LESON8A

LESON8A - Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Product...

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Econ 275 - Public Finance - Fall 1992 - 9/24/92 - Lesson #8 - leson8a.275-- Page -- Admin: Papers Due Today. Now. How are things going with this class? Ch 6 Finish the voting model. Write up table and then go through the different referendums. Illustrate that once the optimum is obtained. No vote will change things. Next illustrate the voter's paradox by changing one number and go through the process again. Hammer that the result of electoral process can lead to cycles. Not a good thing. So we study conditions when there won't be cycles. Median voter theorem. Single peaked preferences. Draw graphs of the preferences for the two cases above.
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Unformatted text preview: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Product differentiation Lindahl equilibrium What bureaucrates maximize. Ch 8 (Externalities) Example: Fishing boat. Econ 275 - Public Finance - Fall 1992 - 9/24/92 - Lesson #8 - leson8a.275-- Page --Voting Tables Public Good: High- $10 Billion Med - $5 Billion Low - $1 Billion $1 $5 $10 High 500 1000 1500 Medium 100 500 300 Low 50 30 10 Equilibrium: $5 Taxpayer\PG level $1 $5 $10 High 1200 1000 1500 Medium 100 500 300 Low 50 30 10 Equilibrium: Cycles Scrambled: $1 $5 $10 High 300 1000 1500 Medium 500 400 10 Low 50 100 200 Equilibrium: $10...
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LESON8A - Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Product...

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