40 Index - INDEX after-tax inteer aggregate demand.5...

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Unformatted text preview: INDEX after-tax inteer _. aggregate demand-.5; .. _. . — . .‘T..Ej'-5?4 _aggregatg'gkcea§§£iwafunction-, 573 airling indu'stry;f'é£fi ' ' all other jj allocation, 565, fair,_ 621—624 feasible, .565 .1 finai,'565 '_ _ _ initial endowméifié; allocation of 1-4 “chafing 856%; " appre'siatim, " E- rna-:29? .. I Anm’s- 'E'iimrrem, 616, 624 Arrow; Kehnfifii ' . asset-'Z_integration_h3fpe§hééis; 555 assets,"202. E I I ' assurafice gamgé, H I asymmetric information, £395= 712 auctions, 311—32;g '_ averagé cost, 3677369, ' 39‘s _ come, 370 I ' fixed, 366 long-run, 375, 376 pricing, 436 ' shortémn, 3T6 ' . variable, 368, 376, 393 - average cost. function, 359 axioms,_-35 I _ Wdfiending labor supply curve, ...'176:; -- - - 7 . "baa, 211, 81' - ' Bangladn'ash, 713 barriersto entry, 404 battle of the sexes, 524 behavioral economics, 548 behavioral game theory, 559 Benthamite welfare. function, 617 Bergson-Samuelson Welfare function, 621 Bertrand competition, 494 Bertrand equilibrium, 512 best response; 520 best reopense curves, 520 beta, 240, 246 bid increment, 312 bidding agent, 316 bidding pools, 440 bliss, 43 bond, 197 borrower, 186 boundary optimum, 76 bragketing, 552 budget constraint, 20, 21, 161, 179, 183, 184, 201 line, 22, 31 set, 21, 31 bulk discounts, 448 bundle-3., 457 capital, 323 financial, 323 physical, 323 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 24‘2- capital gains. 206 capital goods, 323 cardinal utility, 57’ came], 438! 495. 602, 511}, 513 catastrophe bonds, 219 A 5'; ENDEX 'celi phone industry, 65?" (21121111 rnio. :18 chit-kin. .527 Chinese economic reforms, Til] Choice behavior, 54-9 choice under uncertainty, 230, 553 Clarke tax classical utilitarian, ($17 Cease Theorem. 630, 631 Ci‘ibirDougias, 6’3, 82 demand, 113 preferences, 64, 72, 100 production function, 325 technology, 357 utility, 64, 93, 575 collusion, 48}, 496 command mechanism, 684 commitment, 5333 commitment device‘s“. 5-58 - cuimnon-value auctions, 312, 320 commons _ tragedy of, 641 ' commuting behavior, 68 comparative advantage, 603 ._ comparative statics, 9, 11, 18, 95, {86, 293, 309, 3-41 compensated demand, 14B - Compensated demand curve, 156 Compensating variation, 254—258, 262, 265 competitive. 570 behavior, 585 equilibrium, 572, 610 market, 5, 12, 14, 289, .334 _ market and Pareto efficiency, 306 complement, 111, 112, 115 _ gross, 112 complementary goods, 458, 658 complements, 650 complete preferences, 35, 616 . composite function, A8 composite good, 21, 182 Concave preferences, 82 utility function, 22-5 conditional factor denmnd, 3:56, 3653 - condominiums, 10 console. 19? constant. nvcrage cost. 39? (content, returns to scale, 331 333, 344. 350, 408 constant-electicit)’ denianri cnz‘vu, 2276, 4'27 constrained maximization, 91 ('rinsnraini, A l0 (‘(f{'JlL(JIl'll('. 38—1 marl-(ct, 384 consumer behavior, 548 consumer cl'ioicu, 548 consumer preferences, 54 consumer‘s surplus, 249,-; 309, 44c change in. 253 I gross, 249 . consumers’ surplus, 251. 441 consumption bundle, 21. 