Beirne & Messerschmidt

Beirne & Messerschmidt - Source: ‘Beime, P.,...

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Unformatted text preview: Source: ‘Beime, P., & Messerschmidt, J .W. (2006). Criminology. Los AngelBes, CA: Roxbury. - The Emergertee of ‘ geeiriogieei firimioiogy l0.l Toward a social Psychology of Crime: Gabriel Tarde' w Imitation and Crime . ‘ ' . - - Collective Behavior and Crime omEvaluatio'n of-Tarcle’s Social Psychology 9,2 Towardsa Sociology of Law and Crime: Emile Durkheim ‘ s. Lavv and Social Solidarity ' - o The Nature of Crime ' - Anomie, Egoism, and Crime e The Evolution of Punishment o Evaluation of Durkheim (Slaséical Marxism: Marx and Engels on State, Law, and Crime a Key Concepts of Marxism State and Law - Criminalizationas a Violation of Rights Crime and Demoralization ‘ Crime and Primitive Rebellion Evaluation of Marxism ter IO introduces: :‘he major strands in the emergence of sociological criminology:Tarde'$ social sychology, Durkheimian sociology, and classical Marxism. he criminological theories of Gabriel Tarde, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and riedrich Engels. ‘ 289 ' - ' .,- 290 HI «a Criminologicai Theory, Key Terms c . um. ideology - r r. ' , restitutive law , imitation ' I - . social classes mode of production ‘ social solidarity repressive law iii—ii Toward a genial Els'nyhoogy of firime: fiahifiiel Faerie ‘ \- mum w In Chapter 9 we learned that French criminologist Gabriel Tarde believed that, rising I rates of recidivism were‘one of the most serious aspects of criminality. Departing from public opinion, Tarde did not think these rates could be explained by the criminal- ity of Lombroso’s born criminals (see Chapter 9.3). Attempting to devise a social theory of crime that would explain more about the incidence and causcs of criminality than the notion of born criminals, Tarde began with the concept of “imitation? imitation and firime , Tarde reasoned that crime—like all other social phenomena—«isinfluenced by the processes of imitation. Imitation is a mental process that he defined as “the powerful, generally unconscious, always partly mysterious, action by means of which we account for all the phenomena of society” (Tarde 1.9122322). Imitation applies to the various psy- chological states and beliefs of individuals. It is a process in which individuals behave as . if they were in a trance, as in sleepwafldng. According to Tarde, the process of imitation always Operates in a social context. Socially and historically it is present in the growth of cities, in national institutions, and even in' international warfare. Imitation cut-s l across all social, racial, and religious boundaries. It infiltrates all aspects of social life, from art to architecture and from music to militarism. It produces both good and evil. It encourages crime. _ I _ 7 r ' Tarde (1903) argued that crime originates in the “higher ranks” and descends to the "lowest ranks.’ ’ The masses are typically tied through imitative bondage to the ideas and ; fancies of their social superiOrs; Drunkenness, smoking, moral offenses, political assas- sination, arson, and even vagabondage are, according to Tarde, crimes that originate with the feudal nobility and were transmittedhthrough imitation, to the masses. Crimi nal propensities therefore typically travel downward and outward—from the powerfu to the powerless, from urban centers to rural areas. ' ‘ Why, then, despite a common exposure to the same set of imitative processes, (1 some people commit crimes while others do not? Tarde claimed that some people are a born with psychological qualities that predispose them to crime. Thosa born with vi- cious dispositions, for example, are more likely to become violent. To the presence of predisposing qualities, Tarde added the necessary component of "a special kind of fever” (19122261). This fever he variously described as a fermentation, an agitation, and a disturbance. .JI Chapter 10 wt The Emergence oiSo'cioiogicol Criminology 291 Despite his preference for an individualistic or psychological theory of crime, Tarde consistently identified two sociological factors that in practice had causal status in his criminology. First, he isolated urbanism as the greatest arena for the spread of crime through imitation. He showed that cities have the highest rate of homicide motivated by greed; it is there where murderer and victim are likely to be utter strangers, and where recidivism is mast pronounced. Urban life encourages the greatest decadence in cus— toms: the formation of political sects, increasing rates of assassination, murder and sui— cide, crimes against children and by children; rape, and vandalism. havior. Such violence exemplifies the processes of imitation and is closely tied to the im— personal social relations of modern urban life. ,Coiiective Behavior and grime A ‘ Tarde’s analysis of collective behavior reveals a frantic dislike of any body of people larger than a small and orderly gathering. For example, he suggested that rfthe crowd, even among the most civilized populations, is always a savage or a faun, still worse, an impulsive and maniacal beast, a plaything of its instincts and unconscious habits, occa— sionally an animal of a lower order" (Tarde 1892358). Tarde often used such concepts as somnambulism (Sleepwalking), paroxysm (a fit), and mental contagion (imitation) to France. In his writings on collective behavior, Tarde tended to equate mob violence with organized activities of the French working class (such as strikes). “The conduct of a crowd,” Tarde declared, “largely depends on the social origin of its members, on their profession, class or caste" (pp. 372—373). Moreover, "Urban crowds are those whose ' ‘ contagion achieves the high- tensity . . . their members . . . drawn from thoSe de- tached from family and tra- dition” (p. 373). Appalled by events such as a strike by 4rfifllTvfi‘ke1-s it? his native region of Périgord, by anar- chist uprisings in:1871 (the “Paris Commune’T), and by a wave of bombings, Tarde emotional turbulence of- ‘h‘ i me - - fectly expressed in the de- Pubiic execution in Paris, May i, i87i: This photograph depicts the execution of luded actions of Striking I 62 police officers by the communords ofthe Paris Commune during the civil war 'workem riot-erg and rem} ..betweeo the Third Republic and the Paris Commune. Events such as this oggra— r 1 t. ’ 1.t.’ El _ voted the French pubiic’s fear of crime and fostered the analysis of mob behavior u Iona]?- po 1 1C move by Gabriel Torde. - ments' For Tarde a second cause of crime was the violence fostered by mass collective be- ' explain the abnormality and the dangerousness of crowds in late nineteenth-century - est degree of speed and in- ' (1893) asserted. that the - crowd behavior was per— i 5i ii .._AI .made the disruptive transition 292 Part III 1': Criminologicai The-013% ‘ Tarde shared certain prejudices with sociologist Emile Durkheim. Before consider- ing Durkheim’s analysis of crime, we briefly assess Tarde’s contribution to the develop- ment of criminology. . Evaiuation of Tarde’s Sendai Psychoiogy Tarde’s criminology was an intriguing attempt to place both the sociological and the psychological dimensions of life into a unitary perspective. In his own era, Tarde’s per— spective was of enormous influence. His social psychology of crime forged a compro- mise between the classical and positivist schools of criminology. His theories on the causes of crime anticipated and influenced later developments in criminology (see Sasson 1995; Zimring and Hawkins 1997). Tarde’s concept of imitation and his theories about urban life and crowd behavior, for example, explicitly influenced certain of the . most important theoretical developments in criminology in the United States—among them the Chicago school of criminology (see Chapter I 1.2), Merton’s theory of anomie (see Chapter 11.3), Sutherland’s theory of differential association {see Chapter 11.4), and subcultural perspectives on delinquency (see Chapter 12). r W2 inward a Socioiogyloi Law Enriii“ -7 wimmmmsmwum: um: macaw-man W‘wme; lummulflirl'kfi'u .