell, “Prolegomena to Argumenta- tion," QIS, XVIII (1932), 1-13, 224-248, 381-405, 585-606; such Letters to the Editor as those by Utterback, XI (1925), 175-177; Wichelns, XI (1925), 286—288; Ralph C. Ringwalt, XII (1926), 66-68; and Graham, XII (1925), 196-197. 2See, for example, Mortimer Adler, Dialec- tic (New York, 1927); Paul Edwards, The Logic of Moral Discourse (Glencoe, Ill., 1955); Carl 1. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold W. Kelley, Communication and Persuasion (New Haven, Conn., 1953); Charles Perelman, Traite’ de l’ar- gumentation, 2 vols. (Paris, 1958), and La nou- velle rhe’torique (Paris, 1952); and John Cohen, “Subjective Probability,” Scientific American, MCMVII (1957), 128-38. refer to some of the formulations of the English logician Stephen Toulmin in his The Uses of Argument, published in 19583 ' Toulmin’s analysis and terminology are important to the rhetorician for two different but related reasons. First, they provide an appropriate structural model by means of which rhetorical arguments may be laid out for analysis and crit- icism; and, second, they suggest a system for classifying artistic proofs which employs argument as a central and un- ifying construct. Let us consider these propositions in order. 1. As described by Toulmin, an ar— gument is movement from accepted data, through a warrant, to a claim. Data (D) answer the question, “What have you got to go on?” Thus data correspond to materials of fact or opin~ ion which in our textbooks are com— monly called evidence. Data may report historical or contemporary events, take the form of a statistical compilation or of citations from authority, or they may consist of one or more general declar- ative sentences established by a prior proof of an artistic nature. Without data clearly present or strongly implied, an argument has no informative or substantive component, no factual point of departure. Claim (C) is the term Toulmin ap- plies to what we normally speak of as a conclusion. It is the explicit appeal produced by the argument, and is al- ways of a potentially controversial 3 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). See especially the third of the five essays in the book. Cf. J. C. Cooley, “On Mr. Toulmin’s Rev- olution in Logic,” The Journal of Philosophy, LVI (1959). 297-319- TOULMIN ON ARGUMENT 45 nature. A claim may stand as the final proposition in an argument, or it may be an intermediate statement which serves as data for a subsequent inference. Data and claim taken together rep resent the specific contention advanced by an argument, and therefore con- stitute what may be regarded as its main proof line. The usual order is data first, and then claim. In this sequence the claim contains or implies “therefore.” When the order is reversed, the claim contains or implies “because.” Warrant (W') is the operational name Toulmin gives to that part of an ar- gument which authorizes the mental “leap” involved in advancing from data to claim. As distinguished from data which answer the question “What have you got to go on,” the warrant answers the question “How do you get there.” Its function is to carry the accepted data to the doubted or disbelieved prop- osition which constitutes the claim, thereby certifying this claim as true or acceptable. The relations existing among these three basic components of an argument, Toulmin suggests, may be represented diagrammatically: (D)ata Therefore (C)laim l l Since (W)arrant Here is an application of the method: Therefore <D>——————-———————(C) Russia has Russia would violated 5o violate the of 52 inter— proposed ban national on nuclear agreements weapons test- ing Since (W) Past violations are sympto- matic of probable future violations In addition to the three indispensable elements of data, claim, and warrant, Toulmin recognizes a second triad of components, any or all of which may, but need not necessarily, be present in an argument. These he calls (1) backing, (2) rebuttal, and (3) qualifier. Backing (B) consists of credentials designed to certify the assumption ex- pressed in the warrant. Such credentials may consist of a single item, or of an entire argument in itself complete with data and claim. Backing must be intro— duced when readers or listeners are not willing to accept a warrant at its face value. The rebuttal (R) performs the func- tion of a safety valve or escape hatch, and is, as a rule, appended to the claim statement. It recognizes certain condi- tions under which the claim will not hold good or will hold good only in a qualified and restricted way. By lim- iting the area to which the claim may legitimately be applied, the rebuttal anticipates certain objections which might otherwise be advanced against the argument. The function of the qualifier is to register the degree of force which the maker believes his claim to possess. The qualification may be expressed by a quantifying term such as “possibly,” “probably,” “to the five per cent level of confidence,” etc., or it may make specific reference to an anticipated refutation. When the author of a claim regards it as incontrovertible no qual- ifier is appended. These additional elements may be superimposed on the first diagram: Therefore (D)ata (Q)ualifier-———-———> (C)laim Since Unless (W) (R)ebuttal Because (B)acking 46 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH We may illustrate the model as follows: Therefore (D)—---——-(Q)~——~—-> (C) Russia has Probably Russia would violated 5o violate the of 52 inter- proposed ban national on nuclear agreements weapons testing Since Unless (W>————-—<R> Past viola- The ban on nuclear tions are weapons testing is symptomatic significantly dif~ of probable ferent from the future vio- violated agreements lations Because (B) Other nations which had such a record of vio- lations continued such action /Expert X states that nations which have been chronic violators nearly always continued such acts /etc. 2. With Toulmin’s structural model now set forth, let us inquire into its suitability as a means of describing and testing arguments. Let us compare Toulmin’s method with the analysis offered in traditional logic, the logic commonly used as a basic theory of argumentation in current textbooks. We conceive of arguments in the customary fashion as (1) deriving from probable causes and signs, (2) proceeding more often by relational than implicative principles, (3) emphasizing material as well as formal validity, (4) employing premises which are often contestable, and (5) eventuating in claims which are by nature contingent and variable. The superiority of the Toulmin model in describing and testing arguments may be claimed for seven reasons: 1. Whereas traditional logic is char- acteristically concerned with warrant- usz’ng arguments (i. e., arguments in which the validity of the assumption underlying the inference “leap” is uncontested), Toulmin’s model specif- ically provides for warrant-establishing arguments (i. e., arguments in which the validity of the assumption under- lying the inference must be established— through backing—as part of the proof. pattern itself):1 2. Whereas traditional logic, based as it is upon the general principle of implication, always treats proof more or less as a matter of classification or compartmentalization, Toulmin’s anal- ysis stresses the inferential and relational nature of argument, providing a context within which all factors—both formal and material—bearing upon a disputed claim may be organized into a series of discrete steps. 3. Whereas in traditional logic ar~ guments are specifically designed to pro— duce universal propositions, Toulmin’s second triad of backing, rebuttal, and qualifier provide, within the framework of his basic structural model, for the establishment of claims which are no more than probable. The model directs attention to the ways in which each of these additional elements may operate to limit or condition a claim. 4. Whereas traditional logic, with its governing principle of implication, necessarily results in an essentially stat- ic conception of argument, Toulmin by emphasizing movement from data, through warrant, to claim produces a conception of argument as dynamic. From his structural model we derive a picture of arguments “working” to establish and certify claims, and as a result of his functional terminology we are able to understand the role each part of an argument plays in this process. 5. Whereas the modes based on the 4 In traditional logic only the epicheirema provides comparable backing for premises. TOULMIN ON ARGUMENT 47 traditional analysis—enthymeme, exam- ple, and the like—«often suppress a step in proof, Toulmin’s model lays an argument out in such a way that each step may be examined critically. 6. Whereas in the traditional analysis the division of arguments into premises and conclusions (as in the syllogism, for example) often tends to obscure deficiencies in proof, Toulmin’s model assigns each part of an argument a specific geographical or spatial position in relation to the others, thus rendering it more likely that weak points will be detected. 7. Whereas traditional logic is imper- fectly equipped to deal with the problem of material validity, Toulmin makes such validity an integral part of his system, indicating clearly the role which factual elements play in producing acceptable claims. In short, without denying that Toulmin’s formulations are open to serious criticism at several points5—-and allowing for any peculiarities in our interpretations of the character of tradi- tional logic—one conclusion emerges. Toulmin has provided a structural model which promises to be of greater use in laying out rhetorical arguments for dissection and testing than the meth- ods of traditional logic. For although most teachers and writers in the field of argumentation have discussed the syl- logism in general terms, they have made no serious attempt to explore the com- plexities of the moods and figures of the syllogism, nor have they been very successful in applying the terms and principles of traditional logic to the ar- guments of real controversies. Toulmin’s model provides a practical replacement. . 