33 contingent, 217 _ externality, 585, 600 returns, 205 continuous function, 578, A2 contract curve, 568., 569;- Convex, 52, 225 I H _ indifference curves, 523 I I isoquant, 333 i preferences, 77, 5‘?8, 58 set, 47 7 technology, 326-327 cooperative game, 481 _ cooperative insurance, 229 coordination games, 524 corporation, $338, 1710 cost, 354, 363, 367 average, 367—370, 398 - average, fixed, 368 - ' average, long-run, 375' average. variable, 368,5 370;, 398 fixed, 362 _ ' long run, 360 ' ' long run, average, 330. long run, marginal, 37.9 marginal, 369*3'fl, 3918, 424 private, 635 . __ ' -- a, u ' short run, average,'.;3$fi_ variable, 368, 371' " costly information, 694' coupon, 19'? Conrnot - equiiibrium, 491', 597' model, 490e494 (lemiWcight loss. 308, 416, 441 due to monopoly, 431; 433 due to tax, 3i'iile302, 309 decentralized resource allocation, 606 _ decreasing; returns to scale, 3312 I' demand curve. 3, 4, ii}, 18, 107, 112, 157 curve facing the firm, 2384, 38:3. 398 elastic, 2'32, 282 -_ function, 13, 78, 95, 114 inelastic, 2272 ' reveiation, 13-57 1 demand curve the firm, 384 demanded bmidie,}_78-~ I dependent variable, A1" depietable reoofirc; 208 derivative, A5 derived factor demands, 356 diminishing marginal-,mte of subs-titu- tion, 52. " ' diminishing 'tecl'miiz;u13_r§te of subetitu- tion, 329- Diu'g, 44? dividend, down-sh? equilibriuni', iii: " " dominates, '_ 1% . game, 512 _ .. Dupuit, Em'i-iei. Dutch auction ,-- 3333’, 31$, ' _ _ . economic 313. economic magi: _" I, 421 Edgemrth 627 effmtive price-"2w ' ' aficiency, 15-; " Effitiem " Emilee? {6% elasticity, anti .. demand, eiectric‘ity, 152.7 ‘___ emiesion standaxdsi, endogenous variabie, 2' endowment, 160,:1637164, 178, 587, 629 of consumptioii,-1?3 of time, 1721 : endowment income effect. 169, 17.1., 172, 176 .. Engel curve, 97, 99, 102 English auction,.-312 entitlemE-nt progfam, 3420 entry, 403—405, 42.1, 516 deterrence, 516 envy,_'_622 iNDEX A}?! equation, A3 equiiibrium, 3, 7, 290, 572 analysis, 288, 291 in loan market, 303 price, $8, 10, 18, 289—290, 309 principle, 3, 18 with taxes, 296—305 equilibrium principle, 288 equilibrium strategy, 509 equitable, 622 equivalent Variation, 254—258, 262, 265 Wation auction, 317 1388, 534 _ estimation of preferences, 135 everyone pays auction, 317 evolutionetiiy stable strategy, 534 excess- burden, 302 " ' excess] demand, 14, 57-1, 573 excess risk'aversion, 555 execssive choice, 552 existcnce of a. competitive equilibrium, 5?”? . ekit, 403, 404, 421 exogenous variable, 2 expected return, 232, 236, 23'? expected utility, 223, 224. 555 eXpected utility function, 222, 230 expected value, 221, 224 expenditure share, 28] exponential discounting, 556 extensive form, 514 extensive margin, 269 external monopoiiet, 338 externaiities, 627. 630, 647, 658, 670, 681 consumption, 626 production, 600, 626 face Value, 197 factor demand, 343, 350 inverse function, 343 factors of production, 322 fair, 622 fair allocations, 621 fairness norms, 560 FCC, 311 feasible aliocatiou, 565 Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 311 final allocation, 565 financial 8.83915, 202 financial (mpital, 3‘23 fiilenciai institutions, 211 financiai instruments, 197 financial markets, 1.97, 33? First Theorem of 1Welfare Economics, 579, 585, 588, 599, 600, 64? A34 INDEX first-degree price discrimination, 445, 447’ first-order condition, A9 fixed cost, 362 fixed factor, 339, 349, 375, 411 fixed proportions, 40 fixed suppiy, 290 focal point, 525 food stamps, 29 food subsidy, 305 forest, 209 framed, 549 framing negative, 550 positive, 550 framing effects, 549 free dispose}, 326 ' free entry, 404, 40'? free rider, 675, 682, 687, 692 full income, 174 function, A1 continuous, 578 " future value, 184, 192, 201 _ game theory, 504, 554 . 