~ J'nmwfig'o‘rzmi‘flmh';Ikfl-‘ilflffimufliflnwmw Emile Durkheim (1858—1917) was one of the founders of sociological criminology, and his analysss of crime and punishment exert a powerful influence in the world of criminology today. Durkheim was a prodigious scholar whose innovative Concepts and arguments spanned a great diversity of topics. The breadth of his interests is best seen in the titles of his major books: The Division ofLahor in Society (1893), The Ruies ofSo— cioiogicci Method (1894), Suicide (1897), Professional Ethics and Civil Morais(1900)', and T he Elementary Forms ofReiigious Life (1912). . .l, Durkheim’s writings on law ' . and crime have had tremendous intellectual influence on the devel— opment of criminology. In much of his sociology, Durkheim tried to answer the difficult questiOns about how order and stability could be restored. to France as, it from a preindustrial social struc— ture to modern and more complex forms of social organization in the: nineteenth century: What are the preconditions of an ordered, sta— ble, and moral society? What con— ditions produce social disorder? A __.W_ __ logical Consequence 0f Durk‘ How is pubiic order possible? A late— heini’s search for the sources of trial scene. nineteenth-century French Indus Chapter 10 ‘3’ The Emergence ofSociologicai Criminology 293 social order was a concern with situations in which order and stability seemed to be lacking and that were manifest in such “pathologies” .as crime and deviance. Before outlining Durkheim’s writings on law and crime, We emphasize a theme that spanned his entire work: a sociological method. For Durkheim, societies Can be ana- lyzed properly only through the scientific method of positivism. Like Quetelet’s social mechanics (see Chapter 9.2), Durkheim’s positivism involved a search for lawlike regu- larities in social behavior. Unlike Tarde, Durkheim insisted that generalizations about social behavior can be made independently of individual variations in free wili, psycho- logical state,=and motivation. . Durkheim’s positivist method stemmed from his insistence that "the first and most basic rule is to consider social facts as things" (1982:60). Durkheim’s chief intention here was to distinguish sociology from such sciences as biology. politics, and psychology by making the "social fact” its object of study. But for Durkheim social facts were not to be confused with thepsychic phenomena that exist only in individual consciousness; in re ality, although We are often victims of the illusion that we act with free will, our actions are usually imposed on us externally. Durkheim defined social facts as “manners of act— ' ing, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him” (p. 52). Social facts are thus obligatory'and coercive. They have this character not because they are practiced by many people . but because they are practiced collectively. "Social phenomena,” Durkheim wrote, should thus “be considered in themselves, detached from the con— scious beings who form their own mentai representations of them” (p. 70). ' For Durkheim, then, social phenomena (such as law and crime) have an objective existence of their own and exist quite independently of the individuals who experience them. This is a crucial insight, as we shall learn. Law and Social Solidarity Durkheim analyzed law in many of his writings. His most extended treatment oc- , curs in The Division ofLahor (1893). Here he tried to find the sources of social order (“sociai solidarity") in modern industrial'societies and to determine the changes they undergo during evolution from lower to higher stages of Civilization. , . Durkheim argued that social development lies along a continuum, with primitive societies of "mechanical solidarity” at one end and modern societies of “organic solidar— ity” at the lother. Mechanical solidarity is typical of simple sooieties with onlya limited role specialization or division of labor. Members of such societies are quite similar to each other in their ways of'acting, thinking, and feeling. They live within a shared con! Sensus of beliefs and values—the “collective conscience”—in which collective life domi- nates and replaces individuaiism. During the course of social evolution, as roles within the division of labor became more specialized, social solidarity is transformed from a mechanical to an organic basis. Organic solidarity is thus typical-of societies with an ad— vanced division of labor .and with members who have diffuse ways of acting, thinking, and feeling. Individualism dominates and replaces collective life. The cohesion of such societies derives from complex patterns of interdependence among the members and is" 7 294 Part III e Criminological Theory based on the morals oflvarious occupational categories and also on increasing respect for individual differences. In his search for the sources of social order, Durkheim realized that social solidarity, which is abstractand internal to consciousness, does not lend itself to exact observation or precise measurement. Thus, to classify and compare the various forms of social soli- darity he believed that it was necessary to use another, more visible aspect of social life that varies directly with solidarity. Durkheim argued that "to arrive at this classifica- tion, as well as this comparison, we must therefore substitute for this internal datum, which escapes us, an external one which symbolizes it, and then study the former through the latter" (p. 24). That visible symbol, he asserted, is law. Durkheim never explicitly defined the essential qualities of law, but he implied that law differs from other forms of social regulation (including custom, ritual, ceremony, and professional obligation) because it alone exercises an organized pressure on indi— viduals to conform to its commands This pressure appears in the form of sanctions. To classify the different types of law, which themselves correspond to the different types of social solidarity, Durkheim reasoned that one must only classify different types of sanc- ll tions. Two forms of legal sanction correspond to the two forms of social solidarity: re— pressive sanctions and restitutive sanctions, which Durkheim termed respectively re— pressive law and restitutive law. . Durkheim held that repressive law is found chiefly in societies of mechanical soli- darity. It isreligious in origin and largely identical with penal and criminal law. The violation of repressive law results in the use of repressive. sanctions. These sanctions consist of inflicting suffering or loss on individuals for having offended the strong senti- ments of the collective conscience. Becausc repressive sanctions tend to be enforced by the whole of society,_no special or organized institution (lawyers, courts, police, and so forth) is needed to enforce them. Durkheim provided numerous examples to show that the vast majority of the commands of ancient legal sy'StemsMSuch as the last four books of the Pentateuch (Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy)—are solely directed to sentiments offended by crimes. ' ' " During the evolution from mechanical to organic solidarity, Durkheim argued, the volume of penal law in legal systems declines relative to other forms of law. He noted that certain crimes, such as those offending sexualand traditional sentiments, have nowadays almost disappeared (1984: 109—1 10). With the decline of collective sentiments and the growth of individualism, repressive law is gradually ousted by restitutive law. This law consists not in the infliction of pain but in "restoring the previous state ofafiairs, reestablishing relationships . . . disturbed from their normal form" (p. 29). Restitutive law, growing continually in volume and intensity, results not from breaches of the col" lective conscience but from conflicts among occupational groups (for example, guilds, Lmions, and professional associations). Its violation involves enforcement of the status quo ante (previously existing state of affairs). Moreover, in contrast to repressive law, restitutive law is specialized through its two basic forms: (1) Positive law reflects the co- operation required in a complex division of labor and includes contract, administrative, domestic, and commercial legislation. (2) Negative law involves the rules between per- sons and objects