Banking and Monetary Policy_Butkiewicz_Date__051810

Banking and Monetary Policy_Butkiewicz_Date__051810 -...

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Chapter 16 continued 17: high inflation by their standards, moderate by world standards—New Zealand - Tied to idea that more independent= less inflationary 19: natural tendency is to blame someone else for problems - Example: investment banks and speculators 20: Congress wants to assert its own goals 21: time consistency problem- if worry too much about stabilizing will ultimately increase inflation 22: Bernanke wants inflation to be Feds goal 30: very clear pressure was intention of Nixon Talked about so much history! 32: European Central Bank (ECB) talks about target for money growth rules 34: if nothing is done, increase inflation and will stay higher (due to shock) - 36: strict example: ECB - “constrained discretion” – we use discretion with limits; always want to end up at
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Unformatted text preview: inflation target but have flexibility on how we get there 38: all at some point adopted inflation targeting 41: 1982- before 08 crisis the economy looked much more stableGreat Moderation -This was pretty much a jinx 43: inverted yield curve is because people expected rates to be lower in the future (gold standard time) 51: transparency- tries to set rules/guidelines-Maybe more accountable 55: future decisions generated a lot of attention Final 5/25 10:30 AM in classroom-50 multiple choice questions o 10 from chapters 1-5 o 10 from chapters 6-10 o 30 from chapters 11-16...
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This note was uploaded on 08/29/2010 for the course ECON 302 taught by Professor Abrams during the Spring '08 term at University of Delaware.

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