'gasoline tax, 148 . general equilibrium, 564, 588, 610 .' Georgia Power Company, 152 Giffen good, 10$105, 114, 136, 144 Googie, 318 government—run monopolies, 43?. ' '_ Grameen Bank, 713 :,} graph, A2 - gross benefit, 249 . gross complements, 112. .' gross consumer’s surplus, 249 ' _ 2 gross demand, 167, 178, 571 ' gross demands, 161 1- gross substitutes, 112 ,_: Groves-Clarke tax, 689 hawk-dove game, 533 '_ Hicks substitution effect, 153-155, 158 ' hidden action, 701 hidden information, 701 ' homothetic preferences, 101 horizontal intercept, A5 horizontal supply curve, 290 housing rate of return on, 205 rental rate on, 205 tax treatment of, 263 liyperboiic discounting, 557 identity, A3 . implicit functions, 7} ' impiicit income, 174 ' index fund, '. index numbers, _ ' information «enemy; infremarg'inai, 4315. ' interest 'i'ste, 183%? ' implicit rentai rate, 205'? incentive compatibility constraint, 708' incentive systems, T06 if I income ' distribution, 26? g _ effect, 102, 137, 1141—141156, 179,5 252 expansion paths,.9T--1=D3 '- ofl'er curves, 97—103 " tB-X, 87 . - .- " income elasticity of ems-231 - increasing returns 331 independence independent variehgé i" I I indexing, 133 indifference, 34 . _ . _ _ indifference curve, 52, 56’? construction of, 56?: '2: ' '- '_ _ .- indirect reveaied ."121,-128, _ 130 - -- i " indiv'iduaiistic welfazeegicesn, 621, 625 industry equilibrium.- ‘ long run, 403 .I ' short run,'40‘2 _ industry's-“apply 3591.. inelastic, 282 . .. __ ;, inferior good, 96, Iii-4,3144, 3:56, 163, 281 -' ' inflation _ _ ' expected rate afielflii inflatiOn rate, 19031 1- . initial =endowm€ntg installment icons; 1951113366: 7.225? 69% intellectual properfijs $5 intensive margin, ' nominai, 190, res}, 190, 209 T__ interior optimum, 76 _ internal menopoii'st, 333:7- int-ernalization of predfieftion'externsii-5_ ties, 640 ' ' - internalized, 633 - ' _ int-ertemporai ' " i. budget constraint,=18£i" choice, 182 . .' intertem-porai choiees, .132 Inter’I‘rnst Technology, intransitive prefermoes, 58 intransitivity, ‘686 5 _ _ inverse demand function, .112, 113, 115, 268, 291 '- ' ' inverse function, A3 inverse supply function, 2.91. 25-32. 3%.” lraq, 306 - isocost- lines. 354 isoprofit curves-5, 486, 4:97 isopl‘ofit lines. 340, 483, 594, GU? isoquant, 32-1. 333, 354 isowelfare curves. 619 juint- produciion possibilitiefi set. iii-)3 kinky - tastes, T6 Kodak, 435 labor.- market, 284 _.- 1 . supply, Wild??? r - supply Curve, Ward bending, 1?? Lafier . ' -- curve, 284 effect, 284, 235 __ . Lagrange multiplied 92 . Lagrangian, 589,612, 625.. 593 Laspeyrefi '- price index, 132 quantity index, 131 Law 0f Demand; 14:7, 156 law Q'f dimizushlng marginal product. 3'29 Law of Large Numbers, 553 leisure, 175 lender. 186 level set, 5.9 -. linear demand, 42?: linear function, A4;- liquidity, 201, 204, $207 liquor licenses, 415} loans. 302 ' lock-in, 655 _. logarithm, A6 . _ ' long run, 17, 33B,- 333,‘ 339.. 350 average cost, 375, 380 marginal costs,.3?9 ' lung-run ' cost. function, 360 equilibrium. 406: supply curve, 397, 405. 4'2]. supply function, 395 loss averse, 555 lower envelope, 37.7 lump sum _ subsidy, 27, 31 '- taéc. 27 . luxury good, 101 ' iuxury'goods, 281 maintained hypothesis, 175i» majority votil':g_. 6'14 lNDl‘X :iizu’giiml ifhnngftf. EH marginal {3051, 369 37L 3.81.}, 395, ‘ :‘rrargiii‘cil product. 3'28. 32' , _ . :rmrgirial rate of sulmtitu’rhfiu, 15-52. till. TU 73, $0. 5712’. 6:14, 6m umrginal rate: ml nausibrmaliorr fill? 610 iriargéual revenue, 2?? 282. 42-l-l'25. :35ij marginal revenue product, 469 marginal utility, 65-67. 