that enjoin others not to interfere in certain proprietary rights of the owuer and includes property and tort legislation. w m... .._ i ; Eli Chapter 10 s— The Emergence of Sociological Citininhlogy 295 The Nature of Crime Durkheim’s analysis of relationships between law and sanctions was a critical tool for understanding social solidarity. In pursuing this goal he was led to analyze the na- ture of crime. As a sociologist, Durkheim rejected definitions of crime based on legalis- tic, criteria. Such criteria—as well as criteria based on notions such as evil, social harm, violations of justice, and So forth—he regarded as inadequate for a scientific sooiology. What, then, is crime? To begin, no action is intrinsically or universally criminal. For Durkheim, the common denominator of all crimes is that they are “acts represscd by prescribed punishments” (1984:31). This is what distinguishes a crime from a minor of- fense such as a tort or a breach of etiquette. In societies of mechanical solidarity, an act is defined as criminal because of the universal social reaction that condemns it. As Durkheim argued in The Division of Labor: “An act is criminal when it offends the strong, well-defined states of the collective consciousness. . . . We should not say that an act offends the common consciousness because it is criminal, but that it is criminal be- cause it offends that consciousness" (pp. 3940). From this it seemed to follow that to investigate the nature of crime one must examine the nature of punishment. What functions, then, does punishment serve? Central to Durkheim's criminology is his linking of crime and punishment. Thus: “If our definition of crime is exact it must account for all the characteristics of .' . . punishment" (p. 44). Durkheim defined punish— ment as “a reaction of passionate feeling, graduated in intensity, which society exerts , through the mediation of an organized body over thoSe of its members who have vio— lated certain rules of conduct” (p. 52). Durkheim rejected popular beliefs that the function of punishment is simply re— venge, deterrence, or the reformation of the character of criminals. The true function of punishment is to maintain and strengthen social solidarity. Each time a crime is com— mitted, the subsequent condemnation cf it by penal law reaffirms the values of the col— lective conscience or the shared consensus of a community’s beliefs and values. In this way “honest people" are convinced of the moral righteousness of their conformity to law andof the ."infei‘iority" of criminals. With great insight, Durkheim therefore con- cluded that "punishment is above all intended to have its effect upon honest people” (p. ' 63). ._ _ Durkheim made three specific claims about the nature of crime: (a) crime is normal, (b) crime is inevitable, and (c) crime is useful. 7 Crime is normal. Durkheim caused considerable outrage by claiming that crime is a normal phenomenon, as normal as birth and marriage. Durkheim’s discussion of this seemingly unusual claim is found in his 1894 book T he Rules of Sociological Method, in which he tried to restructure "the fundamental facts of criminology. " Durkheim’s start— ing point—like the starting point of his sociology in general—ewes his concept of theso- cial fact: “A social fact is n‘onnal for a given social type, viewed at a given phase ofirs devel- opment, when it occurs in the average society of that species, considered at the con‘esponding phase of its evolution” (p. 9’7; emphasis in original). In other words, in a given social context and against the background of a given level of social development, the very generality of social facts indicates that they must be nor- mal phenomena. At any given moment society has a "normal" or statistically average volume of births, for example, or of marriages and deaths._For Durkheim, it is only em. .11.- 296 "Part III #— Crz'minological Theory statistical deviations from such averages that are abnormal. Because crime is a social fact, Durkheim complained that criminologists err in seeing it only as a pathological or morbid phenomenon. Generally, crime should not be viewed as deviance or as sick— ness—what is abnormal to the biologist or to the pathologist is not necessarily so to the . sociologist. For Durkheim, then, crime as such is rarely abnormal. crime occurs in all societies, it is tied closely to the facts 'of collective life, andits volume tends to increase as societies evolve from lower to higher phases. However, he was careful to add that although crime is a normal social fact, in a given context its rate might be abnormal. -. Crime is inevitable. To begin with, Durkheim admitted that his idea about the nor- mality of crime surprised him. Eventually, he reasoned that no society can ever be en— tirely free of crime. To illustrate this point, Durkheim asked that we imagine a commu— nity of saints in a perfect and exemplary monastery: “In it crime as such will be unknown, but faults that appear venial to the ordinary person will arouse the same scandal as does normal crime in ordinary consciences” (1982: 100). Moreover, universal and absolute conformity to rules is impossible because each member of society faces variation in “the immediate physical environment, . . . hereditary antecedents, . . . [and] social influences" (p. 100). Crime is therefore inevitable. Even if all the actions regarded as criminal at one moment suddenly disappeared, new forms of crime would be created at once. ‘ . ' ' Crime is useful. Durkheim first claimed that crime is normal and inevitable in The Division ofLabor. But in The Rules ofSociological Method he took the argument a stage further in suggesting that "to classify crime among the phenomena of normal sociology is not merely to declare that it is an inevitable though regrettable phenomenon arising from the incorrigible weakness of man; it is to assert that it is a factor in public health, an integrative element in any healthy'society" (p. 98). ‘ Besides claiming that crime is normal and inevitable, Durkheim thus argued that . - "I Ilfl‘l _-- n .- Inna-uln- -.5_;4; Eli-arm.— lj.‘ _‘I I‘ a _ ___.. -u-.. c .- rality. Indeed, if crime is not a sickness, punishment cannot be its remedy. The nature of crime and punishmentbmust therefore lie somewhere else than in the area of wronng- ing andits correction. If there were no crimes—wif there was no deviation from social norms—Durkheim reasoned, then the collective conscience would have reached an in- tensity, an-authoritarianism, unparalleled in history. In other words, a society with "no crime" must be an extremely repressive one. - - For Durkheim, crime is useful because it is often a symptom of individual original- ity and a preparation for changes in law and morality. He cited the fate of Socrates as an example of crime’s utility. Socrates (470—399 B.C.), perhaps the most original of all Greek philosophers, committed the “crime” of independent thought. Having been con- victed of not believing in the official gods of. the Athenian state and of corrupting the minds of the young, Socrates committed suicide by drinking hemlock. Durkheim sug- gested that “Socrates’ crime served to prepare the way for a new morality and a new faith—one the Athenians . . . needed [inasmuch as] the traditions by which they had hitherto lived no longer corresponded to the conditions of their existence” (1982:102). Today’s criminal may be tomorrow’s philosopher! —-.J| Chapter 10 a» The Emergence ofSoci-ologicai Criminology 297 Anemia, Egoism, and Crime Durkheim applied his sociological insights to the analysis of two specific forms of deviance: suicide and homicide. First, he tried to show that suicide—usually reg'afded as the supreme act of individual devianc'eHhas profoundly sociological rather than psy-' chological or biological causes. Indeed, Durkheim (1951) claimed that variations in sui- cide rates can be explained only sociologically. His general concern was to show that the suicide rate of any society depends on the type and extent of social organization and in! tegration. In any society each social group i - really has a collective inclination for the act, quite its own, and the source of all indi- vidual inclination, rather than their reSult. It is made up of the currents of egoism, altruism or anomie running through the society under consideration. . . . These ten- dencies of the whole social body, by affecting individuals, cause them to commit sui- cide. (pp. 299—300) Durkheim's explanation of varying suicide rates hinges on four types of suicide: , 1. Egoistic suicide results from a weakening of the bonds between an individual and society. 