LESON8B

LESON8B - Econ 275 - Public Finance - Winter 1994 - 2/1/94...

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Econ 275 - Public Finance - Winter 1994 - 2/1/94 - Lesson #8 - leson8b.275-- Page -- Admin Discuss Homework, Collect homework Public Choice - Ch 5 Items: Possibility of cycling in voting Possible efficiency gains from logrolling. What is the objective of the different players in the political game. median voter theorem (single-peaked preferences) product differentiation: all parties head for the middle Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Discussion: Intro: To this point we've talked a lot about the market, how it works and when it might go awry. For better or worse prices provide a means of allocation. Now we want to discuss another means of allocation: that allocation that results from the political process. First we're going discuss "voting" equilibrium, or the allocation that results from the voting process. There are lots of different types of voting rules: (get examples: majority, 2/3, 3/5, 3/4, unanimity), We're going to look at one--majority voting. Along the way we're going to introduce a very powerful idea--the median voter theorem. General discussion of voting allocation:
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LESON8B - Econ 275 - Public Finance - Winter 1994 - 2/1/94...

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