70 marginal willingnefirs in pay, 53., 114 market constraint... 384 demand, 266*?68, 281, 289. 385 envimnment, 384 equilibrium, 572 line, 243 portfolio, 24} supply, 289 system, 14 market supply Curve, 401 markup pricing, 427’, £141 maturity date, 197 maximum. A9 mean, 23-5 mean-variance model, 234 measured income, 17% median expenditure. 686 I‘x-‘licrusuft, 434 l'licrosofr Corporation, 390 minimum social welfare function. MS minimum. All minimum efficient scale 43?, '14] minimum “~ng 4711 mixed atrategies, mixed strategy, r308. 5'39 iubdel, 2. 8, 11 monitorng costs, 713 munnpo‘rist, 12, 14. 580 discriminating, 12, 1-4, 439—456, .58] monopolistic corripatition. 45677-463. :16?T 480 ruunopuly, 1‘2, 123, «iii. 409-5 (leadweight. loss. 4.33 governmum-rm], :13? im‘ffioucy, 130 nafural. -' " 441 P“.r€‘tn efficiélufy. l T mtmnpmny. 4371-473. {TE-l lumiotm'nci. 326, 333. All trzulaihrmatinn, (ST. fill, ‘ mm . mam; he" " RIB—DOS, . Tii‘cmlripal bonds, 2!}? mum-,1! fund, 35:4. 246 il'i‘iu'uully natured tlcrsirurtiuu, 415-4 IV [\J i_. A156 lNDEX Nash bargaining model, 543 Nash equilibria, 526 , Nash equilibrium, 506, 514, 518, 521, ' 652 natural monopoly, 435, 441 necessary condition, 77 necessary good, 101 " negative correlation. 240 negative framing, 550 negative monotonic function, A3 net buyer, 161 net consumer‘s surplus, 249 not demand, 161, 167, 178,'_ 571, 5 net present value, 195 ' net producer’s surplus, 260 ' I _' net seller, 161 not supplier, 161 Netscape Communications Corporation, 664 network externalities, 458, 658, 663 neutral good, 41, 81 .I no arbitrage condition, 204 nominal rate of interest, 190 nonconvex preferences, 82 ' nonconvexity, 598 I '. nonlabor income, 173 - nonlinear pricing, 448 normal good, 96, 114, 156, 163, 281 _- number portability, 657' numeraire, 26, 576, 593 objective function, A10 - .ofi'er curves, 97—103 oil, 207' _ . _ ' oligopoly, 480, 502, 516 -' online bill payment services, 65? . OPEC, 148, 311, 417 - .- '--'opportunity cost, 23, 174, 201, .335, 4134-, ' optimal choice, 73—78, 89 optimality condition, 162 ._ optimization principle, 3, 18, 288 _ ordinal utility, 55 ordinary good, 103405, 114 ordinary income eifect, 169 overconfidence., 558 overtime wage, 177 Paasche price index, 132 quantity index. 131 paradox of voting, 685 Pareto efficiency, competitive market, 306 . Polonius point, 185%; Pareto efficient, 15—16, 1.8, 306~309, 313,‘ 430, 446, 509, 518, 578-584, 589,- 604, 610, 627, 647, 672 ' ' allocation, 16, 568, 583, 588, 589 competitive market, 16 - discriminating monolielist,. 16 monopoly, 17 ' E ' rent. control, 17 ‘ Pareto improvernent;,s15,..17, 672, 673' _ Pareto inefficient, 15,,- . - ' Pareto set, 569 _ _ partial derivative, _ partial equilibriunr,f-'fifiii§.r_ ' participation . partnership, 336' __ _ _ V passing along a patent, 433 ' patent portfolios, 434 patent thicket, 434 ' patents, 434 I payoff matrix, 504 : ' perfect complementefillflififi, 7'9, 99-, 107, 147, 325 * ' ' -_ - perfect price discrimination,'445, .531 _ perfect substitutes", 38,- = ,6'1,‘ 7'8,- --99, 107, 147, 3:25 '- perfectly elastic,'29i3‘ - perfectly inelastic, 298 _' perpetuities, 197 philatelist auction, 313] physical capital, ' 323- Pigouvian tax, pivotal agent, 688' '- pivoted and shifted pollution, 645, 68—9,: pooling equilibrium, portfolio, 236 '- poeition auction, 33.1 positive affine tr __ positive framing, positive monotonicfi'ificfiem'A3 _' preference ' ordering, 58, 69 strict, 34 _ preference(s), 34, 35, 614' axioms, 35 I complete, 35 concave, 82 convex, 47 estimation, 135 _ maximization, 90 nonconvex, 82 _ _ over probability distributions, 217 reflexive. 