PoliticalLaw_CaseDigests_2018.pdf - POLITICAL LAW 2018...

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Unformatted text preview: POLITICAL LAW 2018 Cases DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018 Cases) BY: DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 CHERIE ANNE R. BUZON Officer-In-Charge ATTY. LEAN JEFF M. MAGSOMBOL Adviser ATTY. NILO T. DIVINA Dean 1 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 Abelende, Arra Jean S. Amosin, Airon Jeunne B. Arzadon, Izzel Jarviz M. Aumentado, Reymundo Jr. P. Basbas, Lorane Angeli L. Bernabe, Sherissa Marisse Bool, Leanne Claire M. Buzon, Cherie Anne R. Buzon, Janice Belle T. Caburao, Caitlin P. Camilon, Paola E. Caparas, Aya Dominique S. Castillo, Arleigh Shayne A. Cruz, Karizza Kamille M. Cruz, Regina Annel S. Cuevas, Juliane Erika C. Curiba, Rochelle Nieva D. Dabu, Annabelle O. De Dios, Cathlyn Audrey M. De Villa, Karen A. Dela Cruz, Ma. Clarissa M. Delos Santos, Ma. Alyanna DC. Depano, Machgielis Aaron R. Dioneda, Cianel Paulyn M. Dumelod, Ricka Abigael R. Fernandez, Ma. Czarina A. Flores, April Anne T. Fronda, John Edward F. Gomez, Rose Anne Joy D. Guanga, Airei Kim P. Lacap, Hannah Camille N. Magallon, Andrea D. Manalastas, Claudette Irene Manguiat, Julie Ann C. Opina, Louis- Mari R. Pacumio, Daverick Angelito E. Pasigan, Lovely Joy E. Rabino, Christian Jade R. Ramirez, Edrea Jean V. Ramos, Yurii C. Reyes, Alarice V. Reyes, Joanna Marie Salvador, Kharina Mar V Samson, Kristel L. Santos, Nikki Tricia R. Sanvictores, Ruth Mae G. Sarmiento, Arianna Laine T. Sarmiento, Ian Timothy R. Sim, Lance Lester Angelo Soriano, Manuel Joshua O. Sugay, Alexandra Nicole D. Teves, Jan Matthew V. 2 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL TABLE OF CONTENTS I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. Preliminary Provisions And Basic Concepts.............................................................................4 Legislative Department .....................................................................................................................7 Executive Department .......................................................................................................................20 Judicial Department ...........................................................................................................................27 Constitutional Commissions ..........................................................................................................35 Bill Of Rights .........................................................................................................................................41 Citizenship ..............................................................................................................................................113 Law On Public Officers ......................................................................................................................118 Administrative Law ............................................................................................................................201 Election Law ..........................................................................................................................................225 Local Governments ............................................................................................................................234 National Economy And Patrimony .............................................................................................255 Social Justice And Human Rights ..................................................................................................268 Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture And Sports ................................................270 The Family .............................................................................................................................................274 Amendments Or Revisions Of The Constitution ....................................................................274 Public International Law .................................................................................................................274 3 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW I. PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS AND BASIC CONCEPTS A. National territory B. Declaration of principles and State policies C. Separation of powers D. Checks and balances E. State immunity THE CITY OF BACOLOD, HON. MAYOR EVELIO R. LEONARDIA, ATTY. ALLAN L. ZAMORA AND ARCH. LEMUEL D. REYNALDO, IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS OFFICIALS OF THE CITY OF BACOLOD, PETITIONERS, -versus- PHUTURE VISIONS CO., INC., RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 190289, THIRD DIVISION, January 17, 2018, VELASCO JR., J. No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can thus be implied from the mere conferment and exercise of the power to issue business permits and licences. Accordingly, there is merit in petitioners' argument that they cannot be sued by respondent since the City's consent had not been secured for this purpose. Injury alone does not give respondent the right to recover damages, but it must also have a right of action for the legal wrong inflicted by petitioners. In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et injuria that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. Considering that respondent had no legal right to operate the bingo operations at the outset, then it is not entitled to the damages which it is demanding from petitioners. FACTS: The instant case stems from the Petition for Mandamus and Damages filed by respondent Phuture Visions Co., Inc. (Phuture) on March 5, 2007 against petitioners City of Bacolod, Hon. Mayor Evelio R. Leonardia, Atty. Allan L. Zamora (now deceased) and Arch. Lemuel D. Reynaldo. On January 10, 2007, Phuture applied for the renewal of its mayor's permit with "professional services, band/entertainment services" as its declared line of business, providing the address of the business as "RH Building, 26 Lacson Street, Barangay 5" instead of SM Bacolod where respondent's bingo operations was located. Upon submission of the requirements on February 19,2007 and while the application was being processed, Phuture was issued a "claim slip" for it to claim the actual mayor's permit on March 16, 2007 if the requirements were found to be in order.However, petitioners found