Week 4 Liberalism & Interdependence- Keohane, Oye, Moravcsik

Week 4 Liberalism & Interdependence- Keohane, Oye, Moravcsik

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International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? Robert O. Keohane p. 119-126 (p. 119-121) Complex interdependence led to study of international institutions encompassing “international regimes”: structures of rules and norms that could be more or less informal o Ex. (p. 120) International trade regime: no formal rules or centralized management but provided a set of interlocking institutions Institutions allow for states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing transaction costs (p. 121) o Don’t centralize enforcement of agreements o Reinforce practices of reciprocity incentives for governments to keep own commitments to ensure others will States uncertain about interests of rivals/partners therefore less likely to enter into agreements with them o International institutions reduce uncertainty by promoting transparency and honesty and monitoring compliance of governments with their commitments Domestic institutions might have to change in order for international institutions to work Yesterday’s Controversies: 1989-95 p. 122-123 Criticism (p. 122) 1. International institutions are insignificant since only states wield real power in world politics Ex. Weakness of UN to achieve collective security against aggression by great powers effects of international institutions were because of great powers that backed them up Counter argument: Overstated; even US has influence over institutions but decision-making procedures and rules of institutions effect the willingness of states to accept them and adopt such policies 2. Anarchy: States preferring relative gains over absolute gains Ex. American-Soviet arms race focused on relative positions Counter argument: Only applicable in bilateral competition where one states’ gains influence power relationship; not in most issues of cooperation (trade, climate change) that involve multilateral negotiations and therefore gains are harder to determine 3. Cooperation not harmonious (p. 122-123) : emerges from disagreement and takes place through bargaining Increases in number and scope of cooperative multilateral institutions emerge from potential joint gains from cooperation (p.123)
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Bargaining problems potentially produce obstacles to achieving joint gains Ex. Kyoto Protocol U.S. Senate and developing countries Institutions provide ‘focal points’ to which competing actors may agree, but not all issues have institutions Today’s Debates (p. 123) Bargaining dependent on beliefs of states, not just resources and pay-offs Institutional arrangements influenced by: o Authority over agenda Ex. Jacque Delors (p.123) o Voting/consensus arrangements used, interpretation of ambiguities Ex. Kyoto Conference (p.123) o Participants blocking implementation of ratified agreements Ex. GATT (p.123) Procedures and rules on international institutions create informational structures (p.124)
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This note was uploaded on 08/26/2010 for the course POLI 244 taught by Professor Saideman during the Fall '07 term at McGill.

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Week 4 Liberalism & Interdependence- Keohane, Oye, Moravcsik

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