'It is a special type of suicide caused by excessive individualism. It recedes Only with the sort of increase in collective sentiments produced by wars and political crises. Socialgroups prone to egoistic suicide include Protestants (whose religious beliefsfos— ' ter individualism), the unmarried, the childless, and the widowed. 2. Altruistic suicide results when individuals have insufficient inner strength to re— sist the demands of a social group into which they are overly integrated. Examples in- elude Hindu widows,'who place themselves next to their husbands on their funeral. pyre, and slaves, who are expected to die with their masters. . I 3. Anemia suicide results from a sudden crisis in economic or familial life. Thus, in situations such as sudden impoverishment or unexpected riches, or immediately after I family members are diverced, an abrupt change in expectationscauses massive per; sonal or social upheaval. In the aftermath of these situations, those who cannot adjust to their suddenly altered position beCome more suicide-prone (and see Chapter 12.3). _ 4. Individualized suicide has particularized characteristics, either in the mental state that leads to the act or in the way it is achieved. These characteristics include melan— \mhiy—JHTsxn—iwmmxtgng wax-aw ; _ choly, passion, and irritation, though these might also have social causes. In addition to suicide, Durkheim (1958) analyzed the offense of homicide. He sug- gested that civilized peoples always consider three'broad moral attitudes as duties: re- spect for life, respect for property, and the honor of others. In primitive societies, homi- cideis the most serious breach of moral duty because it is viewed as an offense against the whole of society, against what is sacred. Offenses against individual property or in— dividual honor are seen'as far less serious than offenses against the social order as a whole—and sometimes they are not, considered offenses at all, In ancient Greece, Rome, and Judea, for example, victims of crimes other than homicide had to pursue their own redress and could allow the guilty party to pay a sum of money as a form of , satisfaction. I ‘ I Durkheim suggested that during Social evolution, and especially with the onset of Christianity, something of a reversal occurs in the hierarchical order of these duties. u .lL - r BOX10.1). 298 Part III 4» CriminologicalThemy With the growth of modern societies, collective Sentiments are generally reduced in in— tensity and sentiments centering on the individual achieve prominence. Homicide therefore remains the supremely forbidden act because it violates the individual. Given that homicide is so abhor-red, Durkheim (1958) claimed that homicide rates tend to de- cline relative tothe advance of civilization. At the same time, rates of other offenses against the individual, whether against person or preperty, tend to increase. Durkheim was confident that homicide rates decreased with modernization be- cause of the growth of the "cult of the individual" (namely, the great respect afforded the person by public opinion). But Durkheim knew that this eXplanation was too general: The decline in the rate of homicide at the present day has not come about because respect for the human person acts as a brake on the motives for murder or on the stimulants to murder, but because these motives and these stimulants grow fewer in ‘ number and have less intensity. (p. 117) ' How, then, does one explain cases in which the general rule about declining homi- cide rates does not apply? To explain counterexamples, Durkheim introduced statistical evidence shoWing how other variables—including rural/urban differences, wars, reli- gious membership, political crises, and state power—influence homicide rates. For ex- ample, he argued that Catholic countries tend to have higher homicide rates than Protestant ones because the latter’s religious beliefs are more individualistic and, there fore, promote greater respect for the sanctity of individual life. The Evolution 0f Punishment In his 190-1 essay "Two Laws of Penal Evolution,” Durkheim offered a sophisticated theory of the history of punishment, returning squarely to his earlier concern with law and crime in The Division (Bf-Labor. This final theory on the sources of punishment, and of changes in its justifications and forms, was a marked improvement on earlier analy- ses. Indeed, in his entire criminology it was only here that Durkheim considered that political factors sometimes influence the way in which certain behavior is defined as criminal. _ . , a In the essay, Durkheim modified his earlier argument to suggest that forms of pun— ishment have varied historically in two ways, quantitatively and qualitatively. Each form is governed by a separate law, one quantitative in scope, the other qualitative (see Durkheim's first law contains two propositions. First,’societies are more or less ad- vanced according to their level of social complexity or to the intensity of their division of labor. Here Durkheim repeated his argument that less—developed societies are domi-- aw l:The intensity of punishment is greater the more closely societies approximate to a less developed type—and the more the central power assumes an absolute character. Law 21Deprivations of liberty. and of liberty alone, varying in time according to the seriousness of the crime, tend to become more and more the normal means of social control. sits». .._ __..n.‘ Chapter 10 t Thefimeigence of Sociological Criminology 299 nated by repressive laws and barbaric forms of punishment, especially capital punish— ment. In such societies punishment is severe because most crimes are seen as religious violations that threaten the collective conscience. The second prOposition concerns ab— solutist forms of political power: the exercise of governmental power without checks and balances. This authoritarian form of power (hypercentralization) exists in different types of society, early and modern, but occurs only when it is seen as a right: r'Such was ° the state of the criminal law until the middle of the eighteenth century. There then oc— curred, throughout Europe, the protest to which Beccaria gave his name” (1983:113). Durkheim’s first law implies that with social development the severity of punish— ment generally declines. This decline dccurs not because authorities become more le- nient but because the type of crime changes. In less-developed societies, crime is seen as a threat to collective life, and, therefore, punishment is severe; in more—developed soci- eties, crime is seen as a threat to individuals only, and punishment is correspondingly less severe. Howevor, by identifying the importance of the relationship between state power and punishment, Durkheim could now explain certain factual counterexamples to his earlier analysis. For example, he now claimed, interestingly, that in societies dom~ inated lay-political absolutism, crimes retain a primarily sacrilegious character {1983). In other words, authoritarian societies act punitiver and repressiver not because they are not socially developed but because their organs of political power regard crime reli— giously—as an attack on the social order as a whole. _ Durkheim’s second law refers to qualitative changes in punishment. Durkheim illus- trated the workings of the second law with examples from ancient Greece and modern France. He established that the death penalty had disappeared completely from some legal codes and had been taken over by incarceration. Durkheim explained this change by arguing that there is no need for incarceration inless-developed societies. There, a crime affects the entire community, and, because responsibilityfor it is communal, all members of the community ensure that the offender does not escape before trial. How— ever, with the disintegration of ancient societies—after which crime became more of an offense against an individual rather than society as a whole—some method of pretrial detention was needed to ensure that offenders were held accountable. Thus, Durkheim advanced the brilliant argument that the prison emerged from, _ changing forms of crime.