5 It may be charged that his structural model 13 merely “a syllogism lying on its side,” that it maltes little or no provision to insure the formal vahdity of claims, etc. 3. Our second proposition is that Toulmin's structural model and the vocabulary he has developed to describe it are suggestive of a system for clas- sifying artistic proofs, using argument (defined as movement from data, through warrant, to claim) as a unifying construct.6 In extending Toulmin’s analysis to develop a simplified classification of arguments, we may begin by restating in Toulmin's terms the traditional dif- ference between inartistic and artistic proof. Thus, conceiving of an argument as a movement by means of which accepted data are carried through a certifying warrant to a controversial claim, we may say that in some cases the data themselves are conclusive. They approach the claim without aid from a warrant—are tantamount to the claim in the sense that to accept them is automatically to endorse the claim they are designed to support. In such cases the proof may be regarded as inartistic. In another class of arguments, however, the situation is quite different. Here the data are not immediately conclusive, so that the role of the warrant in carry- ing them to the claim becomes of crucial importance. In this sort of argument the proof is directly dependent upon 60ur suggestion as to the structural unity of artistic proofs is by no means novel. The an- cients regularly spoke of pathetic and ethical enthymemes, and envisioned the topoi as ap- plicable beyond the pistis. (See in this connec- tion James H. McBurney, “The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory,” SM, III [1936], 63.) At the same time, however, it must be recognized that especially since the advent of the faculty psychology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, rhetorical thought has been profoundly and persistently influenced by the doctrine of a dichotomy between pathetic and logical appeals. (For significant efforts to com~ bat this doctrine see Charles H. Woolbert, "Con- viction and Persuasion: Some Considerations of Theory,” QJS, III [1917], 249264; Mary Yost, “Argument from the Point of View of Sociol- ogy,” QIS, III [1917], 109-124; and W. Norwood Brigance, “Can We Redefine the James-Winans Theory of Persuasion?” QIS, XXI [1935], 19-26.) 48 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH the inventive powers of the arguer and may be regarded as artistic. If, then, the warrant is the crucial element in an artistic proof, and if its function is to carry the data to the claim, we may classify artistic arguments by recognizing the possible routes which the warrant may travel in performing its function. So far as rhetorical proofs are con- cerned, as men have for centuries recog- nized, these routes are three in num- ber: (1) an arguer may carry data to claim by means of an assumption con- cerning the relationship existing among phenomena in the external world; (2) by means of an assumption concerning the quality of the source from which the data are derived; and (3) by means of an assumption concerning the inner drives, values, or aspirations which im- pel the behavior of those persons to whom the argument is addressed. Arguments of the first sort (tradi- tionally called logical) may be called substantive; those of the second sort (traditionally called ethical) may be described as authoritative; and those of the third sort (traditionally called pathetic) as motivational. SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS The warrant of a substantive argu- ment reflects an assumption concerning the way in which things are related in the world about us. Although other orderings are possible, one commonly recognized, and the one used here, is six-fold. Phenomena may be related as cause to effect (or as effect to cause), as attribute to substance, as some to more, as intrinsically similar, as bearing com- mon relations, or as more to some. Up- on the first of these relationships is based what is commonly called argument from cause; on the second, argument from sign; on the third, argument from gen- eralization; on the fourth, argument from parallel case; on the fifth, argu- ment from analogy; and on the sixth, argument from classification. Cause. In argument from cause the data consist of one or more accepted facts about a person, object, event, or condition. The warrant attributes to these facts a creative or generative power and specifies the nature of the effect they will produce. The claim re- lates these results to the person, object, event, or condition named in the data. Here is an illustration, from cause to effect: Therefore (D)———————<Q>——-——~—><C) The U. S. has Presumably The U. S. conducted has a more more tests advanced of nuclear nuclear weapons than weapons has the USSR arsenal than the USSR Since Unless (W) - (R) Some of the U. S. tests have been ineffective / the USSR has gained a greater develop— ment value per test A larger number of tests is more likely to cause a more advanced nuclear weapons arsenal Because (B) Our experience with parallel testing programs indicates this /Expert X testifies that many tests are more likely than fewer tests to create advanced nuclear weapons arsenals When the reasoning process is reversed and the argument is from effect to cause, the data again consistrof one or more facts about a person, object, event, or condition; the warrant asserts that a particular causal force is sufficient to have accounted for these facts; and the claim relates this