35 ' single peaked, 685 strict, 34 transitive, 35 weak, 34 preferences reoovering, I22 preliminary injunction, 435 Drefiént Value, 134,192-194, 201, 232 of- couaumption, 2192 Of income, 192 of profits, 336 of-the firm, 33? _:; price aficmative roie of, 5'86 controls, 419 - ' discrimination, 445, 450, 467 distributive rule,“ 586 elasticizynf dermé, 2?0. 280 ioijifiwer, 481. ' - 1 . leader) 7' 487,:5 maker. 472 _ r '_ ' of-risk, 238,- 241? - ofier curve, 156,3}16L 5210 supports, 349 ': taker, 385, 47'? _ price discrimination, 452 Principle of Reva-sled Preference. 121 prisoner’s dilemma, 509, 512, 518, 526. 675 _ _f' private Goats, 634 _ private—Value aucticms, 312 probability distribution, 2.15 produoer’s surpius, 259260, 391, 398, 413, 441, 446 ,_ producers’ surplus; 309. product differentiation, 461 prodx'mtion _ externaiities, 603, 626 function, 323, 332, 592 poasibilities frontieryfim pos'sibilities_set;=£81, 603 sot, 323, 332 '5 _ tetfhniquw, 327 profit, 334~-335, 349, 391 economic... 335 iong run, 342—343 maximization, long run, 3-12 Short mmi 340—341 property rights, 629, 630, 6-17 proprietorship, 336 profit}: bidder, 316 public good, 671., 692 punishment. gamma, 56E) Punishmmrr strategy, 499 purchasing power,'137, 1-41, 156 pure competition, 1384 Pure exchange, 56.5 pure strategy, 50? purely competitive, 384 quality, 695 quaiin Choice. i395 quarit ity f'o‘riower, 481 leader, 482, «.189 subsidy, 12? tax. '37. 8?, 294 quasi—fixed 6055, 36:2 quasi-fixed factors. 339 quasilinear preferences, 63. 102, 115. 1-18, 631, 64?, 674, {579 utility, 63, 252, 258 randomize, 508 randomizing, 554 rank-order voting, 615 rate of change, A4 rate of excharige, 67, 7'? rate of return, 212 rationing, 28, 32 Rawisian social} welfare function, 618 reaction function, 483, 485 real interest mm, 190, "201 Real Time Pricing {RTE}, 152 real wage, I74 recovering preferences, 12‘2 reflexive, 1 53 reflexi‘ve preferences. 616 regulatory boards, 437' reinsurance market.., 219 relative prices. .75-576, 588 root, 1768. T11 control, 1-4 control and Pareto efficiency. 17' economic, 4]0----4i4, c123 seeking, 416 rental rate, 335 repeated games, 518 repreoematiw consumer, 267 reservation price, 4, 16, 109, 243, 269, 282, 659, (172 reserve price. 31'2 reoiduai claimant, 709 residual demand curve, 487 resource aim-cation, 18 (.ierzcntruiizod, 606, or; returns to soaks, 3:51, 363 and the cost function, ‘ .58 constant. 33}, 344, 350, 408 fieCI‘irzmirzg, 3332 increasing, 331 reveain preference, l2f}---122, 135, 154. 155, ['67 revealed profitability, 3453 revenue. 2T3 rights managmnent, 665 risk. 239 adjusted return, 243 adjustnumt-. 242 averse, 2’25 nverter, 230 lover. 2‘25, 230 neutral. 225 premium, 242 spreading, 229 : risk averse, 555 -.r_isi(—f1‘ee asset, 236, 239 risk1e3s arbitrage, 204 risky asset, 231-232, 236 taxation, 233 Robinson Crusoe economy, 591 rock paper scissors, 508 .Rubil'istein bargaining model, 543 sales tax, 27, 295 Isatiation, 43 . sealed-bid auction, 313 second derivative. A? Second Theorem of Welfare Economics. 584, 586-588, 600 second—degree price discrimination, 445. 