discrepancies in Phuture's submitted requirements, wherein the application form was notarized earlier than the amendment of its Articles of Incorporation (AOI) to reflect the company's primary purpose for bingo 4 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL operations. Aside from this, respondent failed to pay the necessary permit fee/assessment fee under the applicable tax ordinances of the City of Bacolod. Without waiting for the release of the mayor's permit, respondent started the operation of its bingo outlet at SM Bacolod. This prompted the former City Legal Officer, Atty. Allan Zamora, to issue a Closure Order dated March 2, 2007, pursuant to City Tax Ordinance No. 93-001, Series of 1993, which declares unlawful for any person to operate any business in the City of Bacolod without first obtaining a permit therefor from the City Mayor and paying the necessary permit fee and other charges to the City Treasurer. The Closure Order was presented by petitioners' representative to respondent's lawyers to negotiate a possible peaceful solution before its implementation. However, respondent simply ignored the information relayed to them and thus, at around 6:00 a.m. on March 3, 2007, the Composite Enforcement Unit under the Office of the City Legal Officer implemented the Closure Order. In a Decision dated March 20, 2007, the RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary mandatory order and dismissed the case for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA partially granted the appeal by affirming the trial court's denial of the application for a temporary mandatory order but reversing the dismissal of the suit for damages and ordering the case to be reinstated and remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners’ argued that hearing the action for damages effectively violates the City's immunity from suit since respondent had not yet obtained the consent of the City Government of Bacolod to be included in the claim for damages. They also argue that the other petitioners, the City Mayor and other officials impleaded, are similarly immune from suit since the acts they performed were within their lawful duty and functions. Moreover, petitioners maintain that they were merely performing governmental or sovereign acts and exercised their legal rights and duties to implement the provisions of the City Ordinance. Finally, petitioners contend that the assailed Decision contained inconsistencies such that the CA declared mandamus to be an inappropriate remedy, yet allowed the case for damages to prosper. In its Comment, respondent Phuture argues that the grounds raised by petitioners should not be considered since these were only invoked for the first time on appeal. Aside from this, respondent asserts that the case for damages should proceed since petitioners allegedly caused the illegal closure of its bingo outlet without proper notice and hearing and with obvious discrimination. ISSUES: 1. Whether petitioners have given their consent to be sued. (NO) 2. Whether petitioners can be made liable to pay respondent damages. (NO) RULING: 1. Petitioners have not given their consent to be sued The principle of immunity from suit is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which states that "[t]he State cannot be sued without its consent." The purpose behind this principle is to prevent the loss of governmental efficiency as a result of the time and energy it 5 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL would require to defend itself against lawsuits.The State and its political subdivisions are open to suit only when they consent to it. Consent may be express or implied, such as when the government exercises its proprietary functions, or where such is embodied in a general or special law. In the present case, respondent sued petitioners for the latter's refusal to issue a mayor's permit for bingo operations and for closing its business on account of the lack of such permit. However, while the authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is granted by the Local Government Code (LGC), which also vests local government units with corporate powers, one of which is the power to sue and be sued, this Court has held that the power to issue or grant licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the government's proprietary function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a governmental act. No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can thus be implied from the mere conferment and exercise of the power to issue business permits and licences. Accordingly, there is merit in petitioners' argument that they cannot be sued by respondent since the City's consent had not been secured for this purpose. This is notwithstanding petitioners' failure to raise this exculpatory defense at the first instance before the trial court or even before the appellate court. As this Court has repeatedly held, waiver of immunity from suit, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred.[33] Moreover, it deserves mentioning that the City of Bacolod as a government agency or instrumentality cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.[34] Estoppel does not also lie against the government or any of its agencies arising from unauthorized or illegal acts of public officers.[35] Hence, we cannot hold petitioners estopped from invoking their immunity from suit on account of having raised it only for the first time on appeal. 2. Petitioners are not liable for damages Based on the observations made by the trial court, it appears that respondent had no clear and unmistakable legal right to operate its bingo operations at the onset. Respondent failed to establish that it had duly applied for the proper permit for bingo operations with the Office of the Mayor and, instead, merely relied on the questionable claim stub to support its claim. The trial court also found that the application form submitted by respondent pertained to a renewal of respondent's business for "Professional Services, Band/Entertainment Services" located at "RH Bldg., 26th Lacson St." and not at SM Bacolod. These factual findings by the trial court belie respondent's claim that it had the right to operate its bingo operations at SM Bacolod. Certainly, respondent's claim that it had applied for a license for bingo operations is questionable since, as it had admitted in its Petition for Mandamus and Damages, the primary purpose in its AOI was only amended to reflect bingo operations on February 14, 2007 or more than a month after it had supposedly applied for a license for bingo operations with the Office of the Mayor. It is settled that a judicial admission is binding on the person who makes it, and absent any showing that it was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset such admission.