cause to the person, object, event, or condition named in the data. TOULMIN ON ARGUMENT 49 Sign. In argument from sign the data consist of clues or symptoms. The war- rant interprets the meaning or signifi- cance of these symptoms. The claim affirms that some person, object, event, or condition possesses the attributes of which the clues have been declared symptomatic. Our first example con- cerning Russia’s violation of interna- tional agreements illustrates the argu- ment from sign. Generalization. In argument from generalization the data consist of in- formation about a number of persons, objects, events, or conditions, taken as constituting a representative and ade- quate sample of a given class of phenomena. The warrant assumes that what is true of the items constituting the sample will also be true of addi- tional members of the class not rep— resented in the sample. The claim makes explicit the assumption embodied in the warrant. The form can be dia— grammed so: Therefore <D>—-———————<Q)—~—————><c> Leaders of Probably Additional India, Japan, leaders of East Germany, world states Sweden. and oppose U. S. Ghana oppose nuclear U. S. nuclear testing testing Since Unless (W)—--——-<R) What is true of a More leaders, or representative more representa- and adequate sam- ple will also be true of addition- al members of the same class to which the items in the sample belong I 1 Because (3) The sample is sufficiently repre- sentative /1arge enough /etc. tive leaders do not oppose such testing Parallel Case. In argument from parallel case the data consist of one or more statements about a single object, event, or condition. The warrant asserts that the instance reported in the data bears an essential similarity to a second instance in the same category. The claim affirms about the new instance what has already been accepted con- cerning the first. Here is an illustration: Therefore (D) —-——-—(Q)—--~——> (C) An unstable Probably An unstable balance of balance of power led T power cre— to World l ated by nu- War I : clear weap- ons testing might lead to World \Var III Since Unless <W>—~———~———(R) Fear of a nuclear war would intervene / fears of retaliation would deter The power im- balance result- ing from con- tinued testing would be essen- tially similar to the power imbalance prior to World War I l 1 Because (B) Both situations are characterized by an arms race, dynamic power blocs, etc. In argument from parallel cases a re- buttal will be required in either of two situations: (1) if another parallel case bears a stronger similarity to the case under consideration; or (2) if in spite of some essential similarities an essen- tial dissimilarity negates or reduces the force of the warrant. The example illustrates the second of these possibili- t1es. Analogy. In argument from analogy the data report that a relationship of a 50 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH certain nature exists between two items. The warrant assumes that a similar re- lationship exists between a second pair of items. The claim makes explicit the relationship assumed in the warrant. Whereas the argument from parallel case assumes a resemblance between two cases, the analogy assumes only a simi- larity of relationship. Analogy may be illustrated so: Therefore (D)————(Q)—--——-> (C) Appropriate Possibly Appropriate precautions I precautions —quarantine, -—underground vaccination, testing, etc. etc—reduce ——would re- the hazards duce the of infectious hazards of nu- diseases clear weapons I testing Since Unless <W)-————<R) Appropriate pre- cautions against the hazards of infectious dis- eases are related to infectious diseases in the same way that appropriate pre- cautions against the hazards of nuclear weapons testing are re- lated to nuclear weapons tests Nuclear weapons tests have some peculiar property which negates the general principle of the relationship between precautions and the reduction of hazards Because (B) Both participate in the general relationship between precautions and the reduction of hazards In most cases the analogical relation expressed in an argument from analogy will require a strongly qualifying “possi- bly.” Classification. In argument from classi- fication the statement of the data is a generalized conclusion about known members of a class of persons, objects, events, or conditions. The warrant assumes that what is true of the items reported in the data will also be true of a hitherto unexamined item which is known (or thought) to fall within the class there described. The claim. then transfers the general statement which has been made in the data to the particular item under consideration. As illustrated, the form would appear: Therefore <D>———————~<Q>———-——»-+<c) A majority of | Presumably Russia can totalitarian make a states usually fast crisis can make fast decision in crisis deci- the specific sions crisis in question Since Unless <w>——~—<R) Russia does not share this char- acteristic of most totalitarian states /Special cir- cumstances intervene What is true of a majority of totalitarian states will probably be true of a particular totalitarian state, viz. Russia Because (B) The class “totalitarian states” is reasonably homogeneous, stable, etc. /Russia generally