448 second—order condition, A9 security, 39’? self select, 448 self—control, 557 f self—serving attribution bias, 558 ._separating equilibrimn, 704 sequential game, 481, 514, 516, 518 sequential moves, 535 "shadow prices, 590 - sharecropping, 712 ' _ shareholder voting rights, 710 'sheepskin effect, 706 ' short run, 17, 330, 333, 339, 350 ' average cost, 380 cost function, 360 supply curve, 421 uslnitrlown condition, 389 signaling, 70'2- simultaneous game, 481 sinnlltnneous moves, 535 j single peaked preferences, 68:3 . slope, -' Slutsky demand function, 1-57 equation, 156—158. 109, 170, 179, 18!], 1E7, 188 equation. with endowment. 1’51 Klein-it}: 1‘13 145 itiimtil rat-es oi change. 145 incmne efiect, 141—142 substitution effect, 152, 153 Smith, Adam, 41:10 smooth function, A3 social cost. 300. 633.. 635,643, .64? social norms, 546 ' social preference, 614, 684; Social Security, 133 _' social welfare function, 617' software suite, 457, '458 - solution, A3 - Southwest Airlines, '44? - stable equilibrium, 493 Stackelberg I '1' ' follower, 482 ' leader, 484 model, 481 7486, 514 standard deviation, 235 , state contingent security, £220 _ states of nature, 21?, 218, 230 stock market, 212, 229, 337 vaiue, 337 5 strategic choices, 518 _. strategic interaction,.. 480,: 504, 558 Strategy method, 569_ ' '- strict convexity, 48, .120 strict. preference, 34 , Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference {SARP}. 1‘28 subsidies, 306 ' - subsidy, 27, 32. 349 ._ ad valorsm, 27, 2§ .- foocl, 305 . ' lumpsum, 27,31 quantity, 27‘ .. substitute, 111, 115 gross, 112 ' __ _ _ substitution effect, 142. 153,]: 156 ' sufficient conditiori, Sun Microsystems, 4134' _' sunk cost, 362 sunk cost fallacy. 556. supply curve, Fin), 10, 17, 18, 161, 168,- 258, 289, 309, 393 " competitive firm, 387 horizontal, 290 industry. 401 inverse, 391 , long run, 39:3, 397, 405. 406, 4121 market, 289, 401 vertical. 2.90 supply infliction, 350 inverse, 291. 292 . _ switching costs, 555, 658. symmetric treatment, 624 takefit-or—Ieam-it, :83, 7'12 tangent, A6 __j ._ _ my:1 {11, 32, 87,-=199,'__‘294, 309, 408- ad Yabrem, I capital gains,_mflfi Clarke, 689 . .'- deadweigkgt“less,-SDDE~302. 309 gasdine, _' GIGVBSTCIarIfiBs-fiSQ ' lump sum-,7? . wiicfims - ' " Tab-TE??? 35.3 patient < ,_-} perfect $37 _ fi'giina’aion, 445,- time . béhavior ' time diaceantmg tinie- Masai; _' tit far tat, 51’ "5 _ 61 1 trahsfogmations transitiweg 616, 634 'uncm-tainty; 23:5 chflice- undeflflafl a: uniform pricing, {452 ; unis cost finntiQIi-,._3;58 . unit? elastic ._f2'?7, 282 umti‘éam mondiji‘iSt-gr 47"5 ' utility, 5a; -- functien, 5555.3, 61,69 possibilities frontier", 619 possibilities Set-7, 619- utility function _- concave, 225 vakué ', _-}2_? 322, 323,- 332, ENDEX A39 value of the margina! product, 47'0 wiqu tax, 27, 294 variable cost, 368 wiriable factor, 339, 3&9 variance, 235 Verizon W'ireless‘ 658 vertical intercept, A5 Vickmy auction. 313, 315, 316, 2318 van Neumann~Morgenstern utility flinc- ticn, 222 vatng gygtem, 684 mar, ?08,-- 712 in am, 308- iafag, 574," 5%, 588 gnaifiibfiizm, 572. " ' '- ' fi‘w.-.=Mmimi2a¢m . i:(-WACM2,--35?' . ' of Profit Maximization (WAPM), 346 -Wea3< Ax‘mm of Revealed Preference, 124 _"wea.k-preferém:e, 34, 47 weakly preferred set, 36 weighted-sum-of-utifities welfare func- tion, 617 .weifarefunctiOn, 613, 624 BergsoII—Samuelsen, 621 individualistic, 621, 625 Rawisian {minimax}, (2'18 welfare mmdmizafion, 625 wiLhehaVed indifference curve-s, 45 wail-behaved preferences. 45, 47‘ 527 186 windfall profits, 41? ' tax, 421 Winner‘s Surgef 32E) winner’s curse, 320 Yahoo, 318 zeta profits, 59? zero—sum games, 528 ...
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