- But he realized that this explanation was incomplete: "To ex- plain an institution, it is not enough to establish that when it appeared it served some useful end; for just because it was desirable it does not follow that it was possible" ‘ (1983:117). Hence Durkheim proceeded to explain the growth of the prison in'lterms of his first law concerning the less repressive nature of punishment. Prisons arose because of the transformation in criminal responsibility from a collective to an individual basis. Some of the first prisons were “hole[s], in the form of a pit where the condemned wal- low in refuse and vermin" '(p. 119). But prisons, responding to the changed basis of cri- minal responsibility, gradually became milder, reflecting the general decline in the se- verity of punishment. As punishment as a whole became less severe, these new prisons became the typical form of punishment in developed societies. ‘ - Durkheim therefore concluded that "the qualitative changes in punishment are in part dependent on the simultaneous quantitative changes it undergoes" (p. 120). His two laws of penal evolution thus turn out to be interdependent. The very factsthat bring -Jl A .11 300 Part III 4" Criminological Theory about changes in the bases of criminal responsibility in early societies also create the apparent need for widespread use of imprisonment in modern societies! Evaluation of Durkheim Quite aside from the power and scope of its analysis of crime, Durkheim’s criminol— ogy has exerted tremendous influence on the deveIOpment of sociological criminology. This influence has been moat obvious in the writings of the Chicago school of criminol- og I (see Chapter 11.2), Merton's theory of anomie and social structure (see Chapter ‘ 11.3), and Hirschi’s theory of control and crime (see Chapter 12.3). Moreover, criminol- ogists today continue to draw on Durkheim’s insights. I __ ' More than anyone before him, Durkheim identified the sociological links among crime, law, punishment, and social organization. He showed that in any given society the amount and types of crime relate directly to the basic ways in which that society is organized. And sooieties, he insisted, should be understood historically. Durkheim also suggested that crime must be explained sociologically rather than in terms of an indi- vidual’s psychological state or biological nature. Sociologically, crime is a normal and inevitable feature of social organization. Its functions lie not only in the area of sanc- tions but also in the creation and enforcement of scilidarity. ‘ ; Assessments of Durkheim’s criminology tend to focus on three questions. Did he correctly describe the historical transformation instyles of punishment? Have homi- cide rates declined with modernization? How did his own personal and political agenda influence the propositions set forth in his various theories? ' The first question has been debated largely in terms of whether the facts of the evo— lution of punishment fit Durkheim’s theory of crime. In a well—known study that exam- ined legal'evolution in 51 societies, Schwartz and Miller (1964; see also Garland 1990) concluded that in simple societies restitutive law is more common than penal sanctions. This conclusion contradicts Durkheim’s account of the evolution from repressive to restitutive sanctions. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Durkheim may have derived his idea [of the evolution of punishment] from the fact that punishments in European societies were becoming much less severe at the time, due to the reforms introduced by Beccaria and other claSsical theorists. But the extremely harsh punishments that had been imposed prior to those reforms were not aSSOCiated with simple, undeveloped societies, but rather with-absolute monarchies. (Void, Bernard,- and Snipes, 2002:} 12) In answering the second question, empirical researchers have reached quite oppos— ing results. While some have found that homicide rates have declined with moderniza— I tion (e.g., Quinney, 1965), others have found an increase (e.g., Ortega et al., 1992). Still others claim that most researchers have not really tested Durkheim’s theory at all. In- stead, as DiCristina (2004) points out, most commentaries on Durkheim's theory of ho— micide have been rather careless in understanding exactly what Durkheim meant by concepts like "societal complexity” and "modemization." Moreover, Overall, the empirical studies that attempt to assess Durkheim’s theory'of homicide I require extensive reinterpretation since they misrepresent his theory and/or neglect its complexity. Indeed, in view of its complexity, its potential for extensive elabora- Chapter 10 t The Emergence of Sociological Criminology 301 tion, and the considerable data limitations researchers face when testing it . . . Durkheim’s theory is not readily "falsifiable." (DiCristina, 2004:83) Finally, we note that Durkheim is also frequently criticized for the biascs that alleg— edly entered his sociological method in general and his criminology in particular. Durkheim has thus been scolded because his preoccupation with the sources of social order apparently led him to neglect the sources and expressions of social conflict. It is indeed true that Durkheim’s criminology is based on certain assumptions: for example, that law tends to stem from and reflect widely held social values, that crime is a breach of these shared values, and ,that an examination of the political factors that influence the definition of certain actions as criminal is not necessary. A sustained disagreement with such assumptions was an important theme in the works of Marx and Engels. We now turn to their writings about the relationships between law, on the one hand, and poWer and domination on the other. ifl.3 fliassicai Marxism: Marx and Engels on State, Law, and firime Ari introduction'to the emergemie of sociological criminology would be seriously in- I complete without an analysis of the perspectives of the authors of classical Marxism: ‘ Karl Marx (1818—1883) and his colleague and friend Friedrich Engels (1820—1895). Be- fore outlining the various claims Marx and Engels made concerning the nature of crime, we briefly consider certain key concepts of their writings. Key Concepts of Marxism The deveIOpment of Marxianltheory can be traced to Marx and Engels’ initial accep— tance, subsequent rejection, and'ultimate transcendence of early nineteenth-century German idealist phiIOSOphy. In his very first writings in the 18405, Marx strongly op- pOSed the idea that history and social change reflect such idealist factors as God, the in.- tellect, reason, the spirit, and the progress of civilization. Marx gradually developed a materialist concept of historical change. His materialism combined the ideas of English political economists (such as Malthus, Ricardo, Bentham, and Say) and French social- ists (including Saint—Simon, Lassalle, and Fourier), forging them into a new theory ' termed "historical materialism.” Marxism is based on the concept that althoughhuman beings make their own his: tory, they do not do so entirely as they choose "The history of all hitherto existing soci— ' ety,” Marx and Engels famously declared, “is the history of class struggles" (Marx, 196 9a: 1 08). During such struggles sooial classes actively create and recreate the condi— tions of their existence. At the same time, the very existence of social classes means that members of a society cannot live exactly as they would choosc. Social claSSes, therefore, also constrain secial relationships. Class position is an important determinant of such basic life events as social mobility, consciousness, level and types of education and-in— come, leisure patterns, and (as we see later) the likelihood of incarceration. What, then, did Marx and Engels understand by the term r‘social classes"? To graSp this term properly we begin with their concept of mode of