shares the attributes of the totalitarian states class Two kinds of reservations may be applicable in an argument from classifi- cation: (1) a class member may not share the particular attribute cited in the data, although it does share enough other attributes to deserve delineation as a member of the class; and (2) spe— cial circumstances may prevent a specif- ic class member from sharing at some particular time or place the attributes general to the class. g i mm TOULMIN ON ARGUMENT 51 AUTHORITATIVE ARGUMENTS In authoritative arguments the data consist of one or more factual reports or statements of opinion. The warrant affirms the reliability of the source from which these are derived. The claim reiterates the statement which appeared in the data, as now certified by the war- rant. An illustration follows: Therefore (D) (Q)—-——> (C) Klaus Knorr Probably Soviet leaders states, “Sov- calculate that iet leaders a minor build- calculate that a minor build- up of nuclear power in the NATO countries of Western Europe . . will add only marginally [to the danger of American strik~ ing power] .” 1 Since Unless <w>—————<R) What Knorr says Other authorities about the power more qualified than up of nuclear power in the NATO countries of Western Europe will add only marginally to American striking power of nuclear Knorr say other— weapons is wise /special reliable circumstances negate or reduce Knorr's usual reliability as a witness Because (B) Knorr is a professor at Princeton's Center of International Studies /is unbiased /has made re- liable statements on similar matters in the past /etc. The structure and function of an authoritative argument remains basic- ally the same when the source of the data is the speaker or writer himself. The data is carried to claim status by the same sort of assumption embodied in the warrant. We may infer a claim from what Knorr says about nuclear weapons whether he is himself the speaker, or whether another speaker is quoting what Knorr has said. Thus the ethos of a speaker may be studied by means of the Toulmin structure under the heading of authoritative argument. MOTIVATIONAL ARGUMENTS In motivational arguments the data consist of one or more statements which may have been established as claims in a previous argument or series of arguments. The warrant provides a motive for accepting the claim by asso- ciating it with some inner drive, value, desire, emotion, or aspiration, or with a combination of such forces. The claim as so warranted is that the person, ob- ject, event, or condition referred to in the data should be accepted as valuable or rejected as worthless, or that the policy there described should or should not be adopted, or the action there named should or should not be per- formed. Illustrated the form would appear: Therefore (D)—————(Q)—-——->(C) Continued Probably Continued test- testing of ing of nuclear nuclear weap- T weapons is de- ons is needed sirable for the for U. S. mil- U. S. itary security 1 Since Unless (W>-———<R> The U. S. is motivated by the desire to achieve the value of mili- tary security The prevention of a nuclear war or some other value which is inconsistent with con- tinued testing is de- sired to a greater extent Because (B) Military security is related to self-preservation, the maintenance of our high standard of living, patriotism, the preservation of democracy, etc. 52 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH 4. We have exhibited the structural unity of the three modes of artistic proof by showing how they may be re- duced to a single invariant pattern us— ing argument as a unifying construct. Let us as a final step explore this unity further by inquiring how artistic proofs, so reduced, may conveniently be cor- related with the various types of dis- putable questions and the claims appropriate to each. Let us begin by recognizing the four categories into which disputable ques- tions have customarily been classified: (1) Whether something is? (2) What it is? (3) Of what worth it is? (4) What course of action should be pursued? The first of these queries gives rise to a question of fact, and is to be answered by what can be called a designative claim; the second, to a question of defi- nition, to be answered by a definitive claim; the third, to a question of value, to be answered by an evaluative claim; and the fourth, to a question of policy, to be answered by an advocative claim. Supposing, then, that an arguer is confronted with a question of fact, call- ing for a designative claim; or a ques— tion of policy, calling for an advocative claim, etc., what types of argument would be available to him as means of substantiating his claim statement? Up- on the basis of the formulations de— veloped in earlier sections of this paper, it is possible to supply rather precise answers. Designative Claims. A designative claim, appropriate to answering a ques- tion of fact, will be found supportable by any of the six forms of substan~ tive argument, or by authoritative argu- ment, but not by motivational argument. That is, whether something exists or is so may be determined: (1) by isolating its cause or its effect (argument from cause); (2) by reasoning from the presence of symptoms to the claim that a