[40] This admission clearly casts doubt on respondent's so-called right to operate its business of bingo operations. Petitioners, in ordering the closure of respondent's bingo operations, were exercising their duty to 6 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL implement laws and ordinances which include the local government's authority to issue licenses and permits for business operations in the city. This authority is granted to them as a delegated exercise of the police power of the State. It must be emphasized that the nature of bingo operations is a form of gambling; thus, its operation is a mere privilege which could not only be regulated, but may also very well be revoked or closed down when public interests so require. In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that injury alone does not give respondent the right to recover damages, but it must also have a right of action for the legal wrong inflicted by petitioners. In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et injuria that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. Considering that respondent had no legal right to operate the bingo operations at the outset, then it is not entitled to the damages which it is demanding from petitioners. II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT A. Legislative power 1. Scope and limitations 2. Principle of non-delegability; exceptions B. Houses of Congress; composition and qualification of members 1. Senate 2. House of Representatives a. District representatives and questions of apportionment b. Party-list system C. Privileges, inhibitions, and disqualifications ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, Petitioner, -versus- HON. EVANGELINE C. CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 101 AND ANTONIO L. TIU, Respondents. G.R. No. 223451, FIRST DIVISION, March 14, 2018, TIJAM, J. Parliamentary immunity refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question. It is, thus, clear that parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the lawmaker's speech or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in Congress, extraneous to the "due functioning of the legislative process."To participate in or respond to media interviews is not an official 7 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in nature," outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution. In this case, petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private respondent as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called Hacienda Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee hearings in the Senate.Contrary to petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary immunity to cause the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint. The privilege arises not because the statement is made by a lawmaker, but because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation. FACTS: Petitioner, as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, filed Proposed Senate Resolution No. 826 (P.S. Resolution No. 826) directing the Senate's Committee on Accountability of Public Officials and Investigations to investigate, in aid of legislation, the alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-storey Makati City Hall II Parking Building, the reported overpricing of the 22-storey Makati City Hall Building at the average cost of P240,000.00 per square meter, and related anomalies purportedly committed by former and local government officials. Petitioner alleged that at the October 8, 2014 Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-Committee (SBRS) hearing on P.S. Resolution No. 826, former Makati Vice Mayor Ernesto Mercado (Mercado) testified on how he helped former Vice President Jejomar Binay (VP Binay) acquire and expand what is now a 350hectare estate in Barangay Rosario, Batangas, which has been referred to as the Hacienda Binay. Petitioner averred that private respondent thereafter claimed "absolute ownership" of the estate, albeit asserting that it only covered 145 hectares, through his company called Sunchamp Real Estate Corporation, which purportedly entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with a certain Laureano R. Gregorio, Jr., the alleged owner of the consolidated estate and its improvements. Petitioner admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly during gaps and breaks in the plenary hearings as well as committee hearings, and in reply to the media's request to respond to private respondent's claim over the estate, he expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of the documents, private respondent appears to be a "front" or "nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of the actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Bina On October 22, 2014, private respondent filed a Complaint for Damagesagainst petitioner for the latter's alleged defamatory statements before the media from October 8 to 14, 2014, specifically his repeated accusations that private respondent is a mere "dummy" of VP Binay. Private respondent alleged that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in various businesses primarily in the agricultural sector, and that he has substantial shareholdings, whether in his own name or through his holding companies, in numerous corporations and companies, globally, some of which are publicly listed. He averred that because of petitioner's defamatory statements, his reputation was severely tarnished as shown by the steep drop in the stock prices of his publicly listed companies. 8 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL Petitioner in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss contended that his statements, having been made in the course of the performance of his duties as a Senator, are covered by his parliamentary immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. On May 19, 2015, public respondent issued the Orderdenying petitioner's motion to dismiss. In his Comment, private respondent contends that p...
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