production, which Marx iJl A ' E 5 l E i ‘ 302 Part III 4* Criminological Theory ‘ I _ ' _ analyzes carefully in his lengthy book Capital (1868). Analytically, the concept "mode of production" entails'tWO major elements: the means of production and the social rela- tions of production. , “Means of production" refers to specific types of technology, capital, labor, tools, machinery and equipment, monetary systems, and land. In combination, these items I are the necessary raw materials for producing commodities. All these materials, com- bined in various ways, are required to produce commodities as different as bicycles and criminology textbooks. They are subject toalmost infinite variety. Commodities such as reading materials, for example, can be produced on stone tablets, papyrus, parchment, biodegradable paper, and computer discs. Commodities can also be produced, ex- changed, and sold on a small or a large scale and by capital—intensive or labor—intensive means. . - ' r . I “Social relations of production” refers to the many ways in which members of a so- ciety relate both to the possession (legal or otherwise) of the‘ means of production and to the distribution of the commodities that result from the process of production. For ex- ample, the productive process can occur in the institutional context of private or com— munal relationships; it can occur at home, in fields, or in factories; its participants can be slaves, free laborers, whiteacollar workers, bankers, landed gentry, industrialists, or state bureaucrats. The productive process can be more or less influenced by gender. It can be unaffected by or be dominated by political authority. ' , The means of production and the social relations of'production, in combination, compose a mode of production, In their theory of history, Marx and Engels identified several distinct modes of production: primitive communal, slave, feudal, Asiatic, capi- talist, socialist, and communist. Engels usually’but Marx almost never, saw such‘modes of production as definite stages through which all societies evolved. Several modes of production can exist in one Society. For example, until at least the Civil War in the 18605, slave, feudal, and capitalist modes of production all coexisted in the United States. Again, during the 19205, feudal, capitalist, and socialist modes of production all coexisted in the USSR. However, in any given society, one mode of production tends to dominate and lend its character to other aspects of social relationships (Marx, 1973). Any given society, depending on its dominant mode of production, has typical social <_ classes. Under capitalism—Marx’s primary focus—typical classes include the lumped- proletariat (the perennially unemployed, those “unfit” for work), the proletmdazflfikilled and unskilled workers), the middle class, and the capitalist class (those who own capital: industrialists, financiers, commercial speculators, and landlords). In capitalist societies the basic class struggle is between the capitalist class (bourgeoisie) and the working class (proletariat). The economic site of this particular struggle is the productive pro— cess; the struggle occurs over the distribution of the finite of this process. The capitalist class, on the one hand, strives to maximize profit from the unpaid labor of the working class. .Its income lies in rent, interest, and. industrial profit. The working class, on the other hand, strives to maximize wages. It attempts to do so by reducing the length of the working day, by compelling employers to pay higher wages, and by wresting from the capitalist class such conCessions as health insurance, _work—safety regulations, and job security. The goals of the capitalist class and the working class are thus mutually exclu— sive. Typically, the one maximizes its return from the productive process at the expense of the other. ' - ' :: A ll Chapter 10 a» The Emergence of Sociological Criminology 303 For Marx and Engels, then, social claSSes are determined chiefly by their economic position within a given mode of production. The relationships among classes are rarely fixed; they vary aCCording to changes in the political and economic power of one side or another. However, in Marxian analysis the basic source of conflict in capitalist societies is between those who own the means of production and those who have” no source of in~ come other than their labor. This exploitive situation is inherently unstable and, Marx and Engels asserted, tends to lead toward socialism. Under socialism the means of pro- - duction are socialized and class struggles begin to evaporate. We note here the great importance of political power to the maintenance, develop— ment, or rupture of a mode of production and the class relationships associated with it. Maintenance of class relationships ultimately depends on coercion. Sometimes this co- ercion is quite naked; usually it is a subtler process. The relationship between economic position and political power——and, indeed, between economic position and many other ' aspects of social lifewMarx often depicted in terms of the metaphorical “base and su- perstructure." He once described the relationship between economy and politics in the following terms: ' 1-, .. In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indis— pensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which corre- i I spend definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material a life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It isnot the consciousness of men that determines their'being, but, on the contrary, their so- , cial being that determines their consciousness. (1969c2503w504) The mode of productionthus conditions the life process in general. It does so with a mechanism Marx and Engels term ideology. Ideology has several meanings 'in their writings. First, it refers to any set of structured beliefs, values, and ideas. Examples in— clude bourgeois ideology, proletarian ideology, and legal ideology. Bourgeois ideology, for example, refers to beliefs and values—wsuch as thriftiness and respect for private property—typically held by bourgeois (capitalist) classes. In capitalist seciety, the ideas . ‘r of the capitalist hlass tend to be the ruling ideas. 7 I Second, ideology refers sometimes to a set of mistaken or falsc beliefs. “Ideology is a process," wrote Engels, “accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness” (1970d:496). Marx often attacked religious beliefs (“the opium of the masses”), not only because he believed they alienatedpeOple from each other but also because religious beliefs wrongly assumed the existence of God. In the same context, Marx sometimes contrasted ideology with science: Ideology is false be- lief; science is correct belief. I Finally, and most difficult, the term “ideology” refers to a set of beliefs that both re— flect social reality and simultaneously distort it. To help understand this dual process, think of a straight stick standing upright in a pool of water. In this situation the image conveys the appearance that the stick is bent. Thus, the image is both a reflection of . physical matter ( governed by the laws of Optics) and a distortion of it (the stick is not ac- tually. bent). This final meaning of ideology, then, refers to :a process whereby beliefs, _ ..UJ| 304 Part III e Climatological Theory deriving from real sooial relationships, hide or mask the precise nature of such relation- ' ships. Certainideas, such as those associated with justice fulfill the ideological func- tion of masking from exploited classes the nature of their oppression and its precise source. . This final meaning of ideology was especially important for Marx and Engels’s anal- ysis of state and law. Here the institutions and doctrines of state and law play a key role in the dominance-of bourgeois ideology. Etate and Law Marx and Engels used the term “state” to refer broadly to the organs of political au- thority and to the ideological processes that underpin the legitimacy of this authority, including the standing army, police, bureauCracy, clergy, and judicature. Generally, Marx and Engels saw the state both as a- product of society at a certain level of develOp- ment and as aninstitution that seemingly stands above society. However, this apparent ability to stand above society and represent itself as neutral and independent of class struggles is in fact an ideological distortion, inasmuch as the state and its various com- ponents are actually manipulated by the dominant class. _ The state thus has a class character. In capitalist societies the state is typically a weapon or instrument manipulated by the capitalist classes, though Marx realized that state activities are not always so simple. For example, in one analysis of French politics, - Marx (1969b). described how the French state represented the interests of millions of smallholding peasants. In this sort of scenario, the state can be a prize actively pursued by contestants in the class struggle. ' - . Law is a crucial component of the state apparatus. In class societies law is en- dowed by Marx and Engels with several functions (Cain and Hunt, 19-79). First, law tends to reflect and promote the interest of the dominant class in private property. It does so by promoting and protecting all private property, therebyobscuring the fact that the vast majority of property is owned by only a tiny fraction of the population. Law fulfills this function through constitutions, through statutory and case law, and, with support from agencies of the criminal justice system, by enforcing compliance with its commandments. Second, law operates as a central mechanism of bourgeois ideology. Through such notions as "justice" and “fair play,” law promulgates the idea that it is in- dependent of economic and political interests and that it can mediate conflicts in the in- terests of the whole society. But in class societies law cannot do this: To apply law fairly and equally in a society of inequality is merely to perpetuate inequality. Legal doctrines - such as "the rule of law” and "equality before the law" are thus no more than fictions de- signed to lull the populace into believing that law truly does stand above Society as an activated when the legal system represses the working Iclass‘ and its organized political movements. Criminalization as a Violation of Rights In certain of Marx’s writings the process of criminalization was described somewhat ii moralistically as a violation by the state of some natural or inalienable human rights. f . impartial arbiter. Finally, law acts as a repressive apparatus. Typically, this function is F g Q . Jl _. Chépfer 10 “it The Edi-97391103 0f Sociological Criminology 305 Thustin commenting on a decrease in the official crime rate in Britain between 1855 and 1858, Marx complained: » - This apparent decrease of crime, however, since 1854, is to be exclusively attributed to some technical changes in British jurisdiction; to the Juvenile Offenders’ Act . . . and to the Criminal Justice Act of 1855, which authorizes the Police Magistrates to pass sentences fOr short periods, with the consent of the prisoners. Violations of the law are generally the off3pring of economical agencies beyond the control of’the leg— islator. . . [but] it depends to some degree on official society to stamp certain viola,» tions of its rules as crimes or as transgressions only. This difference of nomencla- ture, so far from being indifferent, decides on the fate of thousands of men, and the moral tone of society. (Quoted in Cain and Hunt, 19795189) In one of his very first articles—written in 1842 when he wasa radical journalist in Prussia—Marx (1975a) attacked censorship laws because they violated real freedom of expression. By “real” freedom Marx meant not only freedom to do certain things but also freedom not to be exploited by others. In another 1842 article—which led him even- tually to study economic relationships—Marx (1975b) discussed a Prussian law, en- acted by the Rhineland ASSembly, onlthe theft of wood. Despite a serious shortage of firewood and a depression in the local wine industry, this draconian law made it a cri- _ minal offense for anyone to collect and pilfer fallen wood in private forests. Marx at- tacked this law as a blatant undermining of what had been a customary right of the Rhenish peasantry since the sixteenth century. ' Grime and Demoraiization There is another way in which Marxian writings argued that criminalization vio- lates rights. Many of Marx and Engels’s writings analyzed the capitalist mode of produc— tion, and it is difficult not to believe that they thought capitalist production was'unjust. Thus Marx (1859) wrote in the New York Daily Ii'z'bnnetcommenting on the lot of the ' Irish peasantry: “There must be something rotten in the core of a social system that in—' creases its wealth without diminishing its miscry, and increases in crimes even more rapidly than in numbers." For Marx, the social system assooiated with capitalist pro- duction was unjust partly because it permitted others (namely, capitalists) to profit Vfi‘om workers’ labors. It is a simple matter of historical record that from the birth of industrialization to the time when Engels wrote Condition of the Working Class in England (1845), British capitalism spawned gruesome living and working conditions for the mass of the popu— lation. Sometimes these conditions led to competition among members of the working class, and hence to crime (Engels 1975a). In Marxian analysis these conditions led to massive demoralizatiOn. This psychological condition, in its turn, led either to crime or to rebellion. ' ' The linking of crime and demoralization is a vivid and recurring theme in many of Marx and Engels’s more polemical passages. Thus Engels wrote that the working class 15 ‘ ' . - { cast out and ignored by the class in power, morally as well as physically and men‘— tally. The only provision made for them is the law, which fastens upon them when i! g; i l i. ' which they see no other means of escape” (p. 412). 306 Part III 4" Criminologicai Theory they become obnoxious to the bourgeoisie. Like the dullest of brutes, they are treated to but one form of education, the whip, in the shape of force, not convincing but intimidating. There is, therefore, no cause for surprise if the workers, treated as brutes, actually become such. (1975b:411—412) In another passage, Engels blamed the appalling conditions at home and at work for {I the criminality of the working class in Manchester. These conditions produced demoral- ization that, in turn, fostered widespread “drunkenness, sexual irregularities, brutality, and disregard for the rights of property" (p. 421). Engels also suggested a different form that demoralization might take: “True, there are, within the working class, numbers too moral to steal even when reduced to the utmost extremity, and these starve or commit suicide; . . . numbers of the poor [actually] kill themselves to avoid the misery from Crime and Primitive Reheiiion ‘ One alternative to demoralization was rebellion. In Capital (1868), Marx docu— mented the rebellion of the British working class against the harsh emergence of indus— trial capitalism. As a class, British workers first manifested opposition to the bourgeoi- sie by resisting the introduction of machinery; the Luddi‘tes even smashed it or attempted to assassinate manufacturers. "Theft," said Engels "was the most primitive ferm of protest” (1975b:502—503). ‘ Although Marx and Engels identified certain working—class crime as rebellion, they did not look on it favorably. Doubtless they shared with their contemporaries a puritan assessment of the activities of the dangerous class. In addition, Marx and Engels con- demned such forms of re- bellion as having no value for working—class revolu- tionary consciousness. Thus Engels lamented that wor — ing—class crime is “the earli— est, crudest, and least fruit- ful form. of this rebellion” (p. 502). EISewhere, Marx and Engels analyzed the class allies on which the working class could realisti— cally depend for the growth of its revolutionary move-' ment. ,Within that context, they complained: "The 'dan— gerous class,’ the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the low- ' est layers of the Old society, industrialization on the English working class in the i8405: dangerous workin may, here and there, be conditions,poverty, open sewars, air— and water-borne diseases, and street crime. rifts _.._ ll Chapter 10 t The Emergence of Sociological Criminology 307 1 swapt into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue” (1848:118). Evauation of Marxism ' Marx and Engels’s writings are an important part of the develOpment of sociological ‘ criminolOgy. Their writings, like Durkheim’s, haveendured among criminologists be: cause they offer a radical, sociological approach to crime in capitalist societies. Crime, in their view, is not caused by moral or biological defects in individuals but by funda- mental defects in a society’s social organization. Marx and Engels saw crime, as Durkheim did, as an inevitable feature of existing so— cial organization. Unlike Durkheim, they believed that crime is inevitable because it is - an expression of basic social and class inequalities. Working-class crime, especially, re- sults from demoralization and occasionally turns to primitive rebellion. The extent of crime and its forms, they suggested, should be understood in the context of the specific state, legal system, and class relationships associated with a given mode of production. Yet Marx and Engels did not explain crime simply by reference to economic factors. They clearly understood that crime involves a political process in which the state criminalizes certain conduct and in so doing often reflects the interests not of society as a whole but of certain groups within it. Crime, Marx and Engels sometimes suggested, was a form of rebellion against this process. This idea was taken up by criminologists in. the 19703 and 19805 (see Chapters 13.3, 13.4). . ' Marx and Engels never seriously addressed certain basic questions about the nature of crime. Why, for example, are some actions defined as criminal but others are not? Be— cause they did not consider this definitional question, Marx and Engels, like most of their Victorian contemporaries, tended to accept that crime is a violation of moral or good conduct. In arguing, therefore, that the lumpenproletariat and the unskilled work— ing class engage in the great bulk of this conduct, they generally ignored the different ' types of crime committed by different classes. Finally, the writingsof Marx and Engels contain no analysis of the links between crime and other forms of social inequality (See Chapter 3 ), Review This chapter outlined the early forms of sociological criminology, which derived many theories and concepts from problems identified in the basic social organization of societies. This linking of crime and social organization was, and is, the key-feature of so- ciological criminology. These ideas indelibly influenced the subsequent development of criminological theory. Toward a Social Psychologyot‘ Crime: Gabriel! Terrie . i. Tarde developed a theory about the causes of crime that attempted to combine individualistic and sociological concepts. He was the leading critic. of such bio— logical theories of crime as LombrOSianism. ...J|_ A 308 Part III «6‘ Crit-ninological Theory _2. Tarde applied the concept of imitation to crime, thereby suggesting that, in addi— ' tion to the importance of sociological factors, individual mental states contrib- uted to the growth of crime. _ 3. Influenced by the growth of socialist and anarchist insurrections in France, Tarde pinpointed the imitative behavior of crowds and mobs as one of the lead- ing causes ofviolence in modern societies. ' Toward a Sociology oi“ Law and Crime: Ernie Durkheim 1. Emile Durkheim was one of the founders of sociological criminology. His writ- ings were an extremely successful attempt to integrate a theory of crime with a theory of law. His analysis of crime and punishment exerts great influence on modern criminology. 2. Durkheim’s sociological method was based on the idea that societies can be fully understood only by the scientific method of positivism. Like Quetelet’s social me- chanics, Durkheim's criminology attempted to find regularities in criminal be- havior. ' , 3. Durkheim’s criminology began with the belief that types of law and types, of so- cial solidarity were intimately connected. Mechanical solidarity is associated with repressive law; organic solidarity is associated with restitutive law. During the evolution from mechanical to organic solidarity, the volume of repressive law declines relative to other forms of law. This-is one way of explaining the broad transformation in penal strategies that accompanied-the Enlightenment and classical criminology (see Chapter 9.1). ‘ 4. Durkheim argued that the function of punishment is to maintain and strengthen social solidarity rather than to repress crime. Crime is a normal, inevitable, and useful form of social activity. Detailed analyses of crime in Durkheim’s works concentrate on suicide and homicide. Both of these crimes testify to the sociolog- ical causes of crime and, especially, to the effects of anomie and egoism on them. 5. Durkheim argued that forms of punishment have varied in history according to two laws. Quantitatively, punishment has tended to be more repressive the less developed the society and the more absolute the power of the central authority. ; Qualitatively, the more developed the society, the more imprisonment tends to become its dominant form of social control. Classicai Marxism: Marx and Engeis o grate, Law, and Crime 1. Marx and Engels's writings on state, law, and crime were set in the context of their sociological analysis of modern capitalist societies. 2. The key concepts of Marx and Engels’s sodology are social classes, mode of pro- duction, means of production, social relations of production, and ideology. The articulation of these concepts defines the movement of social relatiOnships thronghout history, although their primary concern was with relationships in capitalist societies.- r, Chapter 10 t The Emergence of Sociological Criminology 309 3. Marx and Engels generally insisted that the institutions of state and law, and the doctrines that emerge from them, serve the interests of the dominant economic class. The state arises from class struggles and gives the false appearance of inde- pendence from serial classcs. Law is endowed with several functions: It defends and enforces existing preperty relationships, and in class societies it does so in the context of unequal ownership of property; it acts as an ideological mecha— nism, promoting respect for private property; and in moments of acute class struggle, it acts as a mechanism of repression. 4. Marx and Engels offered a view of crime and capitalism that differed greatly from the social contract and free—will theorists of the Enlightenment. They de~ fined crime in three ways: as a violation by the state of natural or human rights, as a result of the demoralization caused by the gruesome conditions of industrial capitalism,'and as a form of primitive rebellion. - Questions for Class Discussion 1. What did Durkheim mean when he said that "crime is normal"? Are societies with high crime rates necessarily worSe off than societies with low crime rates? 2. Is crime inevitable? If so, under what circumstances? 3. Can you describe the social organization of a future society in which crime has ' disappeared entirely? - Site” may Readings ‘ v Garland, David. 2001. T he Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contempo- rary Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Greenberg, David E, ed. 1993. Crime and Capitalism: Readings in Marxist Criminol— , Ogy. 2nd ed. Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield. , . Websites 1. <http:l/www.relst.uiuc.edu/durkhei1n>: This site provides readers with biograph- ical and academic summaries of Durkheim's work. Also listed is information about how to join an e-mail discussion list related to Durkheim. I 2. <http:-//www.spu.eduf-uhawlo’marxh.html> :' This site provides summaries of , Marx’s and Engels’s writings, including The Communist Manifesto. There is also a useful link to “contemporary Marxism” for those who wish to explore the current state of Marxism. 3. <http:J/www.runet.edu/~lridener/DSS/DEADSOC.HTML>: This is a website funded by the American Sociological Association, the National Science Founda— ...
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