substance exists or is so (argument from sign); (3) by inferring that be- cause some members of a given class exist or are so, more members of the same class also exist or are so (argu- ment from generalization); (4) by in— . ferring because one item exists or is so, that a closely similar item exists or is so (argument from parallel case); (5) by reasoning that D exists or is so be- cause it stands in the same relation to C that B does to A, when C, B, and A are known to exist or to be so (argu- ment from analogy); and (6) by con- cluding that an unexamined item known or thought to fall within a given class exists or is so because all known mem- bers of the class exist or are so (argu- ment from classification). Moreover, we may argue that something exists or is so because a reputable authority de- clares this to be the case. Motivational argument, on the other hand, may not be critically employed in designative claims, because values, desires, and feel- ings are irrelevant where questions of fact are concerned. Definitive Claims. The possibilities for establishing definitive claims are more limited. Only two of the forms of substantive argument and authoritative argument are applicable. We may sup- port a claim as to what something is: (1) by comparing it with a closely simi- lar phenomenon (argument from paral— lel case); or (2) by reasoning that be- cause it stands in the same relation to C as B does to A it will be analogous to C, where the nature of C, B, and A are known (argument from analogy). In addition, we may support a definition or interpretation by citing an acceptable authority. Among the substantive argu- ments, cause, sign, generalization, and classification are inapplicable; and once again motivational argument is irrele— TOULMIN ON ARGUMENT 53 vant since emotions, wishes, and values cannot legitimately determine the na- ture of phenomena. Evaluative Claims. Evaluative claims may be supported by generalization, parallel case, analogy, and classification, and by authoritative and motivational arguments. By generalization a class of phenomena may be declared valuable or worthless on the ground that a typical and adequate sample of the members of that class is so. By classification, in con- trast, we infer from the worth of known members of a class the probable worth of some previously unexamined item known or thought to belong to that class. By parallel case, we infer good- ness or badness from the quality of an item closely similar. By analogy, how— ever, we infer value on the basis of a ratio of resemblances rather than a direct parallel. In authoritative argu- ment our qualitative judgment is au- thorized by a recognized expert. In moti- vational argument, however, an item is assigned a value in accordance with its usefulness in satisfying human drives, needs, and aspirations. Arguments from cause and sign, on the other hand, are inapplicable. Advocative Claims. Advocative claims may legitimately be established in only four ways. We may argue that some policy should be adopted or some ac- tion undertaken because a closely simi- lar policy or action has brought desira- ble results in the past (argument from parallel case). We may support a pro- posed policy or action because it bears the same relation to C that B does to A, where B is known to have brought desirable results (argument from anal- ogy). Or, of course, we may support our claim by testimony (authoritative argu- ment), or by associating it with men’s wishes, values, and aspirations (motiva- tional argument). This analysis concerning the types of arguments applicable to various sorts of claims may be summarized in tabular form: Desig- Defini- Eva1u~ Advo— native tive ative cative Substantive A. Cause B. Sign C. Generalization D. Parallel Case E. Analogy F. Classification X X X Vikki/.14?» X X Authoritative >4 :4 ><><><>< Motivational The world of argument is vast, one seemingly without end. Arguments arise in one realm, are resolved, and appear and reappear in others; and new argu- ments appear. If one assumes some ra- tionality among men, a system of logical treatment of argument is imperative. The traditional logical system of syl- logisms, of enthymemes, of middles dis- tributed and undistributed, may have had its attraction in medieval times. The inadequacies of such a logic, how- ever, have been described by experts; for example, see S. Mill on the syllogism and petitio princz‘pii.7 The modern search has been for a method which would have some application in the dynamics of contemporary affairs. Toulmin has supplied us with a con- temporary methodology, which in many respects makes the traditional unneces— sary. The basic theory has herein been amplified, some extensions have been made, and illustrations of workability have been supplied. All this is not meant to be the end, but rather the be- ginning of an inquiry into a new, con- temporary, dynamic, and usable logic for argument. 7 A System of Logic, 1, Chap. 3, Sec. 2. Copyright© 2003 EBSCO Publishing ...
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Brockriede&amp;E - TOULMIN ON ARGUMENT AN INